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BOOKS

REVIEWED

KNOWLEDGE. By Michael Polanyi. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958. Pp. xiv, 428. $6.75.

PERSONAL

Michael Polanyi, scientist and philosopher, has written a remarkable volume
to argue the proposition that all knowledge is "personal." He says that the purpose of his book is "to show that complete objectivity as usually attributed to
the exact sciences is a delusion and is in fact a false ideal." (p. 18) In arguing thus, he proposes to move "towards a post-critical philosophy" in this
"enquiry into the nature and justification of scientific knowledge"1 in particular
and of knowledge in general. Polanyi regards knowing "as an active comprehension of the things known, an action that requires skill." In order to
achieve such active comprehension, whether theoretical or practical, "clues or
tools" have to be employed, and they, he says, are 'things used as such and not
observed in themselves." He sees these clues and tools as extensions of the body,
which change the comprehender's being. "Acts of comprehension are to this
extent irreversible, and also non-critical." (p. vii) The reason, he says, is that
"we cannot possess any fixed framework within which the re-shaping of our
hitherto fixed framework could be critically tested." (ibid.) These statements
indicate what Polanyi means by saying that knowledge is personal; there is a
"personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding." (ibid.)
Statements of this sort are familiar enough in the social sciences and jurisprudence, although they have at times been challenged by the protagonists of
certain methods, quantitative, positivist and the like, who desired to mold the
social sciences in the image of what they conceived to be the essence of natural
science. For those who oppose such notions it is of course exciting to hear a
scientist challenge this image as false and misleading.
How does he go about 'his task? He rejects at the outset the notion of
"subjectivism." The knowledge which science, all science, makes available to
the knower is more objective than the subjective opining of less informed persons. What is the meaning of "objectivity" when it is thus placed into the comparative context of more or less? That is the first task to which Polanyi addresses
himself; but before it is retraced, it may be well to indicate the general line
of his treatment. In a first part, he discusses "the art of knowing" under four
headings - "objectivity," "probability," "order," and "skills." In a second part,
he explores what he calls "the tacit component," which consists of "articulation,"
"intellectual passions," and "conviviality." This leads, as "conviviality" con1. These are subtitles of PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE title page & vii. References to this
volume will be given in parentheses without title; those to THE STUDY OF MAN (1959)
will be preceded by SM; occasional references to THE Looic oF LmERTY - REFLECTIONS
AND REjOINDERs (Chicago U. Press, 1951) will be preceded by LL. It may be worth
mentioning that Polanyi was enabled by his university (Manchester, England) to devote
nine years to the completion of this work, unencumbered by teaching duties.
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cludes with "post-Marxian liberalism," to the third part, in which "the justification of personal knowledge" is offered in terms of "the logic of affirmation"
(ch. 8), "the critique of doubt" (ch. 9), and "commitment." (ch. 10) Ontological issues are finally explored, in Part Four, by considering "the logic of
achievement" (ch. 11), "knowing life" (ch. 12), and "the rise of man." (ch.
13) Ultra-biology includes the noosphere.2 "This is the point at which the theory
of evolution finally bursts through the bounds of natural science and becomes
entirely an affirmation of man's ultimate aims." (p. 404) The noosphere consists of that which we consider true and right. In its service, we employ our
freedom; and a free society may therefore be defined as "a fellowship fostering
truth and respecting the right." As a true liberal, Polanyi adds that this sphere
"comprises everything in which we may be totally mistaken." (p. 404) All centers
of living being strive for this ultimate point of liberation, but man alone as far
as we know has achieved it. And he adds, as his last thought, that "that is also,
I believe, how a Christian is placed when worshipping God." (p. 405) Leaving
theology aside, how does Polanyi arrive at this conclusion?
"Understanding ourselves" calls for the recognition of "tacit" as well as
"explicit" knowledge. "We always know tacitly that we are holding our explicit knowledge to be true." The participation of man in the shaping of his
knowledge is thus inescapable, and while it impairs its objectivity, it does not
invalidate it. (SM 12-13) Exploring the ways in which knowledge is acquired
and showing that "fundamental novelty can be discovered only by the same
tacit powers which rats use in learning a maze" (SM 18), he asserts that all
mental operations of understanding "consist in comprehending experience, i.e.,
in making sense of it." This sort of insight leads to the recognition of the limitations in "Laplacean universal mechanics" which "induces the teaching that material welfare and the establishment of an unlimited power for imposing the
conditions of material welfare are the supreme good." (p. 142; SM 48-49)
The "tacit component" of knowledge constitutes the subject of the whole
of Part Two of PersonalKnowledge. It is explored in three chapters, dealing with
articulation, intellectual passions, and conviviality. The chapter on articulation
contains Polanyi's theory of language. This is, as everybody knows, one of the
hotly contested fields of contemporary philosophical interest and has been for
some time. He starts from the now well-established fact that man's intellectual
superiority over animals is almost entirely due to the use of language.S He proceeds to show that all linguistic symbolization involves a commitment to primary
experience which remains inarticulate. From this follows a consequence, namely,
that increasing formalization and symbolic manipulation imply decreasing contact with experience. "There is a corresponding variation in the tacit coefficient
of speech. In order to describe experience move fully language must be less
2. A term coined by P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN (1959).
Cf. esp. pp. 180-211. See also SM 60.
3. Polanyi himself states, 77, n, that he is not engaged in "constructing still another
theory of the origin of language," or arguing that language is either "expressive," "evocative" or "representative," but that he is taking off from what are generally agreed by

linguistic theorists to be the "three main kinds of utterances, namely: (1) expressions of
feeling, (2) appeals to other persons, (3) statements of facts." (p. 77) His discussion
is restricted, however, to the representative function of language.
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precise." (p. 86) The more there is of this imprecision, the greater must be the
powers of "inarticulate judgment." Though Polanyi does not say so in this
context, such a consequence is most pronounced in the field of social and political
inquiry; here as a result "judgment" is most important. These matters are more
fully explored in the chapter on conviviality.
At this point, Polanyi undertakes to analyze the relations of thought and
speech. To start with, he insists, in opposition to the logical positivists, that
"nothing that we know can be said precisely . . . " (p. 87-88) Therefore there
exists an "ineffable" domain of knowledge. "[A]rticulation always remains incomplete ... . but must continue to rely on such mute acts of intelligence as
we once had in common with chimpanzees of our own age." (p. 70) This
inarticulateness does not prevent intelligence from functioning; indeed much
learning operates within this sphere. Recent experiments have shown that even
a one-celled animal does learn, but only in the sense of trick learning, which
Polanyi distinguishes from sign learning and the more specific realm of intelligence which involves "a true understanding of a situation which had been open
to inspection . . . " (p. 74; cf. also 328 ff.) With others, Polanyi would call
this last form "latent learning," but it seems to me that "pattern learning" would
be a more expressive term for this kind of learning; for it is exemplified by the
behavior of a rat which having become acquainted with the pattern of a maze
will choose the next shortest route to a goal, once the shortest route has been
closed. At this point, the inventive or innovative potentialities become apparent:
when "heuristic" acts are discovered, trick learning is at work; when sign learning, observation comes to the fore. "Latent" ("pattern") learning, on the other
hand, involves an act of interpretation. Within this framework, language theory,
based upon the three kinds of utterances already mentioned, rests upon the
recognition that "language is primarily and always interpersonal and in some
degree impassioned. . . " (p. 77) The operational principles of language are
two: one controlling the process of linguistic representation, and the other the
operation of symbols. Passing over the "demonstration" of these principles, we
note that in Polanyi's view "so long as we feel that our language classifies
things well, we remain satisfied that it is right and we continue to accept the
theory of the universe implied in our language as true." (p. 80; SM 82)
This theory involves a commitment; the indeterminacy involved in our
formal knowledge "must be resolved by the observer on the ground of unspecifiable criteria." (p. 81) If the two principles of language, representation and
symbol operation, are used in classifying the sciences, in terms of the relative
importance of the first and the second principle, we find the following sequence: (1) the descriptive sciences, (2) the exact sciences, (3) the deductive
sciences. "It is a sequence of increasing formalization and symbolic manipulation, combined with decreasing contact with experience." (p. 86, ital. added)
It is not easy to place the social sciences within this classification, as most of
them contain some elements of each of the three groups. The problem of the
degree to which the tacit participates in the process of articulation is quite varied
here. But before it can be resolved, three characteristic areas must first be examined: (1) the ineffable domain, (2) the co-extensive domain, and (3) the
domain of sophistication.
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The first does not refer to mystic experience, but to "connoisseurship as
the art of knowing and to skills as the art of doing .

..

" (p. 88; cf. also pp.

54-55) Learning in these fields is a matter of becoming acquainted with practical
examples: "the relationship of the particulars jointly forming a whole may be
ineffable, even though all the particulars are explicitly specifiable." (ibid.) It
is exemplified in topographic knowledge, such as a guide or a surgeon possesses.
This ineffable domain of skillful knowing is similar in its inarticulateness to
the knowledge possessed by animals and infants. "What I understand in this
manner has a meaning for me, and it has this meaning in itself . . . " Polanyi

calls it existential meaning. (p. 90, p. 58) It is crucial for Polanyi's entire approach that he thinks that "to assert that I have knowledge which is ineffable
is not to deny that I can speak of it, but only that I can speak of it adequately
. . . " (p. 91, ital. added) Polanyi in this connection stresses the importance
between subsidiary and focal knowledge. This leads to the second area, the co-extensive domain. "Symbols can serve as instruments of meaning only by being
subsidiarily known while fixing our focal attention on their meaning." (SM 30;
cf. also 92ff. in Personal Knowledge) "[T]he meaning of a text resides in a
focal comprehension of all the relevant instrumentally known particulars
This is what we mean by saying that we read a text . . . " (p. 92)
The domain of sophistication, finally, is "formed by not fully understood
symbolic operations," which may be either "fumbling" or "pioneering." (p. 93)
Polanyi observes that "the gap between the tacit and the articulate tends to
produce everywhere a cleavage between sound common sense and dubious sophistication . . . " (p. 94) and "thus to speak a language is to commit ourselves to the double indeterminacy . . . " because "three things will have to be
borne in mind: the text, the conception suggested by it, and the experience on
which this may bear." (p. 95) There is much tacit assent which Polanyi explores with skill in terms of Gestalt psychology to which, in his view, we owe
much in the way of evidence for showing "that perception is a comprehension
of clues in terms of a whole." (p. 97; pp. 55ff.) He asserts a parallel between
perception and drive satisfaction, and declares that "if perception prefigures all
our knowing of things, drive satisfaction prefigures all practical skills, and
the two are always interwoven." (p. 99)
At this point, Polanyi feels ready to begin to recognize "the nature of 7he
tacit faculty" which he thinks in the last analysis accounts "for all the increase
in knowledge achieved by articulation." (p. 100) All knowledge, even when
acquired verbally, has a "latent" character; that is to say, it is the knowledge
of patterns or designs -

or so it seems to me, and the words we use to designate

it are imperfect symbols for these patterns. Polanyi cites the great literary scholar
Vossler here:
The true artists of speech remain always conscious of the metaphorical
character of language. They go on correcting and supplementing one metaother and atphor by another, allowing their words to contradict each
tending only to the unity and certainty of their thought. 4
4.

&. VOSSLER,

(1904).
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While this is true enough for the artistry of literary expression, it is a dangerous
principle in scientific work, and the unhappy results of it are available in the
writings of jurists and political theorists, e.g., Hobbes and Rousseau. But it has
relevance to Polanyi's major objective. In a fine section on "the educated mind"
he speaks in true humanist fashion of the rich potentialities of true education
and knowledge. His remarks culminate in the striking sentence: "the capacity
continually to enrich and enliven its own conceptual framework by assimilating new experience is the mark of an intelligent personality." (p. 103) This
leads Polanyi into the sphere of responsibility; personal knowledge is a "responsible decision of the knower" (SM 43), and language has to be reinterpreted continually in a process of assimilation and adaptation. (p. 105 & n. 2)
No two situations, no two experiences are ever wholly alike, and our efforts at
coping with them involve continual "conceptual decisions." "To learn a language or to modify its meaning is a tacit, irreversible, heuristic feat; it is a
transformation of our intellectual life, originating in our own desire for greater
clarity and coherence, and yet sustained by the hope of coming by it into closer
touch with reality." (p. 106)
For Polanyi, whether the anticipatory framework to a new experience is
conceptual, perceptual, or appetitive, any modification is "an irreversible heuristic act." (p. 106) Such adaptation and modification proceeds on three levels.
The first is that of seeking greater clarity for confused notions elicited by verbal
symbols with uncertain referent. The second level is the clarification of scientific
language by either (1) correcting the meaning or reinterpreting the text,
(2) reinterpreting experience, or (3) dismissing the text as meaningless. Polanyi
here states that his book is an effort of this kind: "I am attempting to resolve
by conceptual reform the apparent self-contradiction entailed in believing what
I might conceivably doubt." (p. 109) The third level is seen in the continuous
reinterpretation of language in its everyday use: "Languages are the product
of man's groping for words in the process of making new conceptual decisions . .

.

" and "different vocabularies for the interpretation of things divide

men into groups which cannot understand each other's way of seeing things and
of acting upon them." (p. 112) But this position must not be misunderstood
as that of "nominalism" and its derivatives which see language merely as a set
of convenient symbols.
Polanyi rightly observes that "the study of linguistic rules is used as a
pseudo-substitute for the study of the things referred to in its terms." (p. 113)
"Correspondingly, disagreements on the nature of things cannot be expressed
as disagreements about the existing use of words." (p. 114) We should face
up to the fact that we possess the faculty of recognizing real entities. Though
Polanyi asserts that designations referring to these entities "form a rational
vocabulary," it would seem more nearly correct to say that they may do so.
Definition in this sense formalizes a meaning which is tacitly there, by reducing
the informal elements and partly replacing them by a formal operation, the
reference to the thing to be defined. Sharply rejecting the more extreme implications of linguistic positivism, Polanyi writes that "to study the recurrence
of the word 'justice' as a mere noise in its repeated occurrence in appropriate
situations is impossible, for only the meaningful use of the term can indicate
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to us what situations we are to look at." (p. 116)5 In this connection, Polanyi
mentions the non-Euclidian geometries on the one hand, and certain conceptions in the arts on the other, as opening up new "realities," if they lead to a
wide range of new and interesting ideas.
Problem solving can be fully appreciated only within this conitext. It is
a process emerging from the "purposive tension" characteristic of all fully awake
animals. But problems can be solved only when they are "seen." To recognize
a problem is as much an addition to knowledge as to observe a thing, "to see
a tree, or to see a mathematical proof - or a joke." (p. 120) In discussing
problem solving, Polanyi makes extensive use of Kohler's famous study of the
chimpanzees 6 in combination with Poincar 's analysis of "four stages of discovery: Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, Verification." (p. 121) He observes that a problem creates a strain and the discovery of its solution "great
joy." "[Tirue discovery is not a strictly logical performance," (p. 123) and the
obstacle to be overcome may be described as a "logical gap." This gap the discovery bridges, and all such discoveries are inventions which must be considered
"unpredictable." The originality involved here is a consequence of universal
biological adaptivity, and the difference between the highest and the lowest
forms of life is a matter of degree: "genius makes contact with reality on an
exceptionally wide range . .. " (p. 124) Here it is that Polanyi insists upon
a point of crucial importance to his argument, and to effective scientific work,
namely, the risk involved in choosing a problem: it may be insoluble or too
difficult. "But to play safe may be equally wasteful." (ibid.) The researcher
must select from a number of possible lines of inquiry the most promising problem for attack. Here, too, we find both personal involvement and the "plunge"
man must take in coping with life. (cf. also pp. 365-68)
At this point of the analysis, Polanyi turns to what he calls "intellectual
passions." We are told that all that went before was a "digression," caused by
the scientist's involvement in the affirmations of science, which raised the question of its origin in "the very act of uttering speech." (p. 132) The intellectual
passions are more central, and they are focused upon the beauty .of science.
Starting once more from the elation felt by a scientist at the moment of discovery, he quotes (p. 7; see also p. 134) Kepler's Harmonices Mundi (ch. 10
of Bk. V) and then states his dissent from the belief that the outbreak of such
emotions does not affect the outcome of discovery:
Passions charge objects with emotions, making them repulsive or attractive
.. .The excitement of the scientist making a discovery is an intellectual
passion, telling that something is intellectuallyprecious and, more particularly,
that it is precious to science. (p. 134)
The words of Kepler were not merely a report of personal feelings; they "asserted as a valid affirmation of science.. . the scientific interest of certain
facts . . ." (p. 135)
5. This range of questions has more recently been explored by Ernest Geilner in Words
and Things (1959), which aroused the ire of the ordinary language philosophers to such
a degree that the editor of Mind refused to have the book reviewed. See the letter of Lord
Russell to the London Times, Nov. 7, 1959.
6.

W. K6HLER, THE MENTALrrY OF APES (1927),

esp. ch. VII.
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Scientific discovery reveals new knowledge, but the new vision ... is not
knowledge .. , Our vision of the general nature of things is our guide for
the interpretation of all future experience. Such guidance is indispensable.
. .. Any process of enquiry unguided by intellectual passions would inevitably spread out into a desert of trivialities. (p. 135)
Three factors are involved in determining the relative value of a scientific discovery: (1) certainty (accuracy), (2) systematic relevance (profundity), and
(3) intrinsic interest (relevancy). Happily one reads (and wishes one could
shout it into the ears of some of the more rabid behaviorists): "the accuracy
of an observation does not in itself make it valuable to science." (p. 136) All
this shows, according to Polanyi, that the ideal of a strictly objective science
must be abandoned; and the notion that (natural) science deals with recurrent
events (regularities), while history (the human sciences) with unique events,
is true only up to a point. "The difference between scientific and historical interest, moreover, arises, not from the uniqueness of historical events but from
their interpersonal appeal . . . " (p. 137) In human society the most interesting

subjects are politics and history; they are the stages of great moral decisions, and
"the subjects which are most interesting in themselves do not lend themselves
best to accurate observation and systematic study." (p. 139) The three factors
determining scientific value are in a certain rivalry with each other, and their
claims must be balanced for best results.
At this point, Polanyi critically reviews what he considers the Laplacean
fallacy of a completely deterministic universe already alluded to. The ideal of
absolute detachment is related to a world view of exactly determined particulars. It is at the core of the intellectual order of our time. "[lnflexibly resolved
to denature the vital facts of our existence," such a view is based upon the
"sleight of hand" by which a knowledge of atomic data is substituted for a
knowledge of all experience. (p. 141) Science thus conceived is a "perversion
of truth" which may elicit a "sweeping reaction" such as occurred in the fourth
century of our era, because the "wider intellectual disorder" which it entails
is a "menace to all cultural values, including those of science." It reduces
man to a collection of causally determined atoms, and this begets a peril of enormous potential: the use of "the Laplacean fallacy as a guide to human affairs."
(ibid.) Here is the very heart and fundamental thrust of the challenge of Polanyi
to most of his fellow scientists: "Applied to human affairs, the Laplacean universal mechanics induces the teaching that material welfare and the establishment of an unlimited power for imposing the conditions of material welfare
are the supreme good." (p. 142) Its practical consequence, we might add, is the
Brave New World. Views such as these have been commonplace among humanists and upholders of traditional religious positions; a long list of distinguished
philosophers, political and social theorists, theologians and literary men could
be cited in confirmation. But the striking significance of Polanyi's argumentation
is that it arises from the very heart of natural scientific work itself, and that it
addresses itself to the entire fraternity of science, asking it to take cognizance
of the disaster which their world view is conjuring up.
The heuristic passion, the passion helpful to investigation - that is, to discover a new world - is a matter of guesswork. "Scientists - that is, creative scien-
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tists - spend their lives in trying to guess right," that is, to transcend the previous interpretative framework. (p. 143) The work of Einstein, no less than
that of Kepler, serves to show that "this truth-bearing passion is far from infallible." (ibid.) In this connection an observation is worth citing which a certain school of political philosophy ought to ponder: "Number rules to which
no scientist will pay attention are frequently put forward today by the adherents of occult sciences." (p. 144, n. 1) With this aside in mind, we may
conclude with Polanyi that "both Kepler and Einstein approached nature with
intellectual passions and with beliefs inherent in these passions, which led them
to their triumphs and misguided them to their errors." (p. 145)
Elegance and beauty are, as we have mentioned, the values at the focal
point of the scientific enterprise. Intellectual beauty serves as a token of reality
(ibid.), and new scientific insights are not merely hypotheses about an unknowable reality - operational principles with which to manipulate a hidden nature.
(Polanyi here points once more to the parallels between late medieval nominalism and modem positivism and skepticism.) Giordano Bruno, Galileo, and
Kepler joined in rejecting such a notion. The frankest of them, Bruno, was
burned for his insistence that scientific propositions describe reality. "[Tlruth lies
in. the achievement of a contact with reality . . . " (p. 147) You cannot escape
by talking of "fruitfulness"; erroneous views and superstitions, such as astrology
and Marxism, have been "fruitful," and the substitution of "fruitful" for "true"
is specious. It is also nonsensical. It is the reality which matters, and the intellectual beauty of a theory "establishes a new contact with external reality."
(p. 148) Polanyi cites as illustrations the work of Louis de Broglie on wave
theory (which his examiners could not grasp and therefore consulted Einstein),
Dirac's mathematical formulas reconciling quantum mechanics and relativity
(confirmed by the discovery of the "positive" electron four years later),
and Willard Gibbs's phase rule - all intellectually beautiful theories leading
to the discovery of new reality. But the "dilution of the meritorious by floods of
triviality makes the recognition of true scientific value particularly difficult."
(p. 149)
We shall pass over Polanyi's interesting accounts of scientific controversy,
and of the premises of science, to consider briefly the "passions, private and
public" (pp. 171 ff.) by which through a process of verification, scientific discoveries become embodied in textbooks and general opinion. It is a matter of
the ever more general appreciation of the beauty of the theory. "[lit is still
for the sake of this remote and inaccessible beauty . . . that relativity continues
to be valued as an intellectual triumph and accepted as a great truth." (p.. 172)
This beauty is the Inbegriff of the values which the multitude "have been taught
to entrust to a group of men whose cultural guidance they have accepted."
(ibid.) This "routinization" of the original passion finally brings about a state
in which all dynamic quality is lost.
Polanyi next undertakes to compare and contrast the intellectual passions to
bodily emotions, more especially hunger, sex, and fear; their gratification through
eating, copulation and flight is "a manner of verification," but he thinks that the
"intellectual passions perpetuate themselves by their fulfilment." (p. 173) Do not
the bodily passions do the same, if seen in the proper time perspective? Does
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their satisfaction terminate "the situation which evoked them"? In maintaining
life, they recreate themselves, as do the intellectual passions. It is, however, true
that "by contrast to the satisfaction of appetites, the enjoyment of culture creates
no scarcity in the objects of [sic] offering gratification, but secures and ever widens
their availability to others." (p. 174) But this is a result of the nature of the
goods involved, and not of the passions which arouse the search for them. The
gratification of a desire never quenches it for long, and this is as true of the
libido intelligendi as of the other libidines. The pursuit of the "why?" is as endless as the pursuit of other pleasures.
The distinction in the goods to be secured is "vital to the existence of
culture." (ibid.) The relation of science and technology must be seen in this
perspective. (p. 331-32) Involved here is the distinction between theoretical and
practical knowledge - applicable knowledge which determines whether an action
will be successful or not, i.e., will be right or wrong. Polanyi observes that this
distinction is paralleled by that between the science of inanimate things and of
living beings (to be discussed below). His view of technology can be summed
up in the proposition that "technology teaches action." (p. 176) There
is an imperative involved in technology which is oriented toward material
advantages and which uses implements according to specifiable rules. Characteristically, technology proceeds by inventions, while science does so by discoveries. Whether these can be as sharply differentiated as is here suggested may
well be doubted, and Polanyi himself admits that "it may happen that a new
invention involves a new discovery." (p. 177) In Fernald (English Synonyms,
p. 197) we read: "We discover what has existed but has not been known to
us; we invent combinations or arrangements not before in use." Thus, for many
inventions it would first be necessary to discover a relationship or potential; likewise, for many discoveries an invention would have to provide the instrumentality for observing what had not previously been known. One might, in view
of the latter, well question whether one should go as far as to say that "in
addition to the disclosure of a new operational principle, technology requires that
an invention should be economic and thus achieve a material advantage."
(p. 177) Surely the invention of the telescope was a vital step in the development of astronomy, but hardly "economic" in the sense in which the automobile
or the airplane is. This point is made here, because in the human field, and
more especially in politics and jurisprudence, discoveries and inventions are going
hand in hand; and these inventions, such as the "constructive non-confidence
vote" or "association" as an extension of federalism, are neither economic nor
do they achieve a "material" advantage, except in the vaguest sense.
What binds technology and science together, however, is the "beauty" of
both discoveries and inventions. This beauty differs, though both exhibit originality. "[B]ut in science originality lies in the power of seeing more deeply than
others into the nature of things, while in technology it consists in the ingenuity
of the artificer in turning known facts to a surprising advantage." (p. 178) Until
recently, the difference between science and technology was generally taken for
granted. But the Neo-Marxian theory of science sharply challenged this distinction. Both in the USSR and outside it, the difference is obscured
by "a radically utilitarian conception of the public good." (p. 180) The
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spread of this kind of doctrine seems to Polanyi to raise the question whether
the distinctive passions which have produced science "may simply fade away."
(p. 181) Once again he reminds the reader of what happened at the end of
the ancient world, when St. Augustine discredited science. This reflection leads
him to consider another important political perspective of contemporary science:
"In all parts of the world where science is just beginning to be cultivated, it
suffers from a lack of response to its true values." Hence "encircled today between the crude utilitarianism of the philistine and the ideological utilitarianism
of the modem revolutionary movement, the love of pure science may falter
and die." (p. 182)
Passing over Polanyi's interesting observations on mathematics in this context, it remains to speak of his reinforcing the argument about intellectual passions by his pointing to the parallels in the abstract arts, especially music. There
is a kinship between different kinds of order and beauty, whether in nature, in
mathematics, or in art. "In each of these domains it is the relevant intellectual
passion which affirms the distinctive intellectual values by which any particular
performance may qualify for admittance to the domain." (p. 194) The identification of order and beauty implied here involves a highly debatable kind of
esthetics, reminiscent of the more academic writers of classical antiquity and the
Renaissance. Whether the design of a painting "bears the same kinship to
geometry as music does to arithmetic," doubtful in itself, raises the further question whether "the attempts made ever since Vitruvius, to formulate geometrical
rules for the appreciation of harmonious . . . composition" (p. 193) have been
or ever will be successful.
In a final section of this chapter, on "Dwelling In and Breaking Out,"
Polanyi turns from art and beauty to religion and mysticism. (pp. 197-202) This
must be read with Chapter 8, where "The Logic of Affirmation" culminates
in an "invitation to dogmatism." (p. 268) Though seemingly shocking, it is
"but the corollary to the greatly increased critical powers of man." (ibid.) And
though Polanyi thinks it is part of his "post-critical philosophy," it is actually a
striking extension of Kant's critical philosophy which undertook to determine
the limits of man's reasoning capacity and thereby "liberated" man's capacity
for faith. When Polanyi says that "we must now go back to St. Augustine to
restore the balance of our cognitive powers" (p. 266), he thinks that we must
once again recognize that nisi credideritis,non intelligitis, that belief is the source
of all knowledge. Only a genuine appreciation of the "religious passion," involving, as it does, surrender, can provide the basis for this acceptance of belief. Such "indwelling" is the radical "breaking out" of the bonds of the world
of the senses and the world which it represents, the "casting off the condition
of man." (p. 198)
The arts lie between science and worship, Polanyi says. There are penetrating observations made in this connection on Sartre, Proust, and existentialism; but they must be passed over, since they are asides. The main argument
turns upon what the author calls "conviviality." The very unusualness of the
term suggests that we are face to face with one of Polanyi's original insights.
For it asserts in the most insistent fashion the social (political) conditioning
of the products of intellectual passions. "Articulate systems which foster and
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satisfy an intellectual passion can survive only with the support of a society
which respects the values affirmed by these passions . .. " ; but the society is
likewise conditioned by these passions, for "a society has a cultural life only to
the extent to which it acknowledges and fulfils the obligation to lend its support to the cultivation of these. passions." (p. 203) And here is the heart of
the matter: these are the "civic coefficients of our intellectual passions" (ibid.)
and, more especially, the respect for truth which is at the heart of science. Pure
conviviality is to be observed in animals as much as in men; "a solitary chimpanzee is not a chimpanzee," he says, citing K61hler. (p. 210) Although Aristotle is not mentioned, we are asked (not unreasonably) to return to Aristotle's presumption that "a solitary man is not a man"; he must be demigod
or beast. Pure conviviality is "the cultivation of good fellowship" (ibid.), and
Polanyi joins the numerous thinkers, from John Dewey to Alexander Riistow,
who have in recent years insisted upon the vital need for community. Rfistow
especially has linked the growth of culture to the small community, while at
the same time recognizing the role of conquest, of Ueberlagerung,in this process through the founding of greater dominions.7 We are here facing one of
the key points in the thought of neo-liberalism which is of growing importance
as political and social thought turns to the task of transcending the totalitarian
challenge.S This task is the deeper concern of Polanyi, who states the principal
purpose of his book to be "to achieve a frame of mind in which I may hold
firmly to what I believe to be true, even though I know that it might conceivably be false." (p. 214) Such a purpose calls for an explicit exploration
of the domains of morality, custom, and law as parts of culture. (ibid.)
Moral judgments, while akin to intellectual valuations, encompass the whole
person. Two kinds of culture must now be distinguished: Polanyi calls them
individual culture and civic culture. They are necessary to each other and closely
related; the cultural ideal involved is that of a "highly differentiated intellectual
life pursued collectively." (p. 219) At this point is introduced the idea of a
cultural elite which conducts this intellectual life. Science, humanities, arts, and
religions are all the work of such elites, or "authoritative specialists." The individual culture of these specialists is supported and given scope by the civic
culture of the community as a whole. Such civic culture presupposes three
civic institutions: group loyalty, property, and power. It is not customary to
speak of loyalty and power as institutions, surely, and we need not adopt such
a perspective, in order to acknowledge that they are crucial for the maintenance
of "civic culture." The author's characterization of a free or pluralistic society
is more or less standard; that it centrally includes a belief in an autonomous
process of coherent thought, is Polanyi's main concern. In a system of popular
government, the administration of civic culture calls for the cultivation of "civic
thought." Elitist propensities intrude themselves in a footnote in which it is
(correctly) pointed out that "the function of authoritative individuals is generally
recognized for the interpretation of the Constitution itself in Britain." (p. 222,
7. ALEXANDER
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n.1) It is, of course, likewise recognized in the United States, in that the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution. Polanyi's conception of authority is
informed by his view of tradition and its acquisition through learning. "To
learn by example is to submit to authority," for authority involves superior
knowledge. "You follow your master because you trust his manner of doing
things even when you cannot analyse and account in detail for its effectiveness."
(p. 53) Such following is qualified, however, by a measure of dissent. "Every
acceptance of authority is qualified by some measure of reaction to it . . ."
(p. 208)9 Unfortunately, he links it to coercion, in the conventional fashion,
when considering authority in the political context. (p. 212) By doing so, he
deprives authority of its distinctive role, which separates it from power.
"The shaping and dissemination of moral convictions should take place . ..
under the guidance of intellectual leaders . . . " in an ideal free society, ac-

cording to Polanyi, but he does not wish to enter into a description of "the
institutional framework within which moral, legal and political opinions are
thus continuously re-moulded in a free society .

.

. " (p. 222) From the stand-

point of political theory, this institutional framework is, however, the proof of
the pudding, and a failure to analyze it leaves a gaping hole. What Polanyi says
about the results of this process may be summed up in the expression "moral
progress" of civic thought "moved by its own passions and guided by its own
standards." (p. 223) A free society accepts this thought, not because the citizens
decide, but because "they are deemed competent to decide rightly .

"o

The lack of unanimity does not invalidate this view; not only is there disagreement in other spheres as well, but the lack of unanimity at the time action is
taken is eventually superseded by a consensus of broad scope. Polanyi refers
here to Dicey's well-known study (Law and Public Opinion in England, 1905),

but in retrospect its argument would seem to apply only to a unique historical
constellation.
These general comments on a liberal society are followed by brief remarks
on naked power and power politics and by a critique of Marxism, leading
toward a post-Marxian restatement of liberalism. In this analysis, problems
such as legitimacy and the need for consent are touched upon, but merely to
enunciate the author's opinion, not to defend what is on the whole a conventional position in the line of traditional liberalism. The reviewer finds little to
quarrel over, little to exclaim about. Power is seen as corrupting, but necessary;
morality as desirable but not ineluctable. "[C]ivic culture still remains dependent
on force and material ends, and remains therefore suspect." (p. 226) The work
of Meinecke on reason of state11 is adduced as background for a critique of
9. Polanyi's conception of authority bears a close resemblance to one which sees authority
as the capacity for reasoned elaboration; cf. my Authority and Discretion in Nomos I
(1958). The link of authority to superior knowledge is further developed by Polanyi at
374-79.
10. Ibid. Polanyi does not elaborate the problem here implied of a "belief in the common man," though his stress on belief seems to require it. Cf. my THE New BELIEF IN
THE COMMON MAN (1942), passim. The possible conflict with a belief in intellectual
elites is not explored or delimited.
11. This is the German title DIE IDEE DER STAATRXSON IN DER NEUEREN GESCHICHTR
(1924), which was rather unfortunately rendered as Machiaveltianism in the English
translation, 1957. Cf. for this also my CoNsTrruTIONAL REASON OF STATE (1957).
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Marxism as Machiavellian in light of Marxist epistemology. Since this is familiar
ground, we pass over it and merely note that such a critique is only possible in
the light of an understanding of the faith in the assumptions of a free society.
We cannot cope with it if we insist on the faithlessness of the kind of outlook
from which Marxism sprang. "Can a revulsion against the consequences of
modern totalitarianism restore a set of beliefs, on the logical weakness of which
the doctrines of totalitarianism itself were founded?" The answer is, obviously,
no. "Can we face the fact that, no matter how liberal a free society may be,
it is also profoundly conservative?" The answer must be yes. "For this is the
fact. The recognition granted in a free society to the independent growth of
science, art, and morality involves a dedication of society to the fostering of a
specific tradition of thought, transmitted and cultivated by a particular group
of authoritative specialists . . . " (p. 244) In the support of these authorities,
"the protection of the same policemen and soldiers who guard the wealth of
the landowners and capitalists" (p. 245) must be accepted. It is the institutional framework, the civic home of a free society. We must place some limitations on the claim of idealistic appeals. We must face an unpalatable truth
which troubles our conscience: "an absolute moral renewal of society can be
attempted only by an absolute power which must inevitably destroy the moral
life of man." (ibid.)
Even at this point in the train of Polanyi's argument, advanced as it is with
profound dialectic skill, his work would have been a major achievement. The
parallel between the need of accepting the hypothetical nature of all thought,
without letting it be destroyed by skepticism, and the acceptance of an imperfect
social order, has been demonstrated with convincing force. However, in two
more parts, on the justification of personal knowledge, and on knowing and
being, Polanyi proceeds to elaborate his argument. Any attempt to delineate
and evaluate these chapters with the same care as the preceding ones would
unduly extend this critical examination. By looking back from the end, a more
concise appraisal may prove adequate for present purposes. To some extent,
these chapters are an elaboration of the author's The Logic of Liberty (1951);
they are themselves most skillfully summarized in The Study of Man (1960).
Indeed, the latter book may be considered a kind of prolegomena to the larger
work. In conclusion, Polanyi returns to his main theme: "the emergent noosphere
is wholly determined as that which we believe to be true and right . . . It defines a free society as a fellowship fostering truth and respecting the right."
(p. 404) There is a desperate effort to transcend the naturalistic perspective
without contradicting the phenomenal world of natural science. Primeval incandescent gases do not prefigure the works of the human mind; yet a "field"
is said to have the "power" to bring into being "centres of first causes," and
each such center is "an essentially new and autonomous prime mover." (p. 405)
This seems rather dubious metaphysics, at best. He concludes by writing that
We may envisage then a cosmic field which called forth all these centers by
offering them a short-lived, limited, hazardous opportunity for making some
progress of their own towards an unthinkable consummation. And that is
also, I believe, how a Christian is placed when worshipping God.
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This belief is hardly going to be shared by a good many Christians. Teilhard de
Chardin is on safer ground, theologically, when he insists that he is dealing only
with the phenomenal world.
How does Polanyi arrive at these final conclusions? I showed earlier that
he acknowledges a "logic of affirmation" which makes us recognize belief as the
source of all knowledge. (p. 266) Referring to St. Augustine's Confessions as
an example of a "logically consistent exposition of fundamental beliefs," he avows
to have made a "decision," namely, "to give deliberate expression to the beliefs" he finds himself holding. (p. 267) On the basis of this decision, Polanyi
undertakes a "critique of doubt" which is meant as a refutation of Kant, but
is actually a refutation of certain Neo-Kantians and of Descartes, whom he
mentions only in passing. A detailed consideration of my disagreements with
Polanyi would lead too far afield, and would not contribute to an appreciation
of his nuclear position, with which I very much agree. 12 He insists that "all
fundamental beliefs are irrefutable as well as unprovable" (p. 271); and so
would Kant. Having spoken of the "practical faith in this Son of God" (which
he even underscores), Kant stated that "this idea is completely existential in
its own right" and that "we ought to conform to it"; and he adds:
Did we have to prove in advance the possibility of man's conforming to this
archetype, as is absolutely essential in the case of concepts of nature, if we
are to avoid the danger of being deluded by empty notions, we should have
to hesitate before allowing even to the moral law the authority of an unconditional and yet sufficiently determining ground of our will.13
The real divergence is not the recognition of the existentially binding commitment to faith, but the extension of this commitment to the "realm of nature"
which Kant sought to exclude from it. Thus the radical dualism of Kant's two
worlds, the phenomenal and the noumenal, is challenged by Polanyi, and his
"critique of doubt" should have been directed against this dualism, or rather
its absolutism, which Kant himself came to take back in the Critique of Judgment. Polanyi himself recognizes, of course, the value of doubt, if it is "reasonable" and points to its juristic equivalent, but rightly insists that only our beliefs warrant it. (pp. 274-77) It must stop short of "scepticism." "There exists
• . .no valid heuristic maxim in natural science which would recommend either
belief or doubt as a path to discovery." (p. 277) Both have played their part
in scientific progress. At this point, Polanyi adduces the comparable situation
in the law of evidence under which certain kinds of information are not admitted. He also mentions the presumption in favor of the accused that he is
innocent. Such presumption tells the court what to believe at the start; it is
an instance of a "much stronger will to believe." (p. 279) It is justified by the
will to do justice. But the main subject of Polanyi's critique of doubt is religious
12. See my INEVITABLE PEACE (1948), and the Introduction to THE PHLOSOPHty OF
KANT (1949), where my view of Kant's position as that of a "critical rationalinm" is
set forth. Polanyi's position is an extension, in my view, of Kant's critique of reason. Characteristically, Polanyi refers only to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, but not to the Critique
of Judgment and the Critique of Practical Reason, let alone to his Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone, wherein faith is asserted to be beyond the critique of reason.
13. THE PHrLOSOPHY OF KANT, supra note 12, at 398.
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doubt. Its impact has been tremendous, and it has been both salutary and
destructive. "Today we should be grateful for the prolonged attacks made by
rationalists on religion for forcing us to renew the grounds of the Christian
faith." (p. 286) The entire discussion shows that the critique of doubt is the
obverse, logically, of Polanyi's logic of affirmation and its antecedents. In a very
interesting analysis of what gives a belief system stability, Polanyi develops the
analogy between the circularity in the beliefs of the Azande described by EvansPritchard and the corresponding behavior of believers in our own naturalistic
system. He writes that "science may deny, or at least east aside as of no scientific
interest, whole ranges of experience which to the unscientific mind appear both
massive and vital" - an observation to which any beneficiary of osteopathy,
employed contrary to the advice of scientific medicine, can bear witness. It is
obvious, and Polanyi thinks it is laboring the obvious, to insist that "universal
doubt," i.e., "the virgin mind, bearing the imprint of no authority," is not the
model of intellectual integrity; it would result in a "state of imbecility." (p. 295)
"[T]he advocacy of 'rational doubt' is merely the sceptic's way of advocating
his own beliefs." But since the challenge of the totalitarians called this set of
beliefs into doubt "it is absurd to oppose such [totalitarian] doctrines now on
the ground of scepticism." (p. 298)
In short, we cannot escape commitment. "[T]he thought of truth implies a
desire for it . . . " (p 308), and is therefore personal. The framework of commitment is one in which the personal and the universal require each other. Such
commitment "enacts the paradox of dedication." (ibid.) It is like the judge
finding the law which is supposed to exist though yet unknown. He is committed
to this law. His is "the freedom of the responsible person to act as he must."
Polanyi says that "The course of scientific discovery resembles the process of
reaching a difficult judicial decision . . . In both cases a passionate search for
a solution . . . narrows down discretion to zero and issues at the same time in
an innovation claiming universal acceptance." (p. 309) This statement is hardly in keeping with more recent views on the nature of judicial decisions, and
not only in the light of "realism." It is, on the contrary, now broadly appreciated that there exists an ineluctable residue of discretion which must be recognized in order not to be abused, and I should think that this mode of viewing
the judicial process is quite in line with Polanyi's main thesis about the in14
escapable residue of faith involved in all attempts at rational decision making,
It is also involved in the view that "the science of today serves as a heuristic
guide for its own further development." (p. 311) This statement one might
paraphrase for the law as "the judicial decision (jurisprudence) of today serves
as a heuristic guide to the judicial decision of tomorrow." Reality, thus, is both
encompassed by our judgments, and transcends them, awaiting further efforts
at being encompassed. But at every stage, it calls for commitment to the stage
reached, passionate commitment, engaging the whole person. Truth, therefore,
becomes "the rightness of an action" and thus "allows for any degree of personal
participation in knowing what is being known." (p. 320) By such a conception, sciences and arts are linked by a gradual transition, as are the natural and
14.

Cf. inter alia BENJAMIN CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921),
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the social and the humanistic sciences. In all of them, "commitment offers...
legitimate grounds for the affirmation of personal convictions with universal intent." (p. 324; SM 42 ff.)
To know life is to understand an ascending scale of being. It ranges from
the biology of the cell to the appreciation of human greatness. The brief recapitulation of the data which we find in such works as those of Chardin, Clark,
Eiseley and Lintonl,5 need not detain us here. It leads up to the recognition
of our "calling" as men who are to exercise responsible judgment with universal
intent. (p. 379) Such calling dissolves if looked upon noncommittally. But "so
long as we can form no idea of the way a material system may become a conscious, responsible person, it is an empty pretense to suggest that we have an
explanation for the descent of man." (p. 390) Randomness seems involved in
such emergence, but we do not know. The field concept is introduced to account for a teleological finality. The calling of man here hinted at is more
fully stated in The Study of Man (ch. II), where it is seen as the problem of
establishing "the existence of a human mind capable of making decisions of
its own." (SM 43) Chardin transcended the problem by imputing to all phenomena the quality of being animate; Polanyi still speaks of an "inanimate universe." He therefore believes that we must reject the "professed basic assumptions of all scientific physiology." The tacit assumptions are quite different. They
involve purpose. The study of learning confirms this conclusion. Animals appear
"to have feelings similar to our own" (SM 58), but 'man alone can command
respect." As was shown earlier, "human thought grows only within language
and since language can exist only in a society, all thought is rooted in society"
(SM 60) ; and the responsibilities involved prove that "behaviorism . . . is totally impracticable." Particular manifestations of behavior are (a) meaningless,
(b) largely unknown, and (c) to be comprehended only as "pointers to the mind
from which they originate." (SM 65) This is said against the linguistic positivists, but applies to all positivist behaviorists.
With these conclusions firmly derived from existing knowledge established
in the sciences of nature, it becomes possible to come to the understanding of
history. 'The study of man starts with an appreciation of man in the act of making responsible decisions." This appreciation flows from an understanding of
man's natural calling. Polanyi flatly "denies any discontinuity between the study
of nature and the study of man." This position is, as we noted, the real issue
between our author and Kant, but it brings him close to the position of Hegel,le
especially when he writes that "all knowledge rests on understanding" (not in
the sense of Verstand, but of Verstehen). Nonetheless, Polanyi acknowledges,
as Hegel did, that "historians must exercise a special kind of understanding."
But "the characteristic features of historiography" call for "the continuation of
a development broadly prefigured within the natural sciences." (SM 73) This
view is adumbrated by sketching the choices made by animals: "the incipient
15. P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OF MAN (1959); W. E. LEGRos
CLAR, THE ANTECEDENTS OF MAN (1960); LOREN EISELEY, THE IMME4SE JOURNEY

(1946);
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Herder and the Romantics. But Hegel shares his view and rejects the idea of a discontinuity.
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transcendence of self-centered individuality by a personhood striving to achieve
intellectual excellence," e.g., as shown in Napoleon's career. Basing his position
on Pieter Geyl's well-known study, he concludes that "the writing of history is
itself a process of history . . . " Contrary to appearances and established prejudices, the same holds of science. The well-worn distinction between the study
of unique and recurrent events as the acid test of the contrast between natural
science and history will not, as we saw, stand up to scrutiny. "Hence the peculiar
position of dramatic history at the end of a row of sciences of increasing intimacy
and delicate complexity, yet offset . ... by an exceptionally vigorous and subtle
participation in its subject matter." (SM 85) "To contemplate a person as
an ideal is to submit to his authority." For "we need reverence to perceive
greatness." (SM 96) An appreciation of this distinctive form of existence, with
its passions, its triumphs and its failures, springing from the soil of an intellectual heritage, bent on a search for truth and other excellence akin to truth,
provides the spiritual foundation of a free society. No authority can teach us
which heroes and masters to accept; by recognizing them, we accept our calling.
In these wise and sound conclusions culminates this remarkable endeavor
to break the fetters of an intellectual tradition which has saddled us with totalitarianism. By demonstrating that into every act of knowing there enters a tacit
and passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, Polanyi
succeeds in liberating the modern mind from an ancient incubus for a new start
into a world beyond Communism and Fascism. The two cultures of which C.P.
Snow has written are here "suspended, preserved and superseded," and the "logic
of liberty" vindicated. By inquiring into the nature of scientific knowledge, and
showing its limitations, Polanyi has rescued what is best in critical philosophy
by providing a Critique of Critical Reason.1 7 The many who have suspected
as much, laboring in the social sciences and the humanities in the historical
perspective, owe much to this remarkable work. Natural law is not mentioned
by Polanyi at all, but what he has done is to refute its critics and thereby aid
its restatement on a new and more lasting basis.
CAnRL
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17. Cf., for the logical problems this position raises, the study by Ch. Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tytega, Traiti do l'Argumentation, reviewed infra, p. 199.
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This excellent little book contains three lectures delivered by Lord Radcliffe
at Northwestern University in 1960. It was the author's purpose in these lectures
to call attention to a certain way of looking at law that is characteristic of the
modern period, and to contrast this with the quite different attitude 'that marked
almost the entire course of Western history from antiquity until the nineteenth
century. It is now very widely accepted that law has little or no concern with man's
fundamental nature and ultimate destiny. On these matters, in Lord Radcliffe's
phrase, it is thought that there should be "a permanent public dubiety." (p. 7)
It is the law's business to develop "in response to the changing needs of society
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without being particular as to the direction of its development or the ultimate
purposes which those needs subserve." (pp. 3-4) This attitude is of course not
peculiar to law, but reflects a general disintegration of the unity of human
thought. Whether in law, economics, or physics, the tendency has been to permit,
indeed to encourage, the pursuit of internal consistency and self-defined ends
without particular concern over the upbuilding of a unified and harmonious view
of man's nature and end. In these lectures Lord Radcliffe increases our understanding of this attitude, especially as it affects law, and brings us to reflect on
the possible consequences that such a jurisprudence may entrain.
Only those unconcerned with the past and satisfied that the present carries
with it self-evidently valid credentials can fail to be impressed by how recently
this attitude toward law has come about and what an accumulated weight of
authority stands against it. Only yesterday, historically speaking, both in England
and the United States, judges and lawyers took it as axiomatic that the truths
of religion and morality underlay in some fashion the provisions of positive law,
and that the purpose of law, along with all human learning, was to contribute
to the achievement of man's final end. "Christianity is part and parcel of the
law of the land," and to maintain publicly that its teachings are defective is "a
violation of the first principles of the law," said Chief Baron Kelly in the Court
of the Exchequer as recently as 1867.1 So little time ago as 1892, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, Justice Brewer could say without apparent difficulty,
in construing an act of Congress, that "this is a religious people," "a Christian
nation." 2 General statements such as these received concrete application in
cases striking down contractual provisions and dispositions of property thought
contrary to sound morals or orthodox religious teaching. Of much greater
significance, however, was the general shaping effect of religious belief on the
character of the common law throughout its development.
Lord Radcliffe is particularly concerned to warn of dangers that inhere in a
separation of law from religion and morals and in the neutrality of so important
an institution as government on the question of man's final end. Surely he has
reason for anxiety. On the one side, if law abdicates its claim to be founded on
values beyond social utility, it must also forfeit the obedience that those higher
values can command. The contribution of law to social cohesion may accordingly be reduced. On the other side, if no reference beyond social utility is
recognized, by which the law itself can be judged, there may be too ready an
obedience to law and an acceptance of arbitrary commands when fundamental
justice calls for defiance. Paradoxically, by the same evolution of thought, law
may be weakened in the exercise of its proper influence and strengthened in an
arrogation of powers to which it is not entitled. There is the still more subtle
danger, which the author points out, that official indifference to religion and
morality will breed a growing indifference to these things in society at large.
Whether or not this is the intended effect, it may well be the inescapable consequence of giving an agnostic form to what stands for all men as a model.
If the author is clear about the dangers he sees in the moral and religious
1. 4Owan v. Milbourn, L.R 2 Ex. 230, 234 (1867), cited by Lord Radcliffe at p. 21.
2. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465, 471 (1892)i
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neutrality of law, he is not nearly so clear in telling us what he thinks ought to
be done to meet these dangers, and how today we ought to look upon the law
and its task. Of course the problem is an extraordinarily difficult one, especially
for those who place an equally high value on religious and moral principles and on
freedom of opinion, so that statements that look first one way and then statements
that look another are perhaps justified by the uncertainty of a proper solution.
We are all groping our way in this matter. But I wonder if I am wrong in
thinking that Lord Radcliffe is not quite so uncertain as he at times seems to be in
these lectures; that the uncertainty is often not so much a reflection of his own
views as a -mode of expression he has chosen in order to communicate with his
audience. Perhaps he is not to be criticized for this. Many of those to whom
he speaks are so far educated in the very attitude whose validity he questions that
too direct an expression of contrary views might meet with only incomprehension
and hostility. Certainly this would be the case if traditional notions of natural
law were forthrightly proposed as the solution. But the author's method does
make for occasionally difficult reading, since one must move back and forth
through the lectures in order to piece together an adequate picture of his views.
In his first lecture, Lord Radcliffe tells us that law must stand to men as embodying an order of living that commands the allegiance of the best part of themselves, and that it must have a standard of reference outside itself by which to assess
-its own results. 'But after considering in a general way the development of legal
thought and our present position, he concludes, perhaps somewhat regretfully,
that traditional notions of natural law cannot be used to satisfy this need. At
least, "you cannot hope to get Natural Law in at the front door." (p. 33) Some
of the reasons he gives why you cannot hope to get natural law in at the front
door are not altogether convincing. What does it matter, for instance, that we
have a "modem complex of numerous judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction with a
structure of appellate courts above them"? (p. 33) Why does this increase the
difficulty, if it is otherwise desirable, of orienting our jurisprudence along an
axis of natural law? I cannot see why the framing of legal rules in the light of
natural law is any more "individual a jurisdiction," appropriate only in the hands
of a single judge, than the exercise of the judicial function within a less ultimate
frame of reference. There is always the task, peculiarly that of the appellate
court, of reducing inconsistencies and drawing a bold line of development out
of a mass of confusing particulars. But this remains, no matter what the philosophical foundations of the system. Furthermore, the restricting effect of precedent does not necessarily militate against founding a jurisprudence on natural
law. Rules that have over time secured an indisputable position in the legal
order generally do serve needs that are rooted in human nature, or so one may
think without being unduly naive. That ordinarily a court should not undo what
has been decided after full and adequate consideration is itself a rule that serves
these needs. Of course if absurd and unreasonable rules are entrenched and
maintained behind an unyielding policy of stare decisis, there is to an extent a
falling away from the ideal of natural law as a principle continuously and perBut it is not American lawyers who
vasively active throughout the legal systei.
must contend with this deficiency.
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Well worthy of consideration, however, is Lord Radcliffe's suggestion that we
may 'have no "viable means of bringing the conceptions of Natural Law to bear upon the administration of justice," no "practical way" -by which positive law can be
seen to observe and honor the connection. (pp. 24-25) At first I was uncertain
of the author's meaning here, and supposed him to refer indirectly to the confining
effect of precedent or to the absence of sources of indisputable authority on the
natural law. But what I now think him to mean -and
it is certainly an
important point for those who see in general invocations of natural law the
remedy for all our ills - is this: The justification for very many legal rules can
be as easily made in terms of a limited, socially defined value as by reference to
the fundamental nature and needs of man. In either case the rule adopted is
likely to be the same, especially when there remains a large measure of agreement between those who refer to natural law and those who look for no warrant
beyond the changing values of society. Sometimes, indeed, a natural law justification seems dragged in by the heels, an unnecessarily grandiose explanation for
what is really a very ordinary problem of adjusting human relations. The perfectly understandable inclination is to justify a rule, whenever possible, in more
modest and at least temporarily satisfactory terms. The cases in which reference
to an ultimate standard is inescapable, because there can be no other explanation
for the court's decision, are rare, although somewhat less so when courts have a
constitutional mandate to scrutinize legislation in accordance with such standards
as "due process of law" and "equal protection of the laws." These cases alone
cannot keep alive a way of thinking about the whole mass of legal rules that tests
their value by their tendency to satisfy man's fundamental needs and advance
him toward his final end. Formerly, perhaps, such an idea was so firmly rooted
and received such generous support from other branches of learning that it gave'
direction to the entire legal system without being specifically manifested in this
or that rule. In a general sort of way it supported the whole structure and was
drawn upon when appropriate by men imbued with the idea. It was not lost
for want of continuous and concrete application. But now when a different attitude prevails and no connection between law and an ultimate point of reference
is assumed, neither general notions of natural law nor occasional instances of its
relevance may be adequate to revive or keep alive the idea. Some more specific
and continuous connection with the ordinary material of legal thought is necessary.
This connection, it appears in the second lecture, is "public policy." "Public
policy" is the back door through which natural law may perhaps enter in. I say
this with some uncertainty, because it is not altogether clear whether Lord Radcliffe conceives of public policy as a doctrine by which the courts invoke standards derived from human nature, or whether it is simply a means by which they
draw upon values that have come to be regarded in the particular society as more
or less permanent, without any claimed connection with a natural order. There
is a good deal to suggest that he relies on the historical fact of the Western tradition, or perhaps even only the English tradition, and eschews any more absolute
basis.
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The civilization of which English law is one form of expression has been
built, with labor and sacrifice beyond record, upon the structure of certain
beliefs as to the nature of man and his purpose in society. They may not
be beliefs essential to the well-being of all societies. Others have been or
may yet be reared upon other foundations and their members may nonetheless find wealth of spirit and material prosperity. But that is not, I
think, for us. (p. 65)
And yet he speaks eloquently of the "essential dignity" and "inalienable requirements" of the individual. (pp. 57, 64)
Public policy when invoked as a distinct doctrine can be rather startling. One
is struck by the boldness of the court in drawing upon its notions of fundamental
values to suspend a rule ordinarily applicable and ordinarily wholly acceptable.
There is a sudden change of direction justified by considerations distinct from
those that enter into the ordinary rule. Thus a condition on a bequest that the
grantee not marry is struck down because it offends a public policy in favor of
marriage. Or a contract is refused enforcement because it tends to immoral
conduct. It is precisely the startling quality of these cases that Lord Radcliffe
counts on as an effective reminder, where general invocations of natural law would
not be, that there are fundamental values against which all laws must be tested.
He counts on the yeast of these cases to leaven the whole mass of the law.
Of course courts should be free to draw on fundamental values to set aside
ordinarily applicable rules, rules that are themselves the products of judicial
activity. As Baron Bramwell put it, "It is strange that there should be so much
difficulty in making it understood that a thing may be unlawful, in the sense that
the law will not aid it, and yet that the law will not immediately punish it."3
American lawyers at any rate will have no difficulty with this idea. Courts have
a creative role to play in establishing rules, whether of narrow or broad application, that advance the common good. The question is not whether the invocation
of public policy to set aside ordinarily applicable rules is justified, but whether it
will in fact achieve the effect desired of orienting the whole legal system according
to certain beliefs about human nature and keep alive an awareness of the law's
subservience to reality. When one considers the matter, there is really no more
reason to think of a decision as based on fundamental beliefs about the nature of
man - asserting "the inmost convictions of the law" (p. 40) - when it is rested
on a distinct doctrine of public policy than when it involves the application
of an ordinary and familiar rule of law. There is no more reason to think of a rule
that strikes down a condition against marriage or a restraint on the alienation of
property as grounded in fundamental values than a rule that compels a defendant
to compensate for injuries negligently inflicted or to perform a promise upon which
another has acted to his detriment. All such rules are pretty closely dependent
on fundamental postulates; in all, the idea of public policy in its broad sense is
very much alive. Public policy as a distinct doctrine is a very limited vehicle for
demonstrating the law's relation to fundamental values. Its incidence is haphazard and episodic. Mostly it impinges on the law of contracts and property.
Opportunities for its application are infrequent, and probably too infrequent to
3. Cowan v. Milbourn, L.R. 2 Ex. 230, 236 (1867).
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have the desired leavening and orienting effect. True, cases invoking public
policy have a dramatic quality that arrests the attention and expands one's
vision of the role of the courts. But is this enough to achieve ,the desired effect?
Is not the need for principles more generally pervasive and more continuously
operative throughout the law? As the reader nears the end of the second lecture,
the public policy about which Lord Radcliffe speaks does in fact seem less and less
a specialized doctrine for the suspension of ordinary rules and more and more a
body of general principles giving form and direction to the entire structure of
the law.
In the third lecture natural law comes in at the front door after all.
[Law] . . . is not strong enough in itself to be a philosophy in itself. It
must still stand rooted in that great tradition of humana civilitas from
which have grown the institutions of the Western liberal world. Cut it
away from that tradition, no matter for how good a reason, and it will
lose what sustains its life. (p. 93)
To what then are we committed? We are asked to believe that man is
by nature a rational and social being. We are asked to believe that the
growth of each individual towards responsibility and the freedom to choose
the best that he can discern is a purpose which must never be conditioned
by or made subservient to other purposes. We are asked to believe that
there is at all times and in all ways an ideal fitness of things which corresponds to these beliefs and that by ourselves and working with others
we are bound to do what we can to see that this fitness prevails in human
affairs. (p. 95)
The character and potentiality of human nature is the truth that must animate
and guide the law. But there is here no sweeping mandate to fashion into law
whatever seems conducive to human welfare. For tolerance as a positive virtue
is given high place, and there is great sensitivity to the importance of individual
freedom in the formulation and expression of beliefs. "[I]t is the development of
individual responsibility in those who are thus confirmed in the right to make
their own mistakes and to achieve their own victories" that is the prize. (p. 76)
The complete neutrality of law and government on the great issues of man's
nature and end cannot be accepted. Anyone who reads the decisions of courts
with an open mind knows that it is not accepted, even today. Such total indifference would detract significantly from the law's ability to command allegiance and weaken dangerously the impulses in society that raise man up. We
cannot do altogether without the law's guidance and education in these matters.
On the other hand, there are values in personal freedom and governmental
abstention that can scarcely be overstated, and which have come only in relatively
recent times to be adequately appreciated. The difficult task of the law today is
to draw a line that gives satisfactory recognition to both these considerations.
These are essentially the ideas that Lord Radcliffe has given us to reflect upon. He
has done so in a calm and humane fashion, but with a firmness that leaves no
doubt of his own deep concern. Those who share it can be directed to these
lectures with profit.
JoHN H. MANSFIELD
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PRINCIPLES, POLITICS,

Principles,Politics, & FundamentalLaw is a collection of four essays by Professor Herbert Wechsler of the Columbia Law School, one of the most powerful
legal thinkers of our day. The essays are entitled "Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law," "The Political Safeguards of Federalism," "Mr. Justice
Stone and the Constitution," and "The Issues of the Nuremberg Trial." The
most interesting and controversial of the essays is the first, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law." This essay was originally delivered as the 1959
Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School. It followed and took its theme
from the Holmes Lecture of the previous year by Judge Learned Hand, now reprinted under the title, The Bill of Rights, and is another in the current series of
scholarly critical analyses of the Supreme Court and its work.
Wechsler first takes up the much mooted question of the legitimacy of the
exercise by the Supreme Court of the power of judicial review. Challenging
Judge Hand's view that the power, although not expressly granted by the Constitution, was a valid interpolation, he finds an express duty of judicial review in
the courts in the words of the Supremacy Clause and the Judiciary Article, Article
III. As a theoretical question, the debate is interesting. There is much force
and reason in both positions, each of which is perhaps stated somewhat too
dogmatically, since we can only speculate today about the reason why the framers
of the Constitution did not deal explicitly with the problem. Even though it
assumed much greater importance after 1789, the question of the power of
judicial review had arisen in the colonies and states prior to 1789 and cannot 'be
regarded as having been unforeseeable. However, the question was answered by
the courts very early in our history, and the constitutional power of judicial review, if not the manner and conditions of its exercise, seems well established today.
Wechsler regards the question as being of more than theoretical importance,
however, since a judge's view of the legitimacy of the power may affect his
exercise of it. Therefore he proceeds to state his view that the courts have no
discretion to refuse to decide properly presented constitutional questions, save
only those committed by the Constitution to another agency of government, the
so-called "political questions."1 Of course he notes the discretionary jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, but in his view this relates only to a litigant's right to
obtain Supreme Court review of the decision of a lower court that does not have
such discretionary jurisdiction. Wechsler's concept of the duty of the courts is a
rigid one, and this rigidity is, for him, a source of strength. It gives the courts
the ability to say that they cannot avoid a decision in a given case because they
are constitutionally obligated to decide. Insofar as he seeks to base this view on
precedent, it is stated somewhat too strongly. As Professor Bickel has pointed
out, the "political question" cases cannot all be fitted neatly into the category
1. Anyone interested in what constitutes a "properly presented" constitutional questio
should study the material in HART &

WECHSLER,

THE FEDERAL COURTS -AND THE FEDERAL

SysTm (1953), one of the finest combinations of legal textbook, reference work, and
stimulator of thought in print today...
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of questions committed to another agency of government. 2 Perhaps we would
all do well to recognize that although there may be argument in individual cases,
the discretionary traditions of equity jurisprudence also have a place in con3
stitutional adjudication.
In addition, the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court means more
than just a denial of review to a litigant of the decision of a lower court. While
it is the function of all courts to decide the particular litigation presented to them,
all courts do more than that. Their decisions provide guides for conduct not
merely for the litigants in the particular decided case but for all persons similarly
situated. This is especially true with respect to decisions of the Supreme Court in
constitutional matters because they possess a finality, even if subject to constitutional amendment or overruling at some future date, not usually accorded to
decisions of the lower courts. 4 Thus the power of the Supreme Court to avoid
decision, and the wise exercise of that power, assume a particular importance
that is neglected, or perhaps even deprecated, by Wechsler.
It is this lack of appreciation that permits him to make the dogmatic statement that the grounds on which the Court dismissed the appeal in the miscegenation case, Naim v. Naim, were "wholly without basis in the law." (p. 47) In
that case, the validity of Virginia's miscegenation statute was brought squarely
into contention. The sparse record indicated that conceivably there was another
ground on which the case could be decided. The Supreme Court remanded the
case to gain additional facts bearing on this other issue. When the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals stated that there was no procedure by which these
facts could then be elicited, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as not having
been properly presented. 5 This is a very difficult case, for the Supreme Court
has no generalized discretionary power to refuse cases that come to it by way
of appeal instead of by way of petition for writ of certiorari. We may assume that
the Court would not have taken this extraordinary course of action had the main
issue in the case not been the explosive issue of miscegenation. But the issue was
miscegenation, and given the very troublesome nature of the problems faced by the
Court in the aftermath of the Segregation Cases, was it not reasonable for the
Court to decide (1) that the time was not propitious for decision of a misce2. Alexander Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term,
75 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 40, 47-51 (1961). Two other good commentaries on Mr.
Wechsler's Holmes Lecture are Louis Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional
Controversy, 109 UNxVERsrrY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 637 (1961) and Louis
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108
UNIvasrry OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1 (1959).

3.

See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).

See also Anthony Lewis, Legislative

Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAaVARD LAW REV Ew 1057 (1958).
4. It is not amiss to point out that the Supreme Court's power of "finality" in this regard
refers only to adjudications of constitutional power and does not and should not imply a

judgment as to the wisdom of the challenged governmental activity. The tendency of the
public to equate the constitutionality of such activity with its wisdom has been properly, but
perhaps vainly, deplored. See Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 217, 231-232 (1955). But see C. L. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE
COUaRT 56-86 (1960) and Bickel, op. cit. supra note 2, at 48-49.
5. 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, appeal vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand, 197 Va.
734, 90 S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
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genation case; (2) that if there was any possibility that the case could be decided
on another ground, the possibility should be explored; (3) the failure of the
appellant to present all the facts relevant to all the issues should not be permitted to force this important issue on the Court; and (4) that the appeal should
therefore be dismissed as having been improperly presented? The Court did not
articulate these reasons, but the history of the case as revealed in the brief orders
of the Court indicates that this is a likely explanation. A difficult question indeed,
and strong arguments may be made on both sides of the issue. But it seems to
me to be much too harsh to state that the grounds for the Court's decision were
"wholly without basis in the law." As a former government lawyer, Wechsler
should be more charitable, because he should appreciate more than most that one
of the most important functions of the Court is deciding what to decide, and
that its more serious errors have been in deciding too much rather than too little.
The most important sections of Wechsler's essay are those that deal with the
standards of judicial review and appraise their exercise. Meeting Judge Hand's
conclusion that the Supreme Court cannot review a legislative choice without
becoming a third legislative chamber, Wechsler disagrees, stating the difference
between the legislative and the judicial function in the difference between "legislative freedom to appraise the gains and losses in projected measures and the kind
of principled appraisal, in respect of values that can reasonably be asserted to
have constitutional dimension, that alone -is in the province of the courts .... .
(p. 22) Further amplifying he states that "A principled decision, in the sense
I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the
case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved." (p. 27)
If all that Wechsler is saying is that a decision of the Court should not depend
on whether the particular party is a Communist, a Negro, a widow, an injured
worker, or Jimmy Hoffa, and that a decision should be reasoned, then there will
be few who disagree with this statement of general principles. And indeed the
initial discussion does not seem to indicate that he means more than this. It is
only when one proceeds to the part labeled "Some Appraisals of Review" that
one perceives that his view of "neutral principles" and "principled decisions" has
substantive connotations.
After pointing out some deficiencies of the Supreme Court relating to its
method of decision, he then applies his standard of neutral principles to questions
of substantive interpretation. He attacks the pre-1937 decisions of the Court
dealing with the Commerce Clause, taxation, and "economic" due process, pointing to the poverty of the Court's reasoning in those cases. Granting that some of
those opinions, especially the later ones, are, to use a euphemism, undistinguished,
it seems most difficult to view the controversy in those cases as having anything to
do with "neutral principles." The controversy spanned decades and dealt with
very important questions of our national future. There were substantial groups
of reasonable men on both sides of the controversy. Most scholarly opinion today supports Wechsler's view that the post-1937 decisions repudiating the earlier
ones represent the most successful phase of modem constitutional development.
But this hardly proves that application of Wechsler's neutral principles would
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have dictated those results or would have dictated contrary results in the pre1937 cases.
Wechsler next turns to the cases dealing with racial problems. He questions
the result in the white primary cases, holding that the Texas Democratic Party
could not exclude Negroes from its primary.6 True, this is a difficult case for
finding the required "state action," but for Wechsler the result cannot be defended on grounds of neutral principles because in his view,
I should suppose that a denial of the franchise on religious grounds is
certainly forbidden by the Constitution. Are religious parties, therefore,
to be taken as proscribed? I should regard this result too as one plainly
to be desired, but is there a constitutional analysis on which it can be
validly decreed? Is it, indeed, not easier to project an analysis establishing
that such a proscription would infringe rights protected by the first
amendment? (p. 40)
Certainly it is a legitimate method of testing the reasoning of a particular decision
to apply it to similar situations. But the situation posed by Wechsler raises so
many different problems that this reviewer - who is troubled, as the Court was,
by the case-has no difficulty in saying that Wechsler's hypothetical presents
an entirely different situation. Racial constitutional problems are difficult enough
without trying to decide them by analogy to religious constitutional problems.
Finally, Wechsler comes to the School Segregation Cases.7 He approves
the result on moral and social grounds, as he approves the result in the white
primary cases, but he finds that result hard to defend on grounds of "neutral
principles." There is not space to set forth his whole argument. He sees the
issue not as a question of discrimination but as one of freedom of association.
Once he sets the issue in those terms, he sees a conflict between the rights of those
persons denied the right of association by segregation and the rights of those
persons forced to associate because of integration. He then confesses himself
unable to write an opinion, based on neutral principles, upholding the claim of
the former.
This is a nice theoretical question. But the transfer of the issue from one of
discrimination to one of freedom of association involves a giant step, which
Wechsler takes with the following sentences:
In the context of a charge that segregation with equal facilities is a denial
of equality, is there not a point in Plessy in the statement that if "enforced
separation stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority" it is solely
because its members choose "to put that construction upon it"? Does
enforced separation of the sexes discriminate against females merely because it may be the females who resent it and it is imposed by judgments
predominantly male? Is a prohibition against miscegenation a discrimination against the colored member of the couple who would like to marry?
(p. 46)
As Mr. Justice Holmes stated in another context, "a page of history is worth a
6. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
7. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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volume of logic."s One can make fine logical arguments that segregation of
Negroes, at least with equal facilities, would not discriminate against them, but
these arguments simply ignore the history of the Negro in this country. And to
compare it to the separation of the sexes is the same type of strained analogy that
Wechsler used in discussing the white primary cases.
When I finished the sections labeled "The Standards of Review" and "Some
Appraisals of Review," I had the feeling that I had not been convinced that
any of the so-called "neutral principles" were guides to decision. That decisions
should not be ad hoc, that the procedure of the Supreme Court with respect
to its method of decision can be improved, these are matters that do not touch
the substance of decision. That decisions should be "principled" is an easy statement to agree to, but Wechsler does not show us how this is a guide to decision
other than to offer us the general statement and his view of what follows therefrom in a few particular cases. If he means that any decision that is "principled" is, in terms of neutral principles, "rightly" decided even though there
are reasonable arguments for a contrary decision (which might also have been
reached in "principled" terms), then this is hardly a guide to decision. It is
rn rely an argument for excellence in thinking and in opinion writing, something
with which we may all fervently agree. If, on the other hand, he means that "principled" analysis would yield, at least in many of the important Supreme Court
cases, only one "right" result, then I must enter my disagreement. 9 Most
important cases that come to the Supreme Court involve hotly contested questions of principle on which reasonable arguments can be advanced for both
sides. Each of us may in a given case believe that reason favors a particular
result, but are any of us so bold as to believe that in each such case reason is
so clear as to be obvious? At least the disagreement of others, all reasonable
men, should be a caution.
Wechsler has picked a series of decisions as examples, presumably among
the strongest he can find, of cases in which his guide of neutral principles seems
to him to indicate that the Court was wrong, even though in many of the
cases he favored the result on social or moral grounds. I find myself in disagreement with him on many of these examples; and even when I agree, I
would find it hard to say that no reasonable man could disagree with me. Of
course it is always easier to pick holes in another man's theory than to construct
a theory of one's own. Actually I am tempted to state that if Wechsler cannot
formulate a satisfactory general standard that will serve as a guide to decision,
then it cannot be done. And in fact I believe this. The most we may hope
for is for able judges who will approach the decision-making process in a judicial
frame of mind. Of course different judges will differ about the scope of this
duty. We cannot and should not expect anything else. But as long as they start
8. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
9. Mr. Wechsler would doubtless be horrified by the suggestion that he is lending his
powerful prestige to those who believe that law is a "brooding omnipresence in the sky,"
to borrow the expression used by Mr. Justice Holmes in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (dissent) when he dismissed that notion. But if Wechsler
means to imply the definition of "principled" suggested above, then perhaps he should
consider further the implications of his "neutral principles."
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from the premise and always remember that they are judges, performing a
task that is far different from that of a legislator or a member of the executive,
then we have the basic raw material for the performance by them of the task
of judicial review. Anything more by way of guide to decision in a specific case
cannot be expected.
The second essay, "The Political Safeguards of Federalism- The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,"
is a careful study of the methods by which the Legislature and the Executive
of our National Government are elected, with particular reference to some of
the proposals for "reform" that have been advanced in recent years. Wechsler
points out the little realized shortcomings of some of these proposals and then
analyzes the effect of the present method of selection. His emphasis on the
great role played by the states and statist considerations is a valuable counterbalance to much of present-day thinking, which has concentrated on the growth
of national power. This essay is exceedingly valuable for every student of
American government and for anyone interested in the American political
process.
The third essay, "Mr. Justice Stone and the Constitution," is a reprint of
an essay that appeared shortly after the death of Chief Justice Stone in 1946
in an issue of the Columbia Law Review dedicated to his memory. It is a
compilation of Stone's views on many constitutional subjects, but perhaps because of the occasion that called forth the essay, it does not attempt a critical
evaluation of his work. This evaluation still remains to be made -by Wechsler,
who knew Stone well and is highly qualified to subject the mass of his writing
to critical analysis, or by someone else willing to undertake this difficult and
interesting task.
The final essay, "The Issues of the Nuremberg Trial," is a thoughtful defense
of the decision to prosecute the German war criminals and the procedure under
which the trial was carried out. The reason for its inclusion in this volume is
set forth in the Introduction.
My purpose is not only to reiterate a defense of the trial and judgment
that the passing years have not induced me to repent, despite the vogue
that hindsight has accorded their disparagement. The more important
Oint is that the prosecution yields a testing case of what the striving for
egality entails. . . I undertake to show how far, in the remote and
unreal setting of the International Military Tribunal, neutrality and
generality of principle emerged as the intrinsic qualities of law and
prime constituents of a judicial action. The case has an important
bearing, therefore, on the central thesis of 'Toward Neutral Principles."
It has a bearing also on the larger question of when law and legal
method are appropriate and useful means for building foreign policy.
Given the principles that we affirmed and acted upon at Nuremberg
as legal principles, could our response to Korea, on the one hand, or
to Suez on the other, really have been different than it was? (p. xii-xiii)
Once again, I would question the validity of the analogy as not being very
relevant and as detracting from the force of his thesis. Actually I think the
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answer to Wechsler is, "Yes, the response could have been different." Not that
it necessarily should have been. But the legal principles affirmed at Nuremberg
do not yield any sure response for me to Korea or Suez any more than they
do for Laos, Cuba, or Berlin today.
Indeed my great wonder is why Wechsler sees such a great similarity between the legal principles motivating our response to Nuremberg and Suez
and Korea while he does not see the same similarity between the Nuremberg
Trial and the Eichmann Trial, which he has elsewhere deplored. 1 0 While
there are important differences, it is nevertheless interesting to compare the
strength of Wechsler's view on the Eichmann Trial with the strength of his
view on the wisdom and justness of the Nuremberg Trial. Many of the objections he has to the Eichmann Trial are similar to objections raised against the
Nuremberg Trial and disposed of by Wechsler: the vindictive aspect of the
proceeding; the claim of universal jurisdiction over the war criminal coupled
with the implied denial of equal justice in that it was and is considered unthinkable by the prosecuting countries to allow the same sanctions to be applied in
connection with any war crimes that might 'have been committed by their own
nationals; and finally, the possibility of trial in an international or even a
German court, since the Nuremberg court can hardly 'be regarded as being an
international court despite its name. It would have been instructive if Wechsler
had added a few paragraphs dealing with these questions to bring his thinking
up to date when he decided to reprint this essay. But we should be thankful
that the original essay has been saved from obscurity by the decision to include
it in this volume.
These four essays of Wechsler are open to many challenges, but like all of
Wechsler's writings they are themselves challenges to thought. They should not
be ignored.
ANDREW L. KAUFMAN
10. On a television program of the National Broadcasting Company, April 8, 1961,
entitled "The Nation's Future," discussing the subject, "Does the Trial of Eichmann by
Israel Serve the Cause of International Justice?" A transcript is available from the network.

OF CHRIST.. By Bernard Hiring, C.SS.R. Translated from the German by Edwin C. Kaiser, C.PP.S. (from the fifth edition, 1959, of
Das Gesetz Christi*). Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1961. Pp.
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An original work like Bernard Hiring's The Law of Christ always poses a
problem for its contemporaries: How does its originality change our view of
the past from which it came? The distinctive note of Father Hiring's work
is that a Christian ethics is a dialogue between God- Christ as God-Manand man. Christian ethics is not a monologue concerned with man's self-perfection, nor with man's obedience to a remote God. What light does his work
shed upon the history of ethics within our civilization? In the first part of this
* This work is published as Volume I of Hiring's General Moral Theology.
succeeding volumes are in process' of translation.
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paper, I would like to make some comments from the point of view of contemporary philosophical ethics. In the second part, I will turn more directly
to Christian ethics; and in the third, to Father Hiring's study.
I.

CONTEMPORARY

ANGLo-AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS

The moral practice, like the political and legal practice, of the AngloAmerican peoples has always been more mature than our theory. There are
a great many things which we do, for which we have not an exportable theory
of why we do them. There are a great many things which we do not do,
although so far as our theory goes we might very well do them. In the past,
the gap between what our philosophy asserted and our practice itself was often
filled by religious training. We were respectful, orderly, law-abiding, partly
at least because our religious training taught us -to cherish an assumed order
in social relationships and in human actions. Now our philosophies no longer
find the order we once assumed in things; relationships, actions, and our own
inner selves are no longer conceived by philosophy as they once were. On the
other hand, the general agreement fostered by religion has broken down. Once
accepted conventions are more frequently questioned in the mobility of -modern
society. Nevertheless, the order that remains in our practice has itself little
justification in contemporary moral theory. To resolve moral questions, we
would find philosophy of less help than common sense, convention, or sentiment.
The fact is that Hume anchored his ethics in sentiment and custom, Sumner
his in convention, Westermarck his in a sophisticated kind of social relativism,
the early Ayer his in noncognitive emotivism. Among the cognitivists, Ross's
formal categories of prima facie duties read suspiciously (though not entirely)
like a code book of English gentlemen at a certain time and place; G. E.
Moore's intuitions have the same limitation. Pragmatism easily becomes an
ethic of success. If one were to take the state of contemporary ethics with
ruthless seriousness, one might do fairly well whatever one pleased and find
somewhere a theory to justify it. "Form your conscience as you will, and act
according to it." I do not see why the most absurd suggestions could not find
support in one theory or another, and with enough logical adjustments be
made watertight. Dikes hold back the tide of such absurd suggestions, however: the dikes of moral sentiment, convention, and common sense held over
from the past. Here again the practice of the Anglo-American people is superior
to our philosophy. But the relation between practice and philosophy can be
reciprocal. The uncertainties of philosophers lead intelligent men into dubious
practice; the pressures upon practice and the collapse of conventions leave
philosophy based on practice or convention blind.
The poverty of contemporary ethics was nowhere clearer than in the discussions concerning the Nuremburg trials after World War II. Officers under
Hitler (and Hitler himself) may have done what the mores of their social
group, legally constituted authorities, and their own personal emotions dictated.
(Hider put his own trust in his intuitions and inner imperative.) Now on most
contemporary ethical theories it is very difficult to say just why these men were
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ethically wrong, although according to the moral sentiments and conventions
of the non-Axis world they certainly were. And it is on this ground, that of
human sentiment, that the criminals were so declared. But their sentiments
were different. Hence, in effect we did not declare them guilty, but deviant.
But what is the norm from which deviant action deviates? The norm
chosen by the leaders of the victors? By the powerful? Take the question a
step further. Do the leaders choose a norm -by consulting the sentiments of
the majority of their people? (In the mood of a moment? or over a period of
time?) On the other hand, if the leaders consult an educated, cultured
elect, they run into the philosophical uncertainties of which we spoke: men
who themselves turn to convention or sentiment or intuition to justify their
moral decisions. That is to say, no intellectual basis is available for ethical
decision. Insofar as Western morality is still coherent, it derives from an
inherited and now intellectually indefensible sentiment and convention.
The one nearly universally accepted moral principle available in the West
is that of the dignity of the individual. But there is, correspondingly, an uneasy
silence about pushing the matter further on: to ask why has the individual an
inviolable dignity? For if one wanted to be perfectly cynical, one would point
out that man is nothing special in the universe, that morality is of no "higher"
value than biology, that we know nothing about man's "meaning," and that,
in fact, there is no final reason why man is any more inviolable than any other
chemical organism, or animal. It is clear that a large portion of the human
race does not value individual human life, or individual conscience. It is not
at all clear why the other half does.
-"The ililemnma of contemporary moral philosophy in the West is that it is
living by intuitions, imperatives, conventions, and sentiments which it has
derived from a past whose intellectual groundwork it has rejected (and does
not 'understand); and it has supplied no intellectual groundwork in replacement. On the contrary, almost everything about contemporary moral philosophy in England and America makes that replacement very unlikely. Emphasis
upon the analysis of the language of a civilization long cut off from its intellectual
roots can at best result in teaching us how sick we are. Emphasis upon positivistic problems, of which we have sure measurement, excludes meditation
upon human destiny, of which no man and apparently nothing in the world
is the measure. The really interesting questions are why intellectual activity
is not simply absurd, why living mildly in peace with one another is not
radically disharmonious with a cruel and ruthless world process, and why it
is considered enlightenment to follow what are only prevailing opinions of a
time. Underneath the placid surface of Anglo-American philosophy there lurk
the questions of the absurd. The sense of law and order in Anglo-American
society, the police force and the pressures of social conformity, settle our moral
disputes and prevent the ruptures in sentiment and convention which would
reveal to us in practice the chaos which already thrives in our intellectual vision.
To the juvenile delinquent who is not ill but says calmly, "Why not? It is only
a rat race, isn't it?" there is no intellectually defensible answer in current contemporary moral philosophy.
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II.

AN INTEGRAL MORAL VISION

In the nineteenth century, religious writers like Dostoievsky argued against
the positivists that cutting the roots of belief in God would be cutting the roots
of moral practice. These writers overlooked two factors. One is that in order
to live well men do not need a thorough-going intellectual justification; they
can begin with faith in man and do quite well. The other is that men do not,
after all, live by logical positivism or - to be more general - by philosophy.
In the main, men live by convention and sentiment and their own partial
insights. The intellectual denial of God in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has not led, among university professors for exainple, to wanton inmorality. Certain areas of moral conscience - professional dedication, personal
dignity, international brotherhood - have been developed to a high degree.
And a certain moral sense for what is done and what is not done, and for what
an ideal man is (David Riesman's "autonomous man," for example), is still
very strong. In spite of the fact that many intellectuals believe there is no God,
no hierarchy of values discoverable in man's nature, no special role discoverable
for man in the universe, no way even of understanding the universe except in
relation to our own tiny, shifting point of view, there remains, nevertheless, a
certain faith in man and in fraternity. It is a faith which has no metaphysical
view of the whole universe to back it up; moreover, it flies in the face of what
can be discovered by scientific method. It is a faith which, as can be seen in
Bertrand Russell's "A Free Man's Worship" or Walter Kaufmann's The Faith
of a Heretic, has no intellectual grounding for its ultimate terms.
The faith of modem man in man, finally, seems to spring positively from
a certain hubris, and negatively from a distaste for conceptions of God. The
positive and negative motives are interrelated. A conception of God hovers
behind Western ethics, even when God is no longer central to ethics; and that
God is usually conceived as a threat to man's dignity. Behind Kant lies a severe
Deity, himself, it seems, subject to a law outside himself; behind the early utilitarians seems to lie the remote God of the Deists, content to let men work out
their calculus of pleasure and pain; behind Roderick Firth's Ideal Observer
lies God as a seeing eye, dispassionate, impartial, abstract. More generally,
God is conceived as some sort of "extra," outside the system, called upon as
rewarder and punisher to redress the malfunctionings of the system. Modern
thinkers seem to understand the matter thus: Whereas men seek human perfection, human dignity, or human happiness, God offers an extra "salvation."
Whereas men seek a rational morality which man can measure, God's morality
is uncontrollable: and mistakes in the conception of God or of what God wants
wreak disaster in human living. To say that "x is right" means "x is approved
of by God" opens the way to corruption; for don't men imagine God and what
God approves of according to their own inclinations? "As a man is, so he,
judges." And too many men try to force their own ideas, as God's ideas, upon
others.
Now the curious irony is that it is the effort to base morality on man alone
that has resulted in a growing sense of the irrationality and absurdity that lurks
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around man. It has also resulted in a faith in man, the value of intellectual
inquiry, and morality itself, a faith which has no intellectual justification. (Why
lead the examined life, why establish universities, why do this instead of that,
if in a final view the universe and man's destiny are, or may be, unintelligible?
Why favor intelligence?) Nevertheless, men have been led to believe that
Christianity prospers only at the expense of man, that God's rewards and
punishments degrade morality, that conformity to the supernatural demands
crushing of the natural, passivity instead of activity, docility instead of intelligence, magic instead of critique. Positively their hubris, and negatively their
distaste for-the God they see, lead them to adopt the stance of Prometheus:
to prefer chains, on barren rocks, in the night, to submission to an unjust God.
The misconception of the relations between nature and grace leads to
alienation between man and God. If communication breaks down, men attempt
monologue. But only dialogue explains ethics completely. For ancient peoples
the whole universe was personal; God was closer to them than they to themselves; morality was a relation to Him. When they spoke about God as rewarder
or punisher, they didn't think of the deistic god outside the universe scrutinizing
and adjusting scales. Their notion even of rewarder and punisher was of one
immediate and present, though other and incorruptible.
It is true that Aquinas distinguished the natural from the supernatural, in
a way destroying earlier simplicity. But we must be very clear as to what he
did. He did not make two realms where before there was only one. He did
not reify an abstract distinction. There is only one world, a world in which
there is much irrationality and sin, a world in which there is much goodness
and grace. In Ohristian terms, there is not now and there never was a world
of nature. Man and his morality are simply not understandable within a closed
system of "pure nature," for there is no such thing. (From what is called
theologically the "preternatural" state of the first humans, there was an immediate transition to the world "after the fall.") Pure nature is only an abstraction. For Aquinas, at least for the later Aquinas, pure nature is like a line on
a graph, a "what might have been" (but is not).1 The Thomistic formula
gratia supponit naturam cannot be translated "grace builds on nature," for
there is no solid entity, nature, upon which to build. It does grave harm to
imagine two solid blocks, grace and nature, one on top of the other; or two
discrete territories, one adjacent to the other. It does great harm to reify what
is designated by these two terms. If we do, grace becomes a magic force beyond
intelligence or critique; and nature becomes a solid, inviolable domain, resistant
and jealous. We then imagine that after we use our intelligence and will, then
a magic force does something "extra"; and that, at a certain point, it becomes
virtuous to stop thinking or willing. But the psychological sicknesses that can
lurk at precisely that point are indication that such bifurcation between nature
1. Cf., e.g., the growth in Aquinas's thought from his treatment in II SENT., Q. 1, a. 2 to
his treatment in DE VEPITATE Q. 24, a. 12 of the question, "Whether a man without grace
can avoid sinning?" In the earlier treatment, thinking that the abstraction, natural man,
was- the object of this question, he answered Yes. In the later treatment, much more concrete, he answered No. Cf. Novak, St. Thomas in Motion, THE DowNsmE Rzvizw
"(Autumn, 1960).
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and grace is mistaken at its beginning. The religious person who insists upon
intuitions, imperatives, mysterious happenings, areas of no more questioning or
no more willing, is ordinarily- and justly- looked upon as ill. But wherever
in Western religious life this imagination of two separate realms of nature and
grace has taken root, even the well sometimes take early refuge in "God's will"
or "Providence" as a means of avoiding intelligent inquiry into intelligible
secondary causes. And the nonbelievers try to base morality on man alone.
To imagine grace as a physical "push" or "pull," or as a "lump of shining
matter," or as a "motor," or even as an "energy," results in many dilemmas
(the opposition between grace and free will, for example) whose root is simply
a poorly chosen image; or, more exactly, in the use of images at all. If one
takes grace rather as knowing and loving- as activities- then one sees more
clearly how grace is "sharing in Christ's life" (precisely, his knowing and loving)
and at the same time my own. The traditional inspiratio voluntatis and
illuminatio mentis are precisely such activity.
The conception of grace as activity accounts for sanctifying grace, actual
and habitual; for gratia sanans and gratia elevans. It is also useful for such
usages as "grace of state" (i.e., knowing and loving in this task) and "the grace
of a beautiful day.., or of a certain trial" (i.e., as stimuli toward new knowing
and loving). Finally, it seems very useful for removing the "magic" from notions
of ex opere operato in sacramental grace. For it is the unity of the intention of
the minister (knowing and loving in at least this minimal sense) with Christ's
power-giving intention that constitutes the sacraments, whatever the further
dispositions of the minister. (And when these further dispositions are active
knowing and loving on his part, then the ex opere operante conditions are
also filled, and his activity is drawn up into Christ's.)
Every nonevil human knowing and loving is an actual grace, either disposing
for or intensifying one's share in Christ's knowing and loving; and even sin is
turned to grace. Everything leads to God; or, misused, distracts from him. We
live under that one economy, and it alone.
In this one economy, as Bernanos says, "Everything is grace." Everything
speaks of God, or is a distraction from him. There is not one realm of the
sacred, one of the profane: everything has its sacred aspect, and its profane.
There is not one realm of grace, one of nature: everything has its concrete
relation to our redemption, and an abstract aspect in which it is merely neutral.
Sunlight on trees, a heavy rain, our studies, a boring job, sickness at home,
or health, a kind word or an insult, an insight or a perduring problem, a lesson
from experience or another failure, a friendship or an enmity -everything
is
a relation to God. But it is not for that reason magic or mystique, not hidden
voices or romantic insights. Each thing is simply a new stimulus for our intelligence and will; we can react to its full possibilities or not.
"Full possibilities" is the key phrase. If we understand all that goes into
each event, we are _capable of an integral moral vision. The contemporary
philosophical view makes no pretense of understanding all aspects of an event;
it does not even understand its own faith in man. To the scientific understanding
of events in which contemporary philosophy shares, the Christian adds meta-
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physical understanding, and also Christian faith. It is important to see that
these latter two methods, which are brought to bear upon each event, are
nonscientific but not antiscientific; different, but not contrary; cannot in
principle conflict with science, but may at a given historical moment conflict.
Metaphysical understanding is extrapolation from the fact that men sometimes understand and that some things are understandable to the view that
all that is is understandable; that, although men do not understand everything,
everything is understandable. In this view, intellectual pursuit and intelligent
morality make sense. Christian faith is an understanding of man's destiny,
through a revelation made by God to a concrete 'historical people, a revelation
made in dialogue with this people, culminating in the incarnation of the Son
of God, and preserved in his Church. The scientific view of an event teaches
us the immediate and crucial factors involved; the metaphysical view relates
the event to a world order, in which both intelligibility and unintelligibility
enter, according to the laws- it seems- of emergent probability; 2 the Christian view relates the event to a personal God known by his own entry into
human history.
When we are able to understand the full scientific account of an event, the
relation of the event to world order, and the personal significance of the event
in terms of our own destiny, we understand the "full possibihities" of the event.
We have an integral moral vision. It is to be noted that there is but one event,
and one integral moral vision. To oppose one way of looking on the event to
another, or to make one depend upon another, is to miss the point that the one
concrete event is simply too rich to be exhausted by any one of them, and needs
all of them if it is to be fully understood.
III.

HXMNG'S CONTMIUTION

Not to have opposed faith to reason, not to have pitted a law-giving God
against docile man, not to have confounded the view of faith (in theology)
with the view of metaphysics or science; to have seen the uniqueness of the
view of faith, and to 'have seen that, nevertheless, it is one and the same concrete event which science, metaphysics, and faith regard - these are the contribution of Hiring's study. The Christian vision of man and his actions is an
integral one; Hiring has presented the wholeness. Through and through the
Christian vision is intelligible: scientific data yield a scientific account, metaphysical data a metaphysical, and data of faith a theological. In a certain sense,
Hir.ng's book is not original. That all these relationships should work out so
has long been believed by theologians. But Hring has from his first page
assumed the position that the view of faith is not a view of "extra" entities,
after scientific and metaphysical entities have been treated; faith is not icing on
a heavy cake, nor adornment on a brutal fact. Faith is another perspective on
the one whole reality, this one concrete economy in which we live. It is not
2.
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the only perspective; for total understanding, the others are needed. But one
same whole reality is under view.
For previous writers of manuals on moral theology - e.g., Noldin, Priammer,
Regatillo, and Zalba - a more or less deductive metaphysics, together with
an inductive consideration of individual cases, formed the two main blades of
moral inquiry. The structural backbone of their effort, dictating the pattern
for the blades to follow, is a combination of what they call natural law and
the systematization of natural and ecclesiastical law in canon law. To be sure,
discussions always open and close with the adducing of the relevant texts from
Scripture, and with exhortations to attend also to the positive side of Christian
living, not only to the legal side. Some of these manuals are even systematized
on the exposition of the exigencies of the Christian virtues, in an effort to
combat an excessive legalism. But the abstract specter of "the natural man"
haunts even these latter .texts, and involves them in the effort of fashioning a
sort of procrustean bed, to which the man who would be good must "measure
up." The result is that even emphasis upon the virtues goes for nought, because
the system is still an abstraction and hence a prey to various kinds of legalism.
It is not sufficiently noted that Anglo-Saxon conceptions of law, arising from
the concrete rather than descending from a universal principle, have not much
influenced the thinking of such theological writers. (On the question of
Church and State, the two divergent approaches to law make crucial differences;
similarly elsewhere.) Furthermore, the student of these texts wants to know,
Where did these abstractions come from? Why is law so little like life?
For Hiring, morality is a dialogue between man and God, in every event and
every action.
For the Christian, religion is infinitely more than any sentiment. It is more
than any need or experience, even more than "saving one's soul," striving
for "happiness." It is fellowship with the living God.... Not even the
glory and majesty of God give us religion. We come to the heart of religion only at the point of encounter between the word of God and the
response of man. (p. 35)
Responsibility - response - becomes the key word in Hiring's ethics.
God the transcendent and the infinitely removed is the God to whom man
responds; but it is through the Son of God and in Him that the world was
created; and this Son became man. Man's likeness to God, through the Son,
becomes in turn the key to response. But man who must respond is body-andspirit; individual, person, and member of a community; committed to history
and to terrestrial tasks; and called to a life of worship. Built upon a full view
of what man is, Hiring's ethic is on good ground for teaching the imitation of
Christ. Christ was fully man, fully incarnated. Christ's way of life was not to
deny his humanity, nor its limits, nor its exposure to darkness and to unintelligibility (sin, suffering, death). Man was created through and in Christ's image
(as the eternal Logos); and Christ's historic life accepts that human created
nature in all its dimensions. To imitate Christ, man too must accept his nature
in all its dimensions and with all its limitations. (Ivan Karamazov could accept

NATURAL LAW FORUM
either God or his creation, but not both.) It is only a perversion of Christian
ethics to deny a part of man's nature: to slight, for example, his body, his relations to his community, or on the other hand his unique and inviolable person,
or his engagement in history. The struggle in Christian ethics is not between
body and soul, or between terrestrial concerns and heavenly concerns, or even
between impersonal law and personal inclinations. It is between exploiting the
full possibilities of events, in imitation of Christ, and limiting one's view and
energies to less. Freedom is the ability to respond fully to an event, in all its
dimensions; and its abuse is to settle for less. Sin is a consciously chosen failure
to realize the full possibilities of a situation.
For Hiring, the natural law concepts of responsibility, freedom, the whole
man, person and community, and the like, at first glance seem to be transmuted
by the onrush of the law of Christ. But a clear historical sense reveals something extraordinary. In giving these natural law concepts flesh and blood, as
it were, through the person of Christ, Hiiring has made natural law theory more
like the concrete natural law of Aquinas than it has been for centuries. The
abstractness and legalism are gone, as it is time they be; for Latin scholasticism
never seems to have grasped the concreteness of Aquinas's revolution. Thus, Hiring sees responsibility not as obligation towards an abstract proposition, but as
response to a Person. But this Person does not speak with a mysterious inner
voice, or merely through a system of law. One must attend with respect to every
aspect of reality to hear this Person: the concrete event, one's own personality,
future effects, pleasure and pain, the codified prudence of law, advice, prayer,
etc. For God speaks in everything. Hliring treats these elements separately,
giving due weight to each in their effect upon concrete decision and judgment
In similar fashion, Hiring's treatment of other natural law concepts returns us
to full, concrete modes of thinking in approaching metaphysics; beneath the
personalizing influence of Christ, natural law ethics here discovers its own best
nonlegalistic, nonabstract self. This influence is fitting compensation for the
artificiality sometimes imported into natural law ethic by well-meaning but
impersonalist Christians.
Hiring's system could be outlined, in terms of the "two questions of ethics"
which contemporary moral philosophers are fond of distinguishing, in the
following fashion. In answer to the first question, What is right? Hiring could
answer: " 'x is right' means 'x is what Christ would approve.'" In answer to the
second question, What actions are right? Hiiring could answer: "Those acts are
right which Christ would do, in the given situation." Such a response has philosophical precedents. In recent literature, Roderick Firth's Ideal Observer theory
employs a similar analysis.3 In the philosophia perennis, Aristotle's man of
practical wisdom fills a similar role-but much more concretely and humanly,
it must be remarked, than Firth's disincarnate, hypothetical observer. Furthermore, the sources to which one can go to find out what Christ would have approved, or would do, are many: not only the explicit words of the Gospels, but
also the living figure of Christ - the sensus Christi - one can grasp there; not
3. Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer, 12 PHILOSOPHY
REsEARCH 317-345 (1952).
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only a long tradition of meditation and explanation, but also the advice of a living
Church; not only sense of the Christian community in which one lives, but also
the resources of personal meditation and insight. It may be noted that Christ,
as God, is omniscient about all facts relevant to the situation; and hence those
who would imitate him must be as diligent as possible in learning about all
aspects of the events in which they find themselves: the scientific not least.
Wherever they close their eyes, stilling the desire for full understanding, there
they fall off from the imitation of Christ.
The principle, the norm, the center, and the goal of Christian Moral
Theology is Christ. The law of the Christian is Christ Himself in Person.
He alone is our Lord, our Savior. In Him we have life and therefore
also the law of our life. Christian life may not be viewed solely from the
standpoint of formal enactment of law and not even primarily from the
standpoint of the imperative of the divine will. We must always view it
from the point of the divine bounty... In Christ, the Father has given
us everything. (p. vii)
Hiring's treatment is sometimes too ecclesiastical, too smug or apologetic in
reference to Catholics, too simplistic and brief with non-Catholic thinkers. But
the larger movement of his thought is by no means ungenerous. It may be hoped
that his work soon becomes the standard Christian moral text. It is a solid step
toward that Christian humanism, that relation between nature and grace, which
the Renaissance fumbled for and missed.
MICHAEL NOVAK
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By H. L. A. Hart. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
Pp. viii, 263. 21s.

CONCEPT OF LAw.

1961.

At the center of this significant contribution to jurisprudence is the contention
that a proper analysis of law begins with a consideration of the viewpoint of the
community whose law it is. It is only from this "internal" standpoint that
the functions of law may be understood. Thus viewed, law may be broken into
two elements: primary rules and secondary rules. Primary rules are standards
of behavior for a society: they impose obligations which are "accepted" by a
substantial part of the community as binding apart from sanctions. If they
existed alone, they would be largely indistinguishable from morals. Secondary
rules supply the obvious deficiencies that attend a set of primary rules alone.
Secondary rules perform three main roles, distinct from each other and from the
creation of obligations. One kind of secondary rule, "the rule of recognition,"
identifies the primary rules so that they are marked off from morals, etiquette,
or private wish. Thus, in England the rule of recognition prescribes that statutes
enacted by the Queen in Parliament are law, decisions of courts are law, duly
enacted municipal ordinances are law. A second group of secondary rules provides for change in primary obligations. These rules include both those which
permit the making of new public laws and those, such as the law of contracts or
wills, which give private parties the right to create or alter primary oblgati6s.
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A third branch of secondary rules deals with the tribunals to determine the violations of primary rules and with the application of sanctions for their breach.
The author comments on this model: "If we stand back and consider the
structure which has resulted from the combination of primary rules of obligation
and the secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication, it is plain that
we have here not only the heart of a legal system, but a most powerful tool for
the analysis of much that has puzzled both the jurist and the political theorist."
(p. 95) This combination of primary and secondary rules is the "key to the
science of jurisprudence." (p. 79)
The author's exultation is justly founded, in large measure, on the advance he
has made from the sterile pattern of analysis of law in terms of force with which
Austin is so much associated. For Austin the law consisted in commands to which
sanctions are annexed,' or, as Hart bluntly puts it, in "orders backed by threats,"
"the gunman situation writ large." 2 This simple description, Hart notes, fails to
account for the whole class of laws identified by him under the head "rules of
change."
Is the essence of Austin saved in the more sophisticated model of Kelsen? Hart
next inquires. Kelsen, in an analysis not without influence on Hart, has contended that "command" is at most metaphorical when used to refer to law. He
has gone on to find that law consists -in "impersonal and anonymous commands,"
called norms, which stipulate sanctions. "It is -the task of legal science," Kelsen
has stated, "to represent the law of the community.., in the form of statements
to the effect that 'if such conditions are fulfilled, then such and such a sanction
will follow.' "3 Thus the law of contracts is analyzed as follows: "If two parties
make a contract, and if one party does not fulfill the contract, and if the other
party brings an action against the first party in the competent court, then the
court shall order a sanction against the first party." 4 As Hart notes, by greater
elaboration of the antecedent or "if" clauses, all his secondary rules could be
restated in the form of conditional directions to officials to apply sanctions.
To this "formidable" recasting of Austin, Hart rightly brings a fundamental
objection: the theory distorts the way law actually functions. Hart's inclusion of
sanctions among the secondary rules means that he does not reject Kelsen's statement that "coercion is an essential element of law." But neither does he admit
that coercion is the typical function of law. Public prosecution or private litigation resulting in official application of sanctions is an ancillary device invoked
when the law has failed to function in its primary purpose of creating standards.
It is a mistake to think of law only from the viewpoint of the bad man who seeks
to avoid punishment. A better understanding of the law can be had by looking at
it as "a puzzled man" or "an ignorant man" trying to channel his activities. The
principal function of law is observed socially not in the infliction of penalties but
1. JOHN AusriN, 1 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 182 (1869).
2. The "gunman" metaphor was used by Hart to criticize Austin in Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HRvARD LAw REvIw 593, 603 (1958), an article in
which a number of ideas in THs CONCEPT OF LAW were first adumbrated.
3. HANs KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 45 (trans. A. Wedberg, 1949).
4. Id. at 53.

5. Id. at 25.
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"in the diverse ways in which the law is used to control, to guide, and to plan
life out of court." (p. 39)
Hart's analysis offers an equally effective critique of such formulae of Legal
Realism as "law is what the courts will do" or "law is what courts do."6 These
formulations fail to account for Hart's secondary rules. Even excluding these
rules from the scope of law, these theories fail because they confuse prediction
with the community's acceptance of rules which makes prediction possible. In
a particular game, Hart observes, the score is what the scorer says it is or what
he will record. But in scoring, the scorer applies a rule independent of his will.
An ordinary game is not a game of "scorer's discretion," of arbitrary calls; and
if a player remarks that he has won a point, this observation is not merely a prediction of what the scorer will do, but an assessment of the applicability of the
rule from the viewpoint of one who accepts the rule. Similarly, in a case, "the
adherence of the judge is required to maintain the standards, but the judge does
not make them" (p. 142) - a statement reminiscent of the nineteenth century
assertion that a judge only finds the law, but qualified in Hart's book by his insistence on the creative role of the judge in the penumbra of uncertainty and
novelty which attend the application of any definite statutes. 7 Even here the
judge refers to standards marked out by the community. A statement that a
particular result will occur in a case is not only a prediction of the judge's behavior, but a reference to'a rule accepted apart from this behavior. (pp. 143-144)
Hart's criticisms are penetrating, vigorous, and convincing.8 But a book
offering "the key to the science of jurisprudence" provokes as many questions as
it offers answers. Does Hart seriously share the belief of Austin, whose phrase
he thus adopts, that there is a science of jurisprudence? It would seem probable
that he does, particularly as he speculates as to why there is such debate as to
the subject matter of this science in comparison with the generally undisputed
subjects of medicine or chemistry. (p. 1)
Hart's book has the "scientific" purpose of advancing "legal theory by providing an improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system
and a better understanding of the resemblances and differences between law,
coercion and morality, as types of social phenomena." (p. 17) But is this modest
purpose of analysis feasible without examination of the larger purposes to which
the legal structure is believed to be directed?
Other sciences may be more easily circumscribed. Their subject matter is defined by the Baconian purpose for which they are normally pursued: the prediction
6. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920), and compare LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 9 (2nd ed., 1951).
7. Hart has not yet met head-on Fuller's contentions that no statutes are interpreted word
by word and that even the simplest statutory phrase for the "clearest cases" requires a
decision as to the purpose of the statute. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 630, 661-667 (1958).
8. The last chapter of the book is an especially effective critique of the Austinian notion
of sovereignty in international law. While this notion has caused much harm in international
affairs (see

F.S.C.

NORTHROP, PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
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179-180 [1960]), it is increasingly under attack by general theorists, e.g., CHARLES DE VisSCeER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (trans. Corbett, 1957),
and specialists, e.g., B. A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 13.
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and control of the properties of a particular kind of physical matter. It would
appear that a similar ambition to achieve prediction and control "like a science"
may have animated such Austinian offshoots as Legal Realism. But it would not
seem that this narrow goal was Hart's. If science is not meant in its normal sense,
perhaps all that is intended by Hart is "an analysis free of personal commitment." Yet, as Polanyi has so vigorously shown, 9 even practitioners of the stricter
kind of science bring value commitments to their work. In the looser sciences
such as sociology some of the best authorities have made plain that not only do
personal value judgments necessarily guide the sociologist, 'but that the most conscientious course with such value judgments is to hold them consciously and state
them explicitly.10 In the "science of jurisprudence," a looser science still, can
one undertake any analysis without a moral purpose, without evaluation of the uses
of law, without commitments as to what law should be? Is not analysis clarified,
if these purposes, values, and commitments are explicitly recorded?
The question of purpose is central to the discussion Hart undertakes of the
intersecting points of law and morals. Morals influence statutory law; they may,
though they need not, guide a judge making case law; law may be criticized
from a moral point of view. Beyond these points of contact, which he says almost
any school of "legal positivism" would admit,11 Hart notes a further substantial
overlapping of law and morals; for a society to be viable, for a legal order to
exist, there is what the author considers a limited moial structure built into the
law:
1. The law must have at least what is here denominated "legal justice,"
that is, law must be applied impartially to like cases; it must be intelligible, within the capacity of most subjects to execute, and generally not retroactive.
2. The law must provide some restriction on the free use of violence.
3. The law must protect property and secure promises. (pp. 189-195, 202)
These minimum requirements for the content of law are based on undisputed,
universally existent facts as to men and their environment. The requirements
could change if man's nature as we know it changes. Given this nature and the
present environment, these elements constitute what the author calls "the core
of good sense" in the natural law position.
-Ishall come back to the derivation of these requirements and shall focus now
only on Hart's explicit refusal to incorporate another moral element into his
notion of law: the requirement that a law be just. His contention is that though
a law must 'be applied impartially to like cases, a community may determine what
are "like cases" in a way that seriously discriminates against a class or race or
group. Such unfair legislation will be one example of unjust but existing law.
This position, it is clear, may make sense if the purpose of Hart's analysis is to
describe a model of law which may be indifferently applied without normative
implication to every society which has existed- a purpose not without its usefulness. It is obvious, for example, that a large number of legal orders - Greek,
9. See Carl Friedrich, Book Review of Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, supra, p. 132.
10. E.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1043-1046, 1063 (1944); ROBERT S.
LYND, KNOWLEDGE FOR WHAT? 200-201 (1939).
11. A point well developed in Thomas Broden, The Straw Man of Legal Positivism, 34
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 530 (1959).
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Roman, early American- have enforced slavery by laws which would be considered unjust.12 If analysis of the law of such societies is to be made, it appears
pointless to deny the character "law" to the unjust statutes imposing or regulating servitude.
Even here, however, contemplating a "purely descriptive" model, there must
be some doubt as to whether there would not be a gain in analytic insight if just
and unjust laws were distinguished. The way laws function socially is for Hart
the ultimate test of the validity of his distinctions. Following his protest against
distortion of the social functioning of law by easy cataloguing, might one not
feel that lumping under a single heading of "primary rules" all obligations, however accepted by their subjects, was itself a fundamental distortion? Is it not
likely that the way law functions for slaves is substantially enough different from
its functioning for even the bad free men of a community to warrant a distinction
between law set for free men and law set for slaves? In short, if "social function"
is the refutation of Austin and of Kelsen, social function also suggests that a basic
differentiation should be made in theory between laws which are regarded by
their subjects as directed to a moral human end (even if the subject is a bad man
who will not obey or a dissident who believes the law unwise) and laws regarded
by their subjects as iniquitous and inconsistent with human nature. The distinction, based on the social functioning of law, might be drawn at the point
where the subjective view of those bound by the law was that it was inhuman.
It might be marked more boldly by one more confident of his values at the point
where in fact, regardless of the subject's views, the law was inconsistent with
human nature and so worked at cross-purposes with the basic tendencies of man.
At either point the distinction would reflect a change in the operation of the law
as real as, say, the difference between rules of change and rules of adjudication.
A theoretical distinction between just and unjust law is, it should be noted,
all that the traditional exponents of natural law theory have sought.13 The issue
is not, as Hart appears to conceive it to be, the banishment of "unjust laws" from
the consideration of the "science of jurisprudence" to become the unhappy objects
of "some other science." (p. 205) The fundamental distinction suggested is
much like a distinction which might be drawn by a person studying the varieties
of love. Such a student might apply the term to the love of God, to the love of
neighbor, to marital love, to romantic love, to the love of a parent for a child.
He might then say, recognizing a common thread in the function of love in this
variety, that these constituted species of "true love." He might at the same time
hesitate to include within the meaning of love the vast variety of perversions
which characteristically bear some resemblances to his true species, 'but which
12. Such classic philosophical defenses of slavery that some men are naturally slaves
(ARsTOTLE, POLITICS 1:2) or that some men will benefit from the guidance of a wise
master (THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, Q. 57, art. 3, ad 2) do not seem to
have much relation to the laws instituting and maintaining slavery in any given society.
13. For example, Thomas Aquinas still treats of "unjust laws" in his "Treatise on Law"
while saying a man is "not bound to obey [such] law, provided he avoid giving scandal or
inflicting a more' grievous hurt." SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, Q. 96, art. 4, ad 3. He also
speaks of a tyrannical law as "not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of
law." "It has the nature of a law" because it is "an ordinance made by a superior to his
subjects." Ibid., Q. 92, art. 1, ad 4.
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might function in a markedly different fashion. A student of love might enrich
his comprehension of his subject by an exploration of these perversions and the
reasons for their deformity, but he would not be prevented from this exploration
because he had chosen to distinguish between love, false and true. Law, too, may
be distinguished as good and bad without limiting its analysis.
If there are serious reasons to question the suppression of difference between
just and unjust law when what is at stake is a model for analysis of dead societies,
the doubt becomes more acute when one treats of living social orders. Here a
jurisprudent may wish to analyze with the purpose of guiding the community
creatively. -Is it helpful to his purpose to deny him a radical distinction between
just laws and laws which will, so he says, function to the damage or destruction
of the community? Does not the evident answer to this query suggest that Hart's
"key" is not useful in this area of jurisprudential activity? Can the province of
jurisprudence be thus limited?
Leaving the task of description, Hart has argued further that his rejection of
justice as an essential element of law also stands on practical grounds: (1) There
is no evidence that men will resist unjust laws more often because they believe
"4an unjust law is no law"; and (2) such a belief would obscure the dilemma of
the kind that confronted the postwar German courts of not punishing an evil act,
legal under Nazi law, or punishing it retroactively.
As to the first point, Radbruch's testimony stands against it, as does a common
sense appraisal of what must have been the effect of German positivism on German judges and lawyers. 14 The evidence is, indeed, far from complete; certainly
none is adduced by Hart. As to the second point, the German courts can be considered to have been in no greater dilemma than were the Allied military tribunals
punishing crimes "against peace and humanity" which were defined by no statute
at the time of their accomplishment. Both sets of courts had to leave evil acts
unpunished or apply retroactive law. The heart of their problem was: Can
criminal law ever be retroactively applied? If there is any moral justification for
such application, does it not rest on the contention that any ordinary human
being performing acts for which he is later held criminally accountable should
have realized at the time of the acts that they were seriously immoral or "unnatural"? If this justification does not hold, then it would seem wrong to invoke
a sanction retroactively. If it does hold, I cannot see that the existence of an evil
statute commanding or permitting the action in any material, way affects the
resolution of the problem. If a person is held accountable for his evil act, he must
equally be held able to see the evil of the statute. The existence of the statute
makes the problem more acute only if one believes that law, whether good or
bad, has some moral weight of its own. This proposition does not seem to me
14. See Fuller, op. cit. supra note 7, at 656-659. Compare THE JUSTICE CASE, III TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERO MILITARY TRIBUNALS (1951), especially
testimony of Defense Witness Professor Jahrreiss, p. 257, 277, 282. Note in particular such
examples of belief in the magic power of a statute to convert wrong into right as the case
of Curt Rothenberger, president of the district court of appeals at Hamburg, 1935-1942, who
opposed denying Jews the right to proceed in forma pauperis while "a direct legal basis is
missing,"

and at the same time urgently recommended

achieve this denial. .(Ibid., pp. 1111-1113)

issuance of a legal directive to
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one Hart is prepared to defend, although it is a proposition which is perhaps
implied by Hart's view of the value of the law being faithful to itself. The
significance of law thus giving itself a value, apart from other human ends, may
now be considered.
This question of the value and end of law is linked to what was noted
earlier as another basic question for Hart, the source for the minimum moral
content he finds in law. What is his basis for this moral injection into the
legal order? He approaches this question with a classic English distaste for speculation of a metaphysical sort and an understandable desire to reach the plain
practical truths on which all sensible men would agree. He reminds us that the
natural law, as historically conceived, depends on "a theocratic view" which "few
could accept today," and he offers to disentangle the natural law not only from
its theological antecedents, but from any complex metaphysics. (pp. 183-187)
He starts with one premise, that "we" are committed to survival, and he founds
his minimal natural law, set out above, as a statement of what, given the nature
of man and his environment, is necessary for survival. (pp. 188-189)
"Survival," it will be seen, is made a simple and absolute value in this account.
Yet survival has not this simple and undifferentiated character. Whose survival
is meant - the individual's or a society's? If individual survival is intended,
then it is obvious that no society we are famliar with has made survival its
governing value or incorporated the requirement of survival of individuals into
its basic laws. Not only has a large part of the law of most civilized societies
been directed to the conditions and ways in which its young men may be sacrificed
in war, but the ordinary laws of domestic society normally are cast on the assumption that individual lives are not our highest value. The whole of automobile
tort law rests on the foundation that while one has a primary obligation to drive
carefully, one does not have a primary obligation not to use a car; compensation
for lives taken is preferred to banning of vehicles which assure the existence of
other values more highly prized by the society.
If, then, the notion of individual survival is rejected as a utopian basis on
which to account for existing legal orders, the notion we are left with of "survival
of a society" involves a number of questions, some of which are far from being
academic at the present moment. Does a society survive if only a tenth of its
people and none of its educational institutions survive? Is bare survival of some
people ever the goal of a society even in its bleakest choices, let alone in the complex functioning of its law? When one speaks of survival of a society, is not what
is meant the cultural content of that society - the ideals of the Third Reich or
the "American way of life" or English civilization? Once these cultural values
are brought into the meaning of survival, the requirements of law to insure the
survival of a particular culture are seen as many more and as much more varied
than Hart suggests. There is no existing law in which the requirements of survival, abstractly taken, form a minimum vital content of the law, and the use of
this abstract notion to form a model of law must result in a serious disfiguration
of realities.
Once one embarks on an enumeration of the minimum moral ingredients of
law, is one not led, perhaps inexorably, to an enumeration of what one believes
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to be the maximum requirement of justice? "Survival" won't do the job. Other
more complex notions, recognizing more human needs, reflecting a richer range
of human capacities, are devised. Where does one stop, as one finds that, in fact,
different societies have recognized some but not all such needs, have encouraged
certain human tendencies and perverted others? Is there any ideal model which
will fit all cases, as Hart appears to have assumed with his starting point of survival? It would seem possible that in the search for a general type, one
would be led back to the rejected model of just law, which measures law in
terms of justice and injustice. This model, with this distinction, is still serviceable for descriptive analysis and may, as has been suggested above, more faithfully
reflect social function. Its development, of course, demands a metaphysics, a
teleology, and possibly a theology.
Yet if survival does not mean individual or social survival, could not a gloss
on "survival" in Hart's context amend the phrase to "survival of 'the legal order"?
In this way, the moral requirements of law would spring from a categorical, imperative that the legal order preserve itself. In Hart's universe the fidelity of law
is to itself. What is commanded as necessary is what is necessary to keep a legal
order in being, just as in a game there are minimum moral requirements to keep
the game in existence. In any game, the rules must be intelligible, not retroactive,
within the player's capacities, and impartially applied; the free use of violence
must be restricted; scores, like property rights, may be changed only in accordance with the rules; and promises or declarations of various sorts must usually be
honored. These requirements are a minimum if the game is to be played at all.
Hart's analysis applies perfectly to games and their rules.15 This application
of it does not involve any of the many complications created by considering the
purposes of society in relation to the notion of law. In a game the purpose is to
play the game. The players have the option of playing. If they choose 'to play,
they must conform to the rules designed to insure the game's existence.
But is this snug fit of Hart's theory to the workings of games a strength or a
weakness? The static character of purpose in games marks a fundamental differ15. Games not only have the same moral minima as Hart's model of law. They may also
be analyzed in terms of his primary and secondary rules. Take football for example:
1. Rule of recognition: The official rule book contains all the rules of the game.
2. Rule of adjudication: The officials are empowered to determine all infractions
of rules, to decide all disputes, and to impose penalties.
3. Primary rules: Certain members of the team in possession of the ball may carry
it forward and will score points if the ball is carried over the opposing team's
goal line. Under certain circumstances the ball may be thrown forward instead
of carried, etc. The team with the ball may not hold the other team with
their hands, etc.
4. Rules of change: By taking the ball under certain circumstances or by preventing the team with the ball carrying it forward ten yards in four downs, the
defending team may gain possession of the ball and the right to score.
The English tradition of analogy between games and law, much favored by Hart, is at
least as old as Hobbes: "It is in the Laws of a Common-wealth, as in the Laws of Gaming; whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them." LEVIATHAN
252 (Cambridge Classics ed., 1904) A more modern parallel is Wittgenstein's insight
into language as a game. See Helen Hervey, The Problem of the Model Language-Game in
Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, 36 ?HILOSOPHY 333 (1961).
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ence between games and law. The other great difference, of course, is that there
is no choice as to participation in the world of law. The conscripted participants
in this world affect the purposes of the rules, just as the rules interact on them
and change their purposes and personalities in a way no game ordinarily does.
The participants' values are inextricably enmeshed not only with the operation
of the rules, but with what the rules shall be. The static and abstract model of
rules whose end is to perpetuate themselves does not exist in any actual social
situation. Hart's model is Monopoly writ large. It is not an analysis of law
in a live society.
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.
ETHIcs: An Essay in the Logic of Ethics, with the Rudiments
of a System of Moral Philosophy. By Marcus George Singer. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961. Pp. xvii, 351. $6.00.

GENERALIZATION IN

It could be persuasively argued that contemporary thought - at least at
its supposedly more sophisticated levels - has been infected by a radical schizophrenia. It has for some time been the dominant fashion in intellectual circles
to accept without question or qualm the knowledge function and the truth value
of certain approved methods of inquiry, and to dismiss as merely "speculative"
or "subjective" or "emotive" or "relative" the claims of any discipline that cannot
establish its results by these methods. The accepted models of rationality are
those of logico-mathematical deduction and controlled empirical verification.
When these criteria are applied with a proper mixture of zeal, bigotry, and
naivete, they issue in a sharp bifurcation: mathematics and the "descriptive" or
"natural" sciences are held in high repute; while other areas of investigation,
and especially such "normative" inquiries as have to do with the questions of
morals, esthetics, and politics, are denied intellectual respectability on the ground
that they are vitiated by the intrusion of "arbitrary," "personal," and "variable"
factors.
The present book is an attempt to rectify this situation insofar as it pertains
to moral theory. This is hardly a novel undertaking; many have chafed under
these invidious distinctions and have resisted the restrictions that they place upon
inquiry. But the majority of such efforts have been largely critical and methodological in their bearing: they have consisted of arguments against this manner
of treatment, attacks on the "most favored discipline" doctrine, and forewarnings
of the irrationalism that such a bifurcation threatens and almost solicits. But
they have not been outstandingly rich or rigorous in their attempts to justify
the claims of the "normative" sciences to be rational disciplines. It is the great
merit of Mr. Singer's book that it is devoted exactly, and exclusively, to this
task: it embodies a conscious commitment to establish the rationality of moral
theory, and to this end it eschews all other considerations and paths of inquiry,
however inviting they may be.
Because of this special and explicit commitment, the book has, in one sense,
an extremely limited scope. It altogether ignores many subjects and problems
whose treatment is necessary to a complete system of moral philosophy, and which
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we are accustomed to finding discussed in most books dealing with ethics. It is
concerned only with moral theory, and not with the broader field of general
value theory; it contains no examination of the actual institutions or practices
of societies, past or present; it has nothing to say on the moral issues that arise
in politics, economics, law, family relations, or other fields of human behavior;
it offers no catalogue of virtues and vices, no analysis of the interplay of conduct
and character, no delineation of happiness or the good life. These omissions
represent neither an oversight nor a dismissal of such matters as beneath philosophic notice. They issue from the author's determination to conduct a rigorous
and detailed argument of the thesis that moral theory is just as rational, in both
its foundations and its developments, as is any other body of theory. Singer's
aim, in his own terms, is "to solve the problem of the justification of moral
principles"; that is, "to establish a rational basis for distinguishing between right
and wrong, and thus to lay the groundwork for a rational and normative
system of ethics." (p. vii)
In arguing the case for this thesis, the book combines a great care for detail,
a nice sense of what is relevant or irrelevant, and a recognition of the limits
that confront all rational undertakings. Indeed, to this reviewer at least, it often
appears that the book is overargued: that there are unnecessary repetitions;
that points are needlessly rephrased; that distinctions are pursued too relentlessly;
that counterarguments are treated with a seriousness they do not merit. And the
concrete examples sometimes suffer through unsuccessful attempts at humor or
ridicule. But these are rather minor matters, though they do interrupt the argument and shadow its lucidity. They can be excused, furthermore, by the facts
that this is "an essay in the logic of ethics" and that this is the only technique
that will be respected by many of those whom Singer is anxious to convince.
At all events, the book easily rises above these lesser faults: it is a forceful and
persuasive presentation, constituting a solid contribution to moral philosophy.
The argument of the book is so closely focused and so painstakingly reasoned
that it is difficult to summarize. The only recourse it leaves the reviewer is to
try to isolate the principles upon which it rests, the major steps through which
they are developed, and the more specific concepts in which they issue.
It is the author's central thesis that the foundation of all moral reasoning
is what he calls "the generalization principle,", which he states in this form:
what is right (or wrong) for one person must be right (or wrong) for any
similar person in similar circumstances." (p. 5) Far from claiming any originality
for this principle, Singer insists that it is actually the foundation stone, explicitly
or implicitly, of virtually all moral doctrines. It has been traditionally known
under such terms as the principle of fairness or justice or impartiality or equity
or universalization; and it figures with particular prominence in such influential
and apparently diverse ethical systems as those of Kant and the Utilitarians.
The importance of the generalization principle lies in the fact that it is crucial
to the generalization argument, which is technically stated in this form: "If
everyone were to do x, the consequences would be disastrous (or undesirable);
therefore no one ought to do x." (p. 61) More colloquial renderings of this
argument are found in such familiar rhetorical questions as "What would happen
if everyone did that?" or "How would you like it if everyone did that?" Singer
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maintains that the generalization argument is "the fundamental principle of
morality." (p. viii) And the whole of his book is devoted to two tasks: first, that
of establishing its status as the basic, rational, and legitimate foundation of
moral theory; and, second, that of elucidating its reach and its limitations, and
of tracing the way in which it is rendered more concrete and thus applicable to
actual moral problems. We can consider these tasks in reverse order.
It is immediately evident that the generalization argument cannot be applied
mechanically and without further qualification; if it is, it soon leads to absurdities
(as exemplified in the well-known remark of Morris Cohen's that "humanity
would probably perish from cold if everyone produced food, and would certainly
starve if everyone made clothes or built houses"). Consequently, as Singer
emphasizes, "the basic problem about the generalization argument is to determine
the conditions under which it is valid." (p. 61) This problem is faced forthrightly, and a solution to it is offered by eliciting other principles that are
necessary to a correct employment of the generalization argument. There are
five such principles that are assigned important supporting and limiting roles.
We can first notice two negative conditions. (1) Where the argument can
be inverted, it is not valid: these are cases in which the consequences of no one's
acting in a certain way would be just as undesirable as those of everyone's acting
in this way. (2) Where the argument is reiterable, it is not valid: these are cases
in which the action posited in the antecedent is specified in such an arbitrary
way that it can be repeated indefinitely. (If everyone took his vacation from
August 1 to August 15, the consequences would be disastrous; hence, no one
ought to take his vacation at that time.)
We now come to three positive principles. (3) The principle of consequences
states that "If the consequences of A's doing x would be undesirable, then A
ought not to do x." Singer insists that this is a necessary and self-evident moral
principle, in the double sense that "its denial involves self-contradiction" and that
it is a "presupposition or precondition of moral reasoning." (p. 64) When we
universalize this principle, we obtain a further proposition: "If the consequences
of everyone's doing x would be undesirable, then not everyone ought to do x."
If we then combine this latter proposition with the generalization principle "if not everyone ought to do x, then no one ought to do x" - we can deduce
the generalization argument: "If the consequences of everyone's doing x would
be undesirable, then no one ought to do x." Obviously, then, the principle
of consequences is just as fundamental and important in Singer's doctrine as
is the generalization principle, and there will be more to say later regarding its
claim to be a necessary moral postulate. For the moment, it need only be indicated that the principle as here employed is highly formal and abstract: it does
not define the meaning, or indicate the content, of the term "undesirable";
nor does it indicate any operations by which consequences are to be identified,
weighed, and balanced. Rather, its acceptance, along with the generalization
principle, constitutes the moral conscience: it is this latter, fortified by theoretical
and practical wisdom, which then makes moral decisions. Two further principles
function chiefly to circumscribe the range of the generalization argument. (4)
The principle of restricted universality limits the reach of the argument to
"similar persons in similar circumstances" and so protects it against abuses and
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absurdities. Finally, (5) the principle of justification clears the way for exceptions
by indicating how it can legitimately be shown that the argument does not
reach some particular person in some particular case: this can only be done
on the basis of class characteristics, not personal ones.
Even if we accept that the generalization argument, as here elaborated and
qualified, is the logical foundation of moral theory, it is still obvious that we
do not often appeal directly to this principle in the processes of either moral
'education or decision. Rather, our habits have been formed and our lives are
ordered by a horde of more specific norms and criteria. Singer is fully aware
of this, and the next major step in his argument is the derivation and classification of the types of rules that translate this argument into terms that are more
concrete and so more readily applicable to the moral situations and problems with
which life confronts us. The hypothesis advanced here is that of a process through
which the generalization argument is fractured into modes of expression that
become progressively more specific in their content, more limited in their range,
and more hypothetical in their demands. The procedure adopted is that of
identifying the principal stages in this process.
At the highest level of abstraction are moral principles, which hold in all
circumstances, allow of no exceptions, and are always relevant to any moral
situation whatsoever. Beneath these, in order, occur moral laws and moral rules,
with the last being further divided into the three subclasses of fundamental rules,
local rules, and neutral norms. The discussions of these various types of moral
directives and imperatives are often illuminating; this is perhaps especially true
in a series of chapters in which the author compares and contrasts his position
with the moral doctrines of Kant and the Utilitarians. But one also has the
feeling that the classificatory apparatus is too artificial and impedes the analysis
rather more than it helps it. Yet behind these abstractions we are given a clear
picture of an infinitely subtle and fluid process through which a categorical
moral principle is adjusted, with fine shades of tolerance and appropriateness,
to the complexities of life and the vagaries of human nature.
Virtually the whole of this book consists in the development and application
of the generalization argument: this is declared to be the matrix from which
further moral laws and rules are derived, and the ultimate criterion to which
moral judgments must be referred. In short, it is the touchstone of moral imperatives, motives, and decisions. This argument itself depends upon two basic
factors: the principle of consequences, which states that "If the consequences
of A's doing x would be undesirable, then A ought not to do x"; and the principle
of generalization, which states that "If not everyone ought to do x, then no one
ought to do x." But what of these fundamental principles themselves? How
are they established and justified?
In dealing with this point, Singer takes his point of departure from the position, "now pretty generally accepted by professional philosophers," that "ultimate ethical principles must be arbitrary" for the reason that "sooner or later,
we must come to at least one ethical premise which is not deduced but baldly
asserted. Here we must be a-rational; neither rational nor irrational, for here
there is no room even for reason to go wrong." (p. 301--quoting Brian Medlin
in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. xxxv, p. 111) His method of
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dealing with this problem is to deny the alternatives of "deduced" or "baldly
asserted"; that is, he rejects the claim that deduction is the only rational technique, leaving no refuge save arbitrariness.
The treatment of this issue is admirably candid and direct. But the argument
backward to the foundations of these principles is not as complete or consecutive
as one might wish - especially in contrast to the developments drawn from them
- so that one hesitates to say too positively what Singer's position is, lest there
be misinterpretation. But if I read him correctly, the gist of his solution to this
problem lies in the simple empirical assertion that the principles of consequences
and generalization are in fact accepted by men as stating valid claims upon
them. That is, these principles embody the common moral sense of mankind:
to be a man is to recognize the force of these categoricals. It is impossible to
give a person moral reasons for being moral: though you can give him prudential
(and probably theological) reasons; and you can, of course, give him moral
reasons for acting in one way rather than another. People in general simply
are moral, in the sense that they acknowledge the legitimacy of moral obligations and rules even though they also violate these. So you cannot prove to a
man that he ought to be moral. You start from the fact that he is moral (just
as you start from the facts that he is moved by rational and empirical considerations); then you can seek to lay bare the fundamental contents of this moral
sense and to develop on this basis an adequate code of morals. The real test
of Singer's doctrine will therefore reside in its fruitfulness in clarifying and correcting actual bodies of moral rules, and in pointing the way to the discovery of
more adequate ones. If it merely serves to confirm the obvious, to give us better
reasons for believing and acting as we now do in the sphere of morality, it
will at best - but also at least - have furnished us with a weapon against
skepticism. But this would be a lesser accomplishment than one has a right to
expect from a principle that pretends to be so basic and so sweeping. Like any
proposal regarding ultimates, the proof of this one must lie in its consequences
rather than its antecedents. To settle this question, the outcome of its further
employment must be awaited.
If one asks "Why should I be moral?" or "Why ought I to do what I ought
to do?" or "Why should I be sensitive to the needs and desires of others?" there is no moral answer to be given him. One can only insist that men do
in fact recognize the claims of morality, of obligation, of their fellows. They
acknowledge in conscience, even when they reject in conduct, the principles of
generalization and of consequences. If this seems unsatisfactory, one can only
point out that the adherents of logical deduction and empirical verification are
in the same boat. For if men ask "Why should I accept the conclusions of logical
arguments as valid?" or "Why should I accept the results of empirical verification as facts?" - there is again no answer save the compellingness of these procedures themselves. The valid, the true, and the moral are equally ultimate.
So there seems no reason to accept 'the first two as "rational" while rejecting the
last as "arbitrary." To have argued as persuasively as Singer has for this conclusion is a definite accomplishment.
IREDELL JENKINS

NATURAL LAW FORUM
By John Courtney Murray, S.J. New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1960. Pp. xiv, 336. $5.00.

WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS.

In the introductory chapter of this book, American pluralist society is described
as "a pattern of interacting conspiracies," chiefly Protestant, Catholic, Jewish,
and secularist. (This illustrates one of Father Murray's favorite rhetorical
devices: arresting readers with a shocking word and then luring them into
thought with a classic definition.) "Conspiracy" means concord, a "breathing
together." The problem of American religious pluralism is "somehow to make
the four great conspiracies among us conspire into one conspiracy that will be
American society- civil, just, free, peaceful, one." For the solution of this
problem, Murray's expectations are modest: "We cannot hope to make American
society the perfect conspiracy based on a unanimous consensus. But we could
. .. limit the warfare, and we could enlarge the dialogue." (pp. 22-23)
To promote this end, the author presents his collection of occasional papers
as "Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition" -the
proposition to
which, in Lincoln's phrase, our nation was dedicated. The principal theme is
that "We hold these truths" - that American Roman Catholics accept the
truths of the Founding Fathers because these truths are rooted in the classical
tradition of natural law. The secondary theme is that American Catholics accept
the First Amendment prescription for church-state relations for practical reasons,
given the condition of religious pluralism. I shall begin with this secondary
theme, offering my comment from a viewpoint outside the Roman Catholic
Church.
Murray makes emphatically clear that Catholics accept the religion clauses
of the First Amendment as "articles of peace"- prudent arrangements for a
pluralist society- but not as matters of religious or political principle. The
phrase "articles of peace" is credited to Dr. Johnson, who used it in explaining
how some Anglicans "accept" the Thirty-Nine Articles without believing in them.
(p. 48) Murray seems to realize that such Catholic acceptance of the First
Amendment is not likely to relieve anxiety within the non-Catholic "conspiracies"; he assures readers that "articles of peace" have a high status, that "social
peace, assured by equal justice in dealing with possibly conflicting groups, is the
highest integrating element of the common good. ' (p. 58)
This repudiation of any basis in principle for the First Amendment will surprise readers familiar with Murray's more technical studies of religious liberty.
These studies have made him the outstanding American proponent of a Catholic
theory of freedom of religion, a theory based upon the distinction between the
functions of Church and state. Let me quote from two of these studies:
. .. the protection of the religious unity of society, by suppression of error
and dissent, is not among the political functions of government. Religious
unity is indeed a value for society, and for this reason the state protects the
full freedom of the Church to achieve and maintain it. But this is the
Church's mission, and in it secular government has no direct share. Nor
may it be used as an instrument to this end ... 1
1.

John Courtney Murray, Governmental Repression of Heresy, THE CATHOLIC

THEo-

WILBER G. KATZ
*.. in the democratic concept of civil liberty, the idea of religious liberty
has the same amplitude as the idea of civil liberty itself. As it declares the
civic equality of all citizens before the law, so it likewise declares the civic
equality of all churches... before the law. As it recognizes equal liberty
for the public expression of any political idea, even though it be contrary
to the common civic beliefs, so it recognizes equal liberty for the public
expression of any religious ideas, again even though it be contrary to
2
common religious beliefs.
I find it puzzling that Murray should have omitted these reassuring ideas from
a volume offered for general circulation and designed as a contribution to interfaith dialogue. To be sure, the First Amendment forbids not only laws "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, but also laws "respecting an establishment
of religion." One can understand Murray's insisting that the latter clause has
no basis in principle, that it reflects only an American "prejudice" (using the
term Edmund Burke applied to church establishment in England, meaning a
concrete judgment of value, not an abstract judgment of truth). (pp. 46-47) But
in asserting that American Catholics share this prejudice, would it not have been
well to suggest that among them, as well as in the other conspiracies, religious
liberty is "believed in" as a matter of principle? There are indeed Roman Catholic scholars who have assigned it a basis in religious principle. 3
This omission is the more serious because in Murray's present exposition of
the theory of the "two powers" he develops the proposition that man finds his
freedom not individually but in the freedom of the Church. (ch. 9) This conception of freedom is particularly likely to arouse the fears of non-Catholics if
isolated from the principle that the force of the state should not be used to keep
people from seeking and exercising their freedom outside the freedom of the
Church. If Murray had included a discussion of this principle, he might have
found more readers outside the Catholic conspiracy willing to approach with an
open mind his excellent chapter on aid to parochial schools. (ch. 6)
As already suggested, the doctrine of natural law is central to the book's
principal thesis. A religiously pluralist society can be "civil," i.e., "a community
locked together in rational argument," only if it has a generally accepted public
philosophy, a public consensus. (pp. 6 et seq.) The thesis is that Catholics can
share an American consensus based on principles expressed by the Founding
Fathers, because these principles are grounded in the classical doctrine of natural
law.- Murray of course does not confuse this doctrine with the "law of nature"
developed by philosophers of the Enlightenment; his final chapter elaborates the
differences. He recognizes the influence of Locke on the Founding Fathers, but
supports his thesis on the ground that the partial truth which gives Locke's
writings their persuasiveness is the truth of the classical doctrine. Murray recogLOGICAL SOCIETY
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nizes also that some currents of American thought reject all natural law theories.
His point is that Catholics adhere to the basic American truths even if many nonCatholics have lost their hold on them.
This book should bring some of these natural law skeptics to consider natural
law as a live option. One persuasive paragraph shows that the core of the
doctrine is implied by anyone who is seriously protesting an unjust statute. His
protest implies
that there is an idea of justice; that this idea is transcendent to the actually
expressed will of the legislator; that it is rooted somehow in the nature of
things; that he really knows this idea; that it is not made by his judgment
but is the measure of -hisjudgment; that this idea is of the kind that ought
to be realized in law and action; that its violation is injury, which his
mind rejects as unreason... (p. 328)
The final proposition.- "that this unreason is an offense not only against his
own intelligence but against God, Who commands justice and forbids injustice"
is also probably implied if the protester believes in the existence of God.
The book should help to dispel some of. the popular misconceptions of the
Catholic doctrine. Many will probably be surprised to read that "the nature of
man is an historical nature," susceptible of change (p. 113), that according to
St. Thomas it is because of the "mutability of human nature," as well as the
diversity of conditions, that "the same things are not always and everywhere good
and just." (p. 114)
Some may possibly be surprised to find it emphasized that the task of elaborating natural law in relation to more complex human relations and institutions is
not primarily for the Church, but for "the wise and honest" (George Washington's phrase), and that the task requires taking into account the findings of
scientific disciplines. (p. 111) In medieval terms it is a function not of the
sacerdotium but of the studium. "The sapientes of whom St. Thomas speaks
made their residence in the University.. ." (pp. 121-122) Sometimes, of course,
the formal support of the Church is added, as in the case of the usury problem,
where the Second Lateran Council threatened usurers with denial of Christian
burial. (p. 122) But even where the Church has declared an absolute natural
law prohibition, this does not mean that civil penalties should necessarily be
imposed. Here again, some readers may be surprised to find a Catholic speaking
out against the Connecticut statute which forbids the use of contraceptives. (p.
157)
Murray deals gaily with Protestant moralists whom he calls "anbiguists"
(all but naming Reinhold Niebuhr):
. . . in the ambiguist descriptions, the factual situation always appears
as a "predicament," full of "ironies," sown with "dilemmas," to be stated
only in "paradox," and to be dealt with only at one's "hazard," because in
the situation "creative and destructive possibilities" are inextricably mixed,
and therefore policy and action of whatever -kind can only be "morally
ambiguous." (p. 283)
Though thoroughly enjoying this discussion, I question Fr. Murray's apparent
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rejection of the notion that Christian moral theory based upon the nature of man
might usefully recognize man as an "amalgam of virtue and corruption." The
state's positive law is necessary partly because of man's sin, and insights into the
nature of sin have something to contribute to the criticism of positive law. In
Hooker's Anglican account of natural law, he declares that "Laws ... are never
framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly
obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience unto the sacred laws of his
nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be in regard of his depraved mind
little better than a wild beast." 4 One need not accept so sweeping a principle,
but in natural law discussion of legal institutions for economic organization, for
example, one surely should not ignore fallen man's disposition to greed, sloth,
and envy.
WILBER
4.

G.

KATZ
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THE ASCENT OF LIFE. A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THE THEORY OF EVOLU-

By T. A. Goudge. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.
Pp. 236. $4.95.

TION.

Professor Goudge has given us a cogent and carefully argued study of contemporary evolutionary theory. Since this is an area which provokes both great
and diverse expectations, the author 'has wisely provided an extensive introductory
chapter to explain his intentions - and it is well worth reading for its own sake.
Goudge's open-mindedness and balance should assure a sympathetic approach
from his readers
If a book with the title Ascent of Life had appeared before World War I,
one would expeat it to be either science or philosophy (or perhaps a mixture
of both) in the sense in which both of those disciplines deal with what I will
content myself with calling the "structure" of the world. The philosophy of
evolution and evolutionary philosophy were likely to be considered the same
thing; and that sort of thing, depending on one's taste in words, was just as
likely to be called metaphysics. However, the history of ideas, it seems, has its
own peculiar laws of evolution - indeed it rivals the biological process in the
complexity of factors which bring about a succession of dominant problems and
the rise and fall of significant theories. Often enough, participants in violent
controversies are exhausted long before the subject matter is; in place of
"extinction" we find "oblivion," and the discussion of evolution has been in
such an oblivion. This is not to say that there have not been important
biological studies going on all the time; nor even that the idea did not appear
in discussions of philosophy, sociology - and theology. But it has not been
really "popular."
There seem to be two factors which were operative (though not exclusively)
in the fall of "evolutionary theory" from popularity. First, biology came under
the shadow of its fast-growing sibling, physics. And there is more at stake than
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simple prestige in holding the top place among the sciences; the very "method
of science" comes to be identified with the method of the ruling science. The
second factor was the breaking of the dominance of idealism as a philosophical
system. Again, it is not just that "idealism" became unpopular; in this instance,
the idea of "world-views" or "metaphysical systems" came into disrepute.
Fortunately, oblivion is as fickle as fame. Of course, Goudge's book is
not an effort to re-establish idealism, nor even to refurbish system-buildingalthough he is not afraid to use the word "metaphysics." The subtitle indicates
the change: this is a book in the philosophy of science; and nowadays, at least,
we are far from identifying that with "scientific philosophy." The author
frankly disclaims an expert knowledge of biology (a warning which goes double
for the reviewer). And he points out that he has followed the interpretation
of individual biologists at crucial points, although he is well aware of the
dangers of such a course. In an area where divergent views are so warmly held,
where lack of incontrovertible "evidence" is not always bolstered even by the
"consensus of experts," the author has laid himself open to serious charges.
Such charges are sure to come from other quarters; I would only say that
there is more than courage involved in his effort. The idea that one must
wait for the "empirical scientist" to lay out the "facts" has ceased to be a
practical ideal even within science itself. Actually, Goudge's suggestive analysis
should be a stimulus to scientists as well as philosophers.
Indeed, too much of the present analysis of scientific method is based on
the model of physics, and the most "broad-minded" efforts to allow biology a
scientific status 'have often worked more to the woe than weal of our understanding of biology- such is the result of false kindness in so many areas.
While this book makes no claim to be a definitive study of evolution, much
less of the methods of biology in general, its careful analysis of various forms
of "explanation" in evolutionary theory could well serve to open up further
discussion of biological methods. Much of this is still work to be done.
Still, the notion of "philosophy of science" does not quite capture Goudge's
approach. The book divides roughly into two parts. The first three chapters
present the background and development of contemporary scientific theory
on evolution. These chapters are aptly described as "philosophy of science";
they contain a careful analysis of terminology, models, methods and types of
explanation used in evolutionary theory. Goudge's reading is wide and his
critical comments are cogent. There are objections to be made from both a
scientific and a philosophical perspective, but none of them are such as to
detract from the value of Goudge's presentations, and they might seem out of
place in this journal.
Chapter Four, which could still be grouped with the first three, takes up
the "evolutionary account of man" and, along with the sixth chapter ("Is
Evolution Finished?"), seems to me to relate in its approach to the large fifth
chapter: "Has Evolutionary Theory Metaphysical Implications?" It is encouraging that Goudge would be willing to apply his cautious and careful
method to such a question, and I hope I can explain my disappointment in
the results without seeming to carp. For it is just the qualities of caution and
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care which induce the author to cut the topic down to manageable size.
I am not exactly sure what his principle of selection was, although he seems
to have had a special reason for taking up just the problems he does. Of
course, Goudge cannot be blamed for not selecting what I was interested in,
and there are hints that he will write again in this field, extending his analysis
beyond its present limits.
At any rate, Goudge elects to bypass three issues: the relation of consciousness and evolution (p. 210), the relation of ethics and evolution (p. 148), and
the question of the presence of "design" in evolution. (p. 192) These omissions,
although both honorable and justified, tend to take the edge off Goudge's
discussion of cosmic (in contrast to biological) evolution, direction and purpose
in evolution, and the knowledge of evolution. It is ,not that the author's points
are vitiated by his self-imposed restrictions; they could form (and perhaps do
form for him) a propaedeutic to the study of these other questions. However,
I found my sympathy with his having taken up manageable questions mixed
with a certain discomfort at not having the broader context of the discussion fixed.
It could well be that a reader less preoccupied than I am with context would
not be thus disturbed.
Under the circumstances, I can be excused, I hope, for bringing up a few
issues which are incidental to the main line of Goudge's presentation but which
seem to me to deserve some consideration. None of these are in areas where
we have ready-made answers at hand -and in this sense I am not proposing
them as lacunae in Goudge's present account - but it does seem legitimate
to suggest the complexity of the factors which press in upon the well-kept
borders of Goudge's study.
1) Goudge insists that man is a product of natural processes. (p. 151) Despite
some apparently strong language, the position. seems ambiguous to me. In
saying that man "in no way transcends" the evolutionary process (p. 207) and
that he is "wholly within the system of organic nature" (p. 208), Goudge is
explicitly rejecting a Kantian interpretation. (p. 207) It is not clear to me
how far Goudge's anti-Kantianism is supposed to carry him, and it is not at
all clear how biological evolutionary theory proves or demonstrates the point.
Unfortunately, the pressures of his plan have forced Goudge to leave out his
criticism of the Kantian theory (p. 207), which might have indicated more
definitely his own position. If I am tempted to think that I am not wholly
within the system of organic nature, it is not at all because I think the biologist
has botched his job. It seems possible that biology operates at a level of abstractness which would allow a complete biological explanation of man not to be
a complete explanation of man. Is "man" really the same sort of thing for the
biologist and the poet? Need it be a terrible rent in the fabric of our knowledge
if he is not? Perhaps Heisenberg's remarks about the sciences being able to
explain only what they can describe might be relevant here.1
While it is encouraging that the biologist has recognized that man's evolution
is more "cultural" than "bio-physical" (p. 207), one cannot but wonder whether
1.

Cf. WzRNER HEISRNBERO, PHYSICS AND Pmn.osoPisY' 167 ff. (New York, 1958).
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cultural -evolution is not different in kind from bio-physical. 'If cultural evolution is a natural process, some of the concern at being wholly within the system
of organic nature will be relieved - the system of organic nature having broadened so.
2) It seems inaccurate to me to say that the phrase "the first Homo Sapiens"'
"no more applies to a particular individual than do the expressions 'the average
man' or 'the first proper fraction.'" The continuity involved in the latter notion
is a suggestive analogy, as can be, in a different way, the "constructive" element
of the former. But, so far as I can tell, such is not the whole of the case with
the evolutionary theory of group development. If I am not sure, for example,
who was the first person in the room, because a group may have come in
together, it is possible for me to change my question and ask about the first
group. I could thus'attain a definiteness not possible in the group of fractions
-and of course not at all similar to any discussion of "the average man."
3) The area of final causality needs as much work as does that of causality
in.general; and Goudge can hardly be blamed for not attempting this gargantuan
task in the present work. However, the suggestion that explanations involving
purpose serve only a heuristic function in biology seems unsatisfactory. (p. 205)
(I am unhappy with "as if" theories in general.) There is the further implication that one calls upon final causes only where other explanations fail. (p. 199)
But the problem comes up as to how you could convince someone that his explanations are inadequate; quite clearly, if one's criterion for adequacy of an
explanation is derived from nonteleological grounds, explanations by final causality will always be inadequate- and useful only until a "better" account is found.'
Even in the area of human activity, where Goudge does allow for purposeful'
behavior, I can imagine someone consistently refusing to avail himself of any
analysis involving purpose. I suppose we would say that such a person has little
chance of understanding human activity, but I do not know exactly how onecould prove to him that his view was inadequate.
Goudge spends some time in presenting and discussing a model to show how
the evolutionary process can produce "improbabilities." (pp. 111-12) I shall not
reproduce it here, though I recommend highly Goudge's enlightening account.
I would only point out that the model includes as a part a person who does some
purposeful selecting; and I am unable to feel the force of the model when this
purposeful element is removed.
. 4) Goudge argues (p. 203) that it is improper to call a nonteleological evolution "blind." His reason is the good one that a privative term begs the question
of what "ought to be present." However, he extends this by saying that we
should not: call the process of evolution either purposeful or purposeless. Since
there are processes that are purposeful (human activity), I see no objection to
calling processes that are not purposeful (if indeed they are not) "purposeless."
There is also the peculiarity that the product of a nonpurposeful process
should engage in purposeful activity. But the discussion of this can hardly be
carried through without bringing up the issue of "consciousness" which Goudge
wishes, at present, to avoid.
5) The brief statement that the. notion of an "unchangeable 'human nature'"
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has produced a failure in Western culture to see "that what [man ] is not yet
may be more important than what he is". (p. 210) represents an evident breach
of Goudge's usual caution. "Western culture" is a phenomenon of some size,
but I would venture to say that it would not take too much study to show that
the above statement was an oversimplification.. There is a sense in. which it
seems to me that the analysis of man, from classical to contemporary times, is
somewhat remarkable in having always presented a notion of man as more
important than he has yet become. One suspects- if one is touchy about that
sort of thing - that Goudge has in mind some idea of "natural law" or, at least,
an "Aristotelian" conception of natures. But the relation of an Aristotelian
analysis of natures to contemporary scientific investigation is somewhat complex.
Only the most naive Aristotelian would identify most of the biological classifications of genera, etc., with natures. As a result, the notion of "unchangeable
natures" may not be affected so severely by biological theory as is sometimes
imagined. It is true that neither Aristotle nor Plato thought that "natures"
changed, but this did not prevent either of them from characterizing the physical
world as that which changes. In short, the contrast of the fluidity of contempo.
rary theory with the static notion of classical thought seems to me a misleading
oversimplification.
As for man, the striking thing about him is that, from the *beginning of his
own records to the present day, there has been nothing about his development
that would vitiate the use of "unchanging nature" in describing him. (Accidental
changes can be of considerable importance, of course.) Should, some eons from
now, an organism quite different in kind develop, and should we (or they) describe that organism as "man," then there will be nothing for it but to say that
man then will have a different nature. But the possibility of such a change has
little effect on the analyses and judgments of man's current activities. That is
to say, there is little effect unless one can say now what sort of development man
should be working towards. Here, again, it will not be possible to follow Goudge's
point until he takes up the issues of ethics and consciousness in relation to
evolution.
6) Goudge also steps out from his guarded analyses to make a plea for
"rational control" to replace "superstition." (pp. 210-11, inter alia) It would
be unfortunate to see here an act of irreverence, for this plea is an appeal for
sanity and responsibility. Goudge sees quite clearly that the fact that man does
have some control over his development leads on to the difficult question of what
man wants to make of himself. (p. 205) But the question arises: how (by what
method, through what sort of study) does man determine his ends? If, as Goudge
proposes, man's evolution is more cultural than bio-physical, then the biologist
and physicist should likely play a subordinate role in the determination both of
the ends man seeks and of the methods he should employ in realizing them. A
similar ad hominem argument can be based on the conclusion than man (and his
"reason") is an immature evolutionary phenomenon. (p. 147)
The point I wish to make is that there are overtones of a "scientism" in
Goudge's appeal. But our cultural evolution has not been a "scienitific" achievement; whatever one's taste, one must admit a variety of factois: art, religion,

NATURAL LAW FORUM
politics, literature, and just plain everyday living. The need to understand all
of these is strong enough to risk a trace of "irrationalism." When the question
before us is to determine the future course of civilization, it will not do to form
our goals upon anything less than the total human experience.
There can be no doubt that Goudge has put his finger on one of the most
important problems facing our contemporary society. If I criticize him for what
I take to be unfinished analyses, it is not because I object in principle either to
his book or to his method. We have no chance of approaching a solution to these
problems until we ask the questions. And what we do achieve will always rest
upon just the sort of painstaking study which Goudge has supplied.
JOHN BOLER

LIFE,

DEATH AND THE LAW. By Norman St. John-Stevas. Bloomington, Ind.:
Indiana University Press, 1961.
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Life, Death and the Law was begun under the auspices of the Yale Law
School and completed, thanks to -the farsightedness of the Fund for -the Republic,
which in turn elected the author to a fellowship. The purpose of the book is to
explore the relation between law and morality in present-day Anglo-American
pluralistic society. More particularly, its purpose. is to -investigate whether, and
to what extent, Anglo-American law, particularly criminal law, should support
and give penal sanction to traditional Judeo-Christian moral standards. Law
reflects the moral consensus of society. In an earlier day, the moral consensus
was, theoretically at least, a Judeo-Christian one. But now we live in a pluralistic society. There is still a moral consensus against such violent antisocial conduct as murder and rape, but agreement is diminishing. Today we find deep
cleavages not only between Christian and secularist but between Christian and
Christian. Consider the debates over such questions as: Should the sale and
distribution of contraceptives be restricted by law? Ought the state -to foster
sterilization policies? What should be the attitude of the law to artificial insemination? Should homosexual acts taking place in private between consenting
adults be subject to the criminal law? Should euthanasia be countenanced by
the law? Ought suicide and attempted suicide be treated as criminal offences?
In his first chapter, St. John-Stevas gives a 37-page historical summary of the relation between law and morality. The inquiry is confined principally to England and the United States where Judeo-Christian moral values,
liberal democracy, and a shared tradition of the common law provide the necessary common ground. At the same time, the differences of American and English history, of temperaments and ethnic and religious composition, with their
consequent variations in approach to moral and legal problems, make comparison possible and enlightening. Emphasis is laid on Christian moral ideals because these are the values still generally adhered to within both societies.
The author points out, that apart from certain theorists (e.g., the positivists),
Western tradition regards law and morality as interconnected, although there is
disagreement as to the nature and degree of the connection. These disputes
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one hand there is the Aristotelian philosophy, that man is a social being and that
the state is a natural institution. Catholic Christianity supports this view, holding that the state should foster the full development of man by the promotion
of virtue. On the other hand there is the Augustinian philosophy that the
state is a necessary evil, required only because of the fall of man and needed only
in order to suppress vice. Protestant and Liberal state theories tend to rely on
this tradition.
In tracing the main trends of these opposing philosophies, the author summarizes Catholic natural law thinking from Thomas. Aquinas through John
Courtney Murray and Jacques Maritain. Protestant thought, with its rejection of
the natural law, is traced from Martin Luther and John Calvin through Karl
Barth, Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr, and Joseph Fletcher. Although Catholics are often unable to resist the temptation to engage in polemics over the
natural law, St. John-Stevas maintains a posture of sweet reasonableness. He is
scrupulously fair in making as strong a case as he can for all views. If he does
reach conclusions, they are not forced by authoritarian pronouncements from
above but based rather on the facts supported by reason. The author has not
written a "Catholic" book. He has preferred to use an inductive approach, presenting all views that compete for recognition in our society. He wants the reader
to be well informed, not converted.
The author notes that divergencies in the philosophy of man and the state
are very much with us today, and that it is becoming increasingly more difficult
in our pluralistic society to solve social problems. As one who is genuinely
interested in advancing towards more realistic solutions, he undertakes particular studies of the difficulties in six life-and-death areas - birth control, artificial
insemination, sterilization, homosexuality, suicide, and euthanasia. After giving
us a historico-moral perspective in each area, he sets forth the present state of
the law, marshals the pertinent theological, juridical, sociological, medical and
scientific data, and suggests guidelines for a solution.
In the chapter on suicide, for example, the author cites the present-day rate
of suicide. Next he traces the history of suicide in English law: "Blackstone
recorded that burial [of the suicide] was in the highway, not in the churchyard,
and that a stake was driven through the body." Although suicide is still under a
stigma in England, there is evidence of a more sympathetic attitude towards the
deceased. The author points out that since the eighteenth century, coroners have
avoided embarrassing refusals of the Anglican burial service by reporting that
the suicide took his own life while the natural balance of his mind was disturbed. "This verdict . ... is frequently brought in on very slender evidence."
(p. 239) Next the United States law is reviewed. In most states, neither suicide
nor attempted suicide is a crime. But the author concludes that if suicide and
attempted suicide are not crimes, then, aiding and abetting suicide should
not be either, "but the majority of States have shrunk from following the point
to its logical conclusion."
These legal summaries are followed by a historical study of the formation of
the traditional Western moral reaction towards suicide - that suicide is contrary
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to nature, a wrong against society; a violation of the fifth (sixth) commandment,
and a usurpation of God's prerogative over life. But the author does not leave
us here. He explores the causes of suicide, outlining the arguments of two
schools that have offered divergent theories - the sociologists following Durkheim
and the psychoanalysts based on Freud. The results of these scientific investigations challenge the factual basis on which traditional Christian theology and law
has been based - that (except for insanity) suicide is a perverse act of the will
and a deliberate usurpation of God's sovereignty over life. The author concludes
that the fruits of sociological and medical research are still limited, but the question is seriously raised as to whether the law (which reflects the traditional Christian attitude) should remain in force. Research has shown that criminal law is
irrelevant to the solution of the problem of suicide, because there is no evidence
that the law acts as a deterrent. Would the elimination of the law then amount
to 'a condonation of suicide and a victory for the forces of secular individualism
which oppose the traditional Christian view? "Change in the law would in no
way be a condonation of the individualistic claim that man has the right to
dispose of his own life, but the recognition that while suicide is an antisocial act,
the criminal law is not the best means of dealing with it. If necessary, a repealing statute could include a declaration to this effect." (p. 257) The author then
goes on to the more important question of how the law should deal with attempted suicides and how society can best assure these troubled persons of
psychiatric help.
-AS is evident from the above sketch, perhaps the most remarkable thing about
this study is the ambitious breadth of the research. The reader is impressed with
the clarity and succinctness of the summary of the state of the question. Although
the author is a lawyer, his interest extends far beyond the strictly legal. He shows
himself able to furnish us with the pertinent findings in the fields of history, law,
theology, science, psychology, psychiatry, medicine, and sociology. In handling
legal matters his presentation is not written with the thoroughness of a law review
note or article, nor does he exhibit the depth of insight of the legal philosopher.
His historical summaries tend to be rather sweeping, and in theology he is quick
to draw conclusions. 'No doubt specialists in the fields would want to argue with
him on certain points. But given the broad objective he sets himself, it is doubtful if the study could have been made with any greater skill in the short space
of 278 pages. To 'be overcritical is like asking a man to paint the world and
then to express dissatisfaction when he produces a good map. Detail had to be
sacrificed. There had to be some oversimplification. But the great virtue of
this work is that it searches out the various disciplines, cousins to the law, and
invites them like long-lost relations to a big family party. This achievement is
especially important in a day when specialization tends to keep the various disciplines isolated from one another. The author brings about a happy reunion,
and it is'clear that these cousins have important things to say to one another.
We can say then that this book is not so much an attempt to settle problems
as to provide background and guidelines to assist men of good will in the approach
to legislative solutions of problems that 'have a moral origin. To aid the serious
student, the author has included 59 pages of appendices with the texts of perti-
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nent laws, committee reports, and official recommendations. An extensive
bibliography, index, and table of cases is also provided.
In his first chapter, the author writes: "In democratic pluralist societies,
social policies with moral implications are not laid down by fiat from above, but
are evolved gradually through the rational reflections of free men. Government
• . .is government by discussion." (p. 43) St. John-Stevas has furnished us
with a brilliant vade mecum for future discussions that should lead to better
understanding, better laws, and better government.
CHARLES PALMS
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A Critical Bibliography embracing Law, Society, Economics and Politics). By Arthur Utz. Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1960. Vol. I. Pp. 446.
DM. 36.80.
With the tremendous production of more or less scholarly works in the field
of the social sciences, many of them of a highly specialized character or dealing
with a limited sector of social life, the need for bibliographies is overwhelming.
It is -to a degree filled by bibliographies mostly produced by professional librarians.
Such bibliographies, especially if some expert advice and help is available, are
usually quite comprehensive. Yet they often lack any criteria - unless it be the
names of well-known and established authorities in their respective fields - as
to the value of a particular book or essay to scholars who work principally in the
field of the fundamental problems of the social sciences, in ethics, law, sociology,
economics, and politics. Nevertheless, these very scholars need a vital connection
with the work of special empirical research. Moreover, many persons in public
life would gain if they could familiarize themselves with fundamental problems
and the specialized research that relates to them; but this can only be done with
the help of a selective bibliography and reviews by which an inquirer is saved a
long and frustrating search in comprehensive bibliographies.
To meet this need is the purpose of this excellent bibliography by Professor
A. F. Utz of the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. It contains in Part A an
alphabetical list of about 1500 books and articles published between 1956 into
1959, in German, English, French, Italian, and Spanish, 500 of which are reviewed in Part B. This is a systematic bibliography, according to what the author
calls "Normendenken" (the norms of social ethics), which he elaborated in his
Social Ethics (1956). An example of this approach is the reference in the Preface to "integral treatment" of the political order:
The positive political sciences are prepared to consider any powerful group
which exists in a state as a political phenomenon - they would even say
that labour-unions or any other "pressure-group" could become the sole possessors of political power. However, from the philosophic or normative point
of view, these types of activity - as long as they have not been integrated
into the political equilibrium - can only be considered as phenomena of the
"political question," just as, in the domain of the social, one considers any,
imbalance as pertaining to the "social question." (p. 10)
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Upon this normative basis the bibliography is divided into five main sections:
(1) Principles of Social Doctrine; (2) Philosophy of Law; (3) The Social Order;
(4) The Economic Order; (5) The Political Order. Each is again subdivided
into classes and subclasses. Thus, for example, Professor Legaz y Lacambra's
"Political Obligation and Natural Law," in Volume 2 of this FORUM, is noted
as an article and as referring to II 2. 4. 1, that is, Philosophy of law (general);
and to V 3. 4. 1, that is, Political philosophy (general) ; and to V 5. 2. 1, that
is, Civil rights and liberties, duties (general). These highly refined subdivisions
of the bibliography will be of great help to the user.
The selective bibliography tries to overcome the dangerous dichotomy which
always threatens between the philosopher-theorist or moralist and the "scientific"
specialist, who gathers more or less systematically heaps of factual data, often
classified without well-founded basic criteria. The latter should give a kind of
raw material to -the first, and it is from the first that the fact hunters should
get the principles for their more or less systematic fact hunting. This reviewer
was recently told by certain fact gatherers that they had accumulated a tremendous amount of facts or data but found the whole endeavor rather meaningless because they had not asked the "right" questions. Possibly they would have
been able to ask them if they had cooperated more with the philosopher-theorists.
At the end of each main section a short summary in four languages appears,
indicating the recent general tendencies in the field. The reviews are all by the
author with the advice of Professor Willy Biichi, Dr. Humbert-Thomas Conus,
and Countess Dr. Brigitta von Galen- The bibliographical research has been
supported by the Swiss National Fund for Science and Research.
Since the author invites criticism and suggestion I want first to mention the
following gaps in his American sources for articles: most American law reviews,
Theological Studies, and Social Research.
It may be that space - a problem in all selective bibliographies - is the
reason that objectively important works are not mentioned in this bibliography,
but are found, e.g., in the bibliography of Political Sciences of the Munich
Hochschule fiir Pol. Wissenschaften. Bracher's Die Aufl6sung der Weimarer Republik, an extremely instructive book, is not in this bibliography; neither axe
Kluber's Christliche Sociallehre III; Alfred von Martin's Soziologie; Heinrich
Giesen's Der miindige Christ; Alois Dempf's Kritik der historischen Vernunft.
Nor are Fijalkowski's important critique of C. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum
Fiihrerstaat;Arnold Ehrhardt's Politische Metaphysik von Solon bis Augustin;
Peter Stanlis's Edmund Burke and the Natural Law; Giorgio del Vecchio's
Natural Law and European Unity; F. S. C. Northrop's The Complexity of Legal
and Ethical Experience. All these books (with the exception of the last one,
which appeared in 1959) are within the time limits of Utz's bibliography and
fulfill the criteria of the author as much as many other books which are found
in the bibliography.

In a selective bibliography such things are, naturally, to be expected; other
reviewers probably would point out the omission of their preferred authors. So
this is not meant as a substantive criticism. The books and articles reviewed fall
generally under Utz's criteria, and the reviews themselves are objective in con-
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tent and fair in evaluation. We may look forward to the following volumes as
most valuable tools in research and scholarship.
H. A. RommzN
NATURORDNUNG

IN

GESELLSCHAFT,

STAAT,

WIRTSCHAFT.

Edited by Joseph

H6ffner, Alfred Verdross, and Francisco Vito. Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1961.
Pp. 731. 280s.
This Festschriftl dedicated to Johannes Messner contains fifty-four contributions from theologians, moralists, legal and political philosophers, economists,
and jurists. It is an apt recognition of a scholar whose interests are catholic and
whose books, some translated into several languages, have established him as an
internationally recognized authority, perhaps mainly in the field of social ethics
and natural law. From 1929 with a study on "Social Economy and Social Ethics"
to the monumental Social Ethics-NaturalLaw in the Modern World in 1949, to
his Kulturethik mit Grundlegung durch Prinzipienethik und Pers6nlichkeitsethik
in 1954, Messner has increased in influence from year to year. Following his
maxim that "as all sciences so also must ethics start with experiential facts
(Erfahrungstatsachen)," he has in his most recent book, Funktionar (1961),
treated of the change from the nineteenth century oligarchical democracy to
egalitarian democracy to pluralist democracy, and has shown that pluralist democracy - the competition for political power by parties, pressure groups, and
mass organizations centered around socio-economic and other interests - may be
essentially a mode of the moralization of power.
The Festschrift consists of five parts. The first part is on Messner and his
work. Here Joseph Hoffner, one of the editors, points out that Messner uses
the sociological-historical Betrachtungsweise (method) and the inductive-ontological demonstration to show (with broad use of the results of the empirical
social sciences) that natural law is the "human order of existence" (menschliche
Existenzordnung) ; human nature, that is, "man," must be seen not as an abstract
"individual," but as born into the primary society, the family, which again is
part of an ever-widening circle of diverse societies. The biographical sketch
by Alfred Klose tells us that Messner's editorship of Das Neue Reich and of the
Monatschrift filr Kultur und Politik came to an end in 1938. Messner had been
the friend of Dollfuss and had published a biography of him in 1934, although
his book in 1936 on the "Vocational Group Order" of the Dollfuss constitution
was rather critical. With the fall of Dollfuss, Messner had to flee first to Switzerland, then to England, where he found a new home in the Birmingham Oratory
founded by Cardinal Newman. The fruit of years of intense study in Birmingham was his Naturrecht. In 1949 Messner returned to the University of Vienna,
but he still spends half the year in Birmingham.
Part II, Foundations:Nature and Super-Nature, is a series of essays of interest
1. The book is not technically a Festschrift, which traditionally contains research articles,
often of considerable length, and the editors never use the term. The book is rather "a
homage" by friends. It will be convenient, however, to refer to it as a Festschrift in a
loose sense.

NATURAL LAW FORUM
to the natural law jurist. Part III is concerned with more sociological themes
under the heading: Society: Family-Subsidiarity-Property.Part IV, State-Church,
Law-Constitution-InternationalCommunity, is of much direct interest to the
natural law jurist. Part V, Economics: Theory-Ethics-Politics, has extremely interesting contributions to socio-economic theory and policy, but only T. Nojiri's
"The Theory of General Economic Policy and Natural Law," A. Mahr's "Economic and Ethical Behaviour," and Vito's "The Ethical Foundations of Economics and Aid to Undeveloped Nations" would interest the jurist directly. A
comprehensive bibliography of Messner's publications, information on the contributors, and good indexes of names and subject matters are of great help to
the reader.
When fifty-four contributors are asked for essays, but only some 660 printed
pages are available, it is clear the contributions have to be comparatively short.
Thus of the articles of interest to the jurist the shortest covers seven pages, the
longest eighteen pages, and the average ten to twelve pages. The usual comment on Festschrifts as to the variable quality of the contributions is not inappropriate. The reviewer assumes therefore the privilege of commenting on a
few contributions he found to be of special interest to jurists.
The first is an extremely interesting article by Professor Albert Mitterer (well
known for his study of the influence of the "world image" of St. Thomas on
his views in ethics and law and the corrections of these views made necessary
by progress in biology and related sciences). Mitterer points out here that man's
dominion over the world especially in creative culture is viewed today much
differently from the way St. Thomas saw it. Therefore the Naturrechtsfindung
today has to be done differently. The over-all "world image" and the view of
certain values have changed, and thus the view and the consciousness of natural
law corresponding to an earlier evolutionary stage have changed. Uncritical
acceptance of Thomistic views leads necessarily to mistakes. (pp. 46-47)
Professor Erik Wolf gives a profound rechtstheologische interpretation of
St. Mark 12, 13-18 (tribute to Caesar), and comes to the conclusion that the
demands of the human order are derived from the divine order, and not the
reverse. The human order lives already "between the times" derived from the
divine order and moving towards it. True politia Christianais not a historical
order-model; neither a social-conservative nor a*social-revolutionary pattern can
make a Christian state real. The divine order is never simply identifiable with the
political order; the latter is founded on the first, but does not represent it.
Professor Jakob Hommes, whose philosophical books on Hegel, existentialism,
and Marxism are well known, gives us in "Natural Law, Person, Matter," a
condensation of the last chapter of his book (to be published soon), Das dialectische Wesen des Naturrechts. The "problematical" character of the natural
law rests in the separation of the personal realm and its theoretical basis, the
separation of an objective, naturrechtliche, and theistic metaphysics from the
world of natural science and technology. To unite these worlds, the metaphysicalpersonal and the scientific-technological, is the fundamental problem if natural
law is to survive. (p. 72)
Anton-Hermann Chroust presents some short reflections on natural law which
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are rich in content and always interesting. His justified criticism of some adepts
of the natural law is similar to that of Messner, as the latter's methodically careful distinctions in his opus magnum show.
The Catholic theologian, Bernhard Sch6pf, in "Natural Law in Moral Theology" defends Messner's view that the New Testament revelation does not
make additional demands on human society but only adds supernatural motivations and makes clearer already valid rules. What is new in the New Testament
is the new and wholly different relationship of God and man. Here a gap opens
between Catholic and quite a few Protestant theologians. The original Protestant
adoption of natura destructa in contrast to natura vulnerata made natural theology and natural law impossible, or at least very difficult. But this tradition did
not remain uniform. For example, John Wise based his Vindication of the
Government of New England Churches on the natural law doctrine of Pufendorf.
The recent rise of dialectical theology, or "theology of crisis," initiated by Karl
Barth, has again strengthened the view that Protestants cannot accept natural
law. To anyone interested in this problem, Albert Auer's essay in this volume,
"Protestant Understanding of Law and Natural Law," will be of great help.
He distinguishes three groups: First, those who adhere more or less strictly to
Karl Barth's theology, for whom law is exclusively of supernatural origin, i.e.,
law has its source in revelation, and ethico-legal norms are truths of faith. With
them are those who follow Johannes Heckel (lex caritatis) and Erik Wolf (Recht
des Nachsten). Second, those who stress the doctrine of the order of creation,
like H. D. Wendland, E. Brunner, U. Scheuner. Third, those like Hermann
Weinkauf, Hans Reiner, C. H. Dodd, and W. Schulze, who affirm that the old
natural law problems are revived in contemporary Protestantism. F. Karrenberg's contribution, "State and Society in Protestantism," offers thoughts both
challenging and complementary to Auers.
Professor Alfred Verdross discusses human dignity in the occidental philosophy
of law, from Plato to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United
Nations. The dignity of the human person is "anterior" to all social order;
therefore, it demands the fulfillment of five general demands: (1) each social
order must grant the person a space or realm in which he may act and work as
a free and responsible agent; (2) the law must protect and secure this realm;
(3) the authority must be limited; (4) the observance of these limitations must
be put under control; (5) the duty of obedience to authority is not absolute,
but subordinate to the dignity of the human person.
An interesting commentary by Hans Peters is rather critical of German
judges who cannot escape from their "positivistic" training. He states as an
example of the problem that the right of free choice of vocation was in 1954
interpreted as enabling a public savings bank to establish -a branch, and he asks
if this has any relation to the idea of human rights or the protection of free
development of the human person.
Professor Utz discusses the Philosophy of Law as a Sol-Wissenschaft (normative science); he defines the "juridical as inter-human relations in as far as
they are subject to an obligatory regulation." He shows that jurisprudence and
legal sociology and theory are sciences of being, and he discusses the juridical
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as object of norm-sciences according to Kantianism, value-philosophy, and universal norm-recognition.
Another article concerned with the problem of the ultrapositive law is by
the late Professor Hans Nawiasky, who fears that some constitutional jurists do
not sharply enough distinguish ethics and (juridical) law as two different normsystems which must never be confused; as a consequence of the lack of sharp
distinctions, the "new view" (initiated by the late Joseph Wintrich, President of
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, a dedicated natural law jurist)
joins the two systems of norms so closely that ethics dominates law.
A contribution by a young scholar, H. Schambeck, "Ideas and Theories of
Natural Law, a Methodological Enquiry," is a very thoughtful study and comes
to the conclusion that natural law is not so much "reason law" as "essence law"
and has little to do with Stammler's "just law." He sees in this the common
understanding of Messner, Verdross, von der Heydte, Rommen, and many
others.
In a short but interesting article Professor Akira Mizunomi of the University
of Kyushu, Japan, discusses "Natural Law and the Essence of the State." He
discusses mostly the German thinkers of the last sixty years, such as Ratzel (the
founder of geopolitics), Cumplowica, Franz Oppenheimer, Marx and Engels,
who identify the constitutive and integrating form of the State with its "matter,"
or in other words, with power or with the biological or racial element. He contrasts the "spiritualizing" thinkers, such as Dabin, Rommen, and especially Messner, who see in man's rational nature and ethical aspirations the constitutive
form of the State. Kelsen and Jellinek he considers as trying to amalgamate both
fundamental views. He points out that the "spiritualizing" thinkers are, of course,
all committed to the natural law. Another young Japanese scholar, Professor
Sugano, of the University of Tokyo, gives a short, but clear, report on "Natural
Law Freedom in the New Constitution of Japan and the Ethical Consciousness of the Japanese People."
The contribution of a Belgian scholar, Florent Peeters, on natural law and
the right to Heimat (that untranslatable term for a nation that lived in many
states, in language islands, in eastern and southeastern Europe) is an interesting
case of the "growing" natural law. Compulsory transfers of families from their
old Heimat into their national territory has been practiced by all the totalitarian
nations. The author sees in these transfers clear violations of natural law and
contends that the Heimatrecht is, like private property, a natural right.
Professor Wiirtenberger discusses natural law and capital punishment in an
essay which will be of great interest to criminologists. He criticizes certain theological and ethical views which do not give enough weight to the democratic
and humanitarian spirit of our constitutions and to the complexity of the "guilt"
of the criminal personality in the present situation. Since natural law is also the
critical and limiting norm for positive law, theologians and moralists ought to
cooperate in this problem with the jurist and criminologist.
Of the many contributions in the field of economics, Professor Taketosbi
Nojiri's "Economic Policy and Natural Law" shows that any realistic economic
theory must apply certain principles of natural law and that some theorists of
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the order-thinking in economics actually do so. Among the latter he discusses
the theories of Walter Euken, of the Sombart disciple H. Ritschl, and of Theodore
Putz.
The reviewer must claim indulgence for his choices. The book itself, with its
broad surveys of problems and applications of natural law, is a well-deserved
homage to a great scholar and teacher.
H. A. ROMMEN
TRAITi DE L'ARGUMENTATION. 2 vols. By Ch.
Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tytega. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1958. Pp. 734. 2400 frs.

LA NOUVELLE RHETORIQUE -

In this treatise, the authors are deliberately reviving an ancient tradition
of European letters and philosophy, started by the Sophists and given first systematic philosophic form by Aristotle, but flourishing into the nineteenth century:
the academic cultivation of rhetoric. They rightly point out at the beginning
that such an enterprise "constitutes a rupture with the conception of reason
and reasoning initiated by Descartes." (p. 1) The logical approach of Descartes,
"l'ideal cartesien," is at home only in the kinds of proof which Aristotle called
analytical. But, our authors ask, is this the only domain in which reason is
competent? Is it true that those fields in which neither sense experience nor
logical deduction can provide an answer to a problem must be abandoned to
irrational factors, to the instincts, to violence? (p. 3) Questioning such dualisms
as Kant's of reason and faith or Bergson's of intuition and reason, they advance
the counterproposition that all of these doctrines involve a false approach to
reasoning: "c'est ld une limitation indue et parfaitement injustifile du domaine
ois intervient notre faculti de raisonner et de prouver." It is the problem of
what constitutes evidence that is at the heart of their own approach. It seeks
to explore the discursive techniques which enable one to secure the assent to
propositions on evidence that is less than logical or scientific in the definitive
sense. Assent is variable in intensity. Why should'one limit oneself to a particular degree of intensity? Why should one identify evidence and truth?
The authors rightly point to the enormous development of propaganda. It
has always seemed to the reviewer that Aristotle's Rhetoric is still the best that
has been written on this subject: the art of persuading and of convincing, the
technique of discussion and deliberation. Assent (adhasion) to an argument
always involves the problem of the audience; all arguments are addressed to
somebody. It is therefore from an analysis of the audience that the authors
start. 1 Their discussion of the audience contains much that is shrewd common
sense about matters essentially psychological, and there aie some few references
to recent psychological writings, notably Wertheimer, Bruner, Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield; but the essential cast of the argument is philosophical.
Distinctions such as ,that between the universal and the special or particular
audience, the select (Ilite) audience and self-reflection (delibiration avec soi1. Professor Eric Wolf of Freiburg has recently put us all in his debt by a detailed critical
study of Aristotle's Rhetoric. It was evidently not yet available to our authors.
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mime) are convincingly delineated. They draw, e.g., a distinction between
persuading and convincing, suggesting that the former is typically addressed
to a special audience, the latter to a universal one. Valuable references back
to Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian help to put their notions in perspective, and
the very general significance of the kind of rhetoric which Aristotle called
"epideictic" (declamatory, displayful) in scholarly discourse is convincingly
argued. Indeed, one of the fascinating aspects of this study is the extent to
which its own argumentation serves to illustrate what it argues about argumentation.
There follow some sections in which the authors are concerned with "education and propaganda" and the related issues of argument and discussion as
a substitute for violence and of the personal commitment (engagement) involved in all arguments. Especially what the authors have to say on the latter
bears some interesting relation to Michael Polanyi's theories about science and
scholarship discussed elsewhere in this issue of the FORUM. In a sense the entire
treatise is the other side of the medal "struck" by Polanyi; for if Polanyi is right
that there is personal commitment in all scientific demonstration even when
most abstract, then the logic of persuasion which our authors are exploring
becomes a vital part of all scholarly and scientific communication - the radical
distinction between demonstration and argumentation is replaced by a relative
one.
But can we therefore say that all education is propaganda, as the authors
are inclined to do? The argument turns upon -their notion of education as the
"porte parole des valeurs reconnues" which assimilates the educator to the speaker
who delivers a declamatory discourse. (pp. 68-69) Such a conception of education is inadequate, especially where "freedom of thought" is part of the value
system. We cannot say as -they do that the educator is simply "chargd d'inculquer
les valeurs d'une sociiti diterminie" nor that "l'ducateur doit proceder par
affirmation, sans s'engager dans une controverse ois l'on difendrait librement
le pour et le contre." Surely an argument of considerable cogency may be
advanced for precisely the opposite view, 2 and since we surely cannot exclude
this outlook as one possible one, since it is and has been in fact held and has shaped
education, education needs to be more broadly defined as seeking to mold and
develop a human 'being, inspired by an ideal of what a human being should be
like. All propaganda, on the other hand, is as our authors recognize, action-related, and even declamatory rhetoric may well be part of a propaganda campaign.
It is obviously impossible to explore the rich contents of this treatise on
argumentation in comparable detail throughout. Suffice it to indicate its general
content and to add a few more footnotes of doubt and qualification. The two
other parts are concerned with the "starting point" and the "techniques" of
argumentation. The first chapter of Part II deals with the accord (consensus)
on the premises of any argument or discussion, the acknowledged facts, truths,
values, etc., capped by a very interesting discussion of the argumentum ad
2.

See, e.g., the chapter on "Independence of Thought and Propaganda" in my THE
IN THE COMMON MAN (1941) ; also the sketch of rival educational philosophies
in Ch. IX.
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hominem and the petitio principii. (pp. 148ff.) The former is taken to be
different from the argumentum ad personam, but their frequent confusion is
noted. Similarly, what is usually considered a petitio principii is declared to
be devoid of sense from a logical viewpoint, and it is asserted that it is an error
in rhetoric, rather than in logic. (p. 151) It involves the use of the argumentum
ad hominem when and where it does not apply. The other two chapters deal
with the choice of such "givens" and their presentation.
In the third part, dealing with the techniques, the quasi-logical forms of
argumentation - Aristotle's enthymemes, or incomplete syllogisms - including such important topics as ridiculing, the rule of justice and probabilities constitute the first chapter. The second contains the arguments based on the structure of reality, and includes such crucial matters as causation and the argument
from authority. The third chapter this reviewer found especially stimulating:
arguing from cases and from analogy forms so large a part of "proving" anything in law and politics that these sections may be considered of especial value
to the student in these fields. In the final two chapters two further important
features of argumentation are explored: the "dissociation des notions" culminating in a presentation of rhetoric as process, and the "interaction des arguments," which includes the discussion of fullness (ampleur) and its dangers,
familiar in the English-American saying: "One good argument is enough."
While this reviewer finds himself in considerable agreement with the discussion of authority as it reinforces his own view of authority as the presumed
capacity for reasoned elaboration, the discussion does not quite reach the decisive
conclusion. This seems in part due to a tendency to confuse authority with
credibility. (p. 417) But it is certainly good to read that many of the attacks
on authority as such are actually efforts to substitute one authority for another.
(p. 412) Here, too, we find a point of contact with Polanyi.
In the discussion of analogy, a new term, phore (not in Larousse), is proposed to refer to those matters which support what is claimed primarily, the
theme or central argument. In Goethe's remark that to read a page of Kant is like
entering a well-lighted room, the entering of the well-lighted room would be
the phore. The strength of the analogy often is derived from valuations implicit
in the phore. The discussion of the effects and the use of analogies is enriched
by many examples drawn from literature; and this use of literary examples
constitutes in fact one of the real charms of this brilliant study. Proust and
Alice in Wonderland, Sterne, Shakespeare, and Corneille, as well as dozens of
others, contribute their bits to this highly instructive exploration of the many
ways in which human beings succeed in securing the adherence and assent of
their fellow men by arguments which carry conviction of varying intensity. At
the same time, there is excellent documentation in terms of ancient and modern
scholarly writing in the fields touched upon; philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and other social scientists, ancient and modem, attest to the authors'
broad and impressive humanist learning.
In their conclusion, the authors undertake to indicate their philosophical
standpoint. Having rejected the entire logical and epistemological tradition
since Descartes, they state that they are combatting the various philosophical
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dichotomies, in their several absolutist garbs: reason versus imagination, science
versus opinion, universal objectivity versus incommunicable subjectivity, and
so forth. They do not believe in such definitive and immutable "revelations";
all immediate and absolute givens, whether sensations, rational evidences, or
mystic intuitions, they would eliminate as such from philosophy. (pp. 676-77)
While recognizing their importance for argumentation, they would consider
them all as equally subject to discussion and argument, and therefore would
insist upon the philosophical importance of studying how such arguments are
carried on. Rejecting the radical distinction between value judgments and
judgments of reality as "une tentative disesperle" (a position with which this
reviewer agrees heartily), they point out that any language is the language of
a community, which implies the adherence (adhision) to certain "prises de
position." Such taking of positions involves a precedent argumentation, and
hence its theory and practice constitute an essential correlative of critical rationalism.
Clearly, the position developed by our two authors is one of great significance to all those concerned with law and politics, in their philosophical dimension. Resuscitating the great tradition of Western rhetoric is most opportune
at this time, when the West finds itself more and more profoundly challenged
by a multiplicity of audiences which a purely technical and manipulative
approach in terms of propaganda is incapable of coping with. Incidentally,
the work is, unlike many.European books, provided with an adequate index
of subjects, as well as names, and a comprehensive bibliography. One can only
hope that it will not be long before an English translation is undertaken, since
there exists no equivalent: work in: our tongue.
CARL

LOCKE ON WAR AND PEACE.

J.
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By Richard H. Cox. Oxford University Press, 1960.

Pp. xx, 220. $5.60.
Locke on War and Peace professes to be a new interpretation of John
Locke's political theory, but the basic thesis around which it is constructed is not
original with Cox. It has already been put forward by Leo Strauss in a number of
works of interpretation of the history of political theory. In Natural Right and
History (Chicago, 1953) and in other writings Strauss has attempted a reassessment of the history of "natural rights" in terms of a fundamental division in the
history of Western political thought between the "classical" natural law theory of
the Stoics and scholastics, and the "modern theory of Hobbes, Locke, and the
French Revolution." There is no' doubt on which side Strauss's sympathies lie, but
there is a good deal of question about the validity of this kind of division of the
history of ideas into "good guys" and "bad guys."
The exaggerations to which such a system is prone were glaringly obvious in a
book, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law, written by one of his students, Peter
Stanlis, which I reviewed in -this journal three years ago.' Strauss had supplied a
useful corrective to some interpretations of Burke as a proto-utilitarian by point1. 4 NATURAL LAw FORuM 166-174 (1959).
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ing out how much his theory had been influenced by Cicero's natural law theory. 2
Stanlis, however, took the Strauss viewpoint and developed it into a polemic
against the "natural rights" theorists, including both Hobbes and Locke, whom
he regarded as in some way responsible for "Jacobin types of popular collectivism," "impersonal leviathan states," and -"the sophisters, economists, and
calculators of our century." 3 Against them he proposed the revival of the classical
natural law theory of Cicero, St. Thomas, and Edmund Burke.
. Why the effort to laud Burke and denigrate Locke? There are overtones of
contemporary ideological controversy in all of this, for it is no secret that the
revived school of conservative theorists in America, as well as a number of religious
writers, is attempting to develop the more orthodox and conservative Burke into
a patron saint for Americans to replace the liberal and free-thinking Locke. One
way of doing this, in addition to identifying Burke with the great political heritage
of the West, is to discredit Locke by associating his doctrine with collectivism (as
does Willmoore Kendall's study, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule,
first published in 1941, and recently reissued in a paperback edition4) and with
Hobbesian doctrines of absolutism which are utterly repugnant to American
political thinking.
More recently, Strauss has continued his war on Locke. When the publication of the Lovelace collection of Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature seemed
to align Locke with the traditional theorists of natural law, Strauss attempted
to use them to support his view that Locke's theory was actually Hobbesianism
in disguise. However, a number of recent articles have utilized the Essays
effectively to point up the inadequacies and misstatements in the Strauss interpretation.5
The method which Strauss uses in determining the real meaning of a writer
such as Locke, as opposed to what has been taken for his intention by previous
commentators, is one which he describes in his book, Persecution and the Art of
Writing (Glencoe, Ill.,
1952). Strauss argues that philosophers who are devoted to
truth but also concerned about the possible revolutionary or subversive effect of
their teachings upon the accepted opinions of their society, are wont to write in
a kind of academic double talk which disguises their real intention from all but
"careful and well-trained readers." This has the good effect of transmitting their
message, while avoiding persecution of the writer or upset of traditional mores of
the society. However, with Strauss's method of careful analysis of the text, it is
claimed, the real views of the philosopher can be discerned, and in the case of
Locke it reveals that he was fundamentally in agreement with Hobbes.
2.

A more judicious and convincing treatment of this theme is contained in CHARLES

PARKIN, THE MORAL BASIS OF BURKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT (1956).
3. PETER J. STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 247-49

4.

(Ann Arbor, 1958).

Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960.

JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE, trans. & ed. by W. von Leyden (Oxford, 1954), is discussed by Strauss in "Locke's Doctrine of Natural Law," chapter 8 of
WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY? (Glencoe, Ill., 1959). His views are strongly criticized in
Charles H. Monson, Jr., Locke and His Interpreters,6 POLITICAL STUDIES 120-133 (1958);
John W. Yolton, Locke on the Law of Nature, 67 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 477-498
(1958); and Raghuveer Singh, John Locke and the Theory of Natural Law, 9 POLITICAL
STUDIES 105-118 (1961).
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It i necessary to discuss Strauss's point of view and method at the outset of
this review, because Cox's book was very heavily influenced by him. While he does
not indulge in the kind of ideological name-calling of Stanlis on Burke, he utilizes
the Strauss. methodology to prove a modified version of the same point, i.e., that
Locke and Hobbes were in basic agreement. This dependence is clearest in the
sections of the first chapter, entitled "The Cautious Mr. Locke," "The Problem
of Persecution," and "On the Interpretation of Locke's Treatises"; but the
Locke-Hobbes equation continues to control the direction of the analysis throughout the book.
Cox is writing not merely about Locke's view of war and peace, in the sense
of his- theory as to the relations which exist or ought to exist between states. In
fact, only a single chapter, rather late in the book, is concerned with international
law and relations. He is writing about Locke's theory of the state of nature, and
of natural law, in relation to the theories which went before it - essentially the
same subject as that discussed by Strauss in many of his writings. Cox's argument
can be briefly summarized: Because of fear of persecution, Locke wrote his
Second Treatise so as to make it appear that he was strongly influenced by Richard
Hooker's Laws of EcclesiasticalPolity, when in fact the principal influence upon
his theory, which he made every effort to conceal, was that of Thomas Hobbes.
(ch. 1) Locke's state of nature is not in opposition to the state of war, as Locke
says at the outset of the Second Treatise, but, as becomes clear later in the work,
is synonymous with it, a state of "want, rapine and force." (p. 104) Locke's natural law reduces itself ultimately to the law of self-preservation and "bears practically no resemblance, except in name, to what was meant by his contemporaries,
and certainly can in no way be reconciled with what his seeming authority,
Richard Hooker, meant by the natural law." (pp. 88-89) In international relations, Locke, like Hobbes, broke with the traditional theory of international law,
represented by Hooker and Grotius, and asserted that states live in a competitive
state of nature, seeking "practically unlimited power." (p. 178) Despite Locke's
statement that the law of nature wills peace, it is war that is man's natural state;
and "peace, therefore, is unnatural and derivative." (p. 187) In order to arrive at
an assessment of the validity of the Cox-Strauss interpretation, the argument for
each of these propositions will be examined and criticized.
Because of fear of persecution, Locke wrote his Second Treatise so as to
make it appear that he was strongly influenced by Hooker, when, in fact, the
principal influence upon his theory, which he made every effort to conceal, was
that of Thomas Hobbes. To take the last point first, Cox asserts that Locke knew
much more of Hobbes than he was willing to admit. He cites two quotations
from letters by Locke to those who had criticized him for reproducing Hobbes's
argument. In each he denied knowing that his argument appeared in the Leviathan, and Cox calls these "curious statements to come from a man of Locke's
deserved reputation for learning." (p. 3) Yet, in the first case the argument concerned the immortality of the soul, on which the position of Hobbes is not at all
clear; 6 and the second involved the charge that Locke in making faith in Jesus
6 See the discussion in HoBsEs,
the Blackwell edition).

LEVIATHAN,

Part IV, ch. xliv (especially pp. 404-411 in
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Christ the essential doctrine of Christianity was repeating Hobbes's definitionhardly a central point to the Leviathan.7 That Locke should not have been aware
of the exact nature of the opinions of Hobbes on these points does not prove that
he was systematically concealing all evidence of Hobbes's influence, nor does the
fact that, as Cox notes, he had a copy of the Leviathan as early as 1681 prove that
he was familiar with every point in it.
In the case of Hooker, Cox asserts that there is a "pattern of contradictions"
in Locke's use of quotations from The Laws of EcclesiasticalPolity and that he
makes "misleading additions" to them. In dealing with this criticism, it might be
wise to use the method which Cox recommends for an understanding of the real
meaning of Locke, i.e., to refer to the original context of Locke's quotations from
Hooker. On page 41, Cox states that "a comparison of the original with Locke's
use of it shows not only that Hooker never uses the expression 'state of nature'
but also that Hooker refers, in the passage quoted, to something different from
Locke's pre-political state." If we check with Hooker we find that, although he
does not use the term "state of nature," he describes a situation similar to that
state when he asserts that "the laws which have been hitherto mentioned do bind
men absolutely even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to
do."8 Locke's addition, by way of explanation, of the words "such as attend men
in the state of nature" to a quotation from Laws, I, x, 4, is also described as misleading by Cox.9 Yet the passage quoted from Hooker is a discussion of the situation in "those times wherein there were no civil societies," 10 a difference of
terminology but not of substance.
There are differences between Hooker's state "wherein there were no civil
societies" and Locke's state of nature, but Hooker's theory contains Locke's two
key conceptions, that of a prepolitical state and that of a movement into organized
society by "composition and agreement."" The terms "contract" and "state of
nature" may have been derived from Hobbes, but their content was derived from
Hooker.
Even Locke's view of the condition of men in the prepolitical state, of which
Cox makes so much in order to prove his similarity to Hobbes, is foreshadowed in
Hooker. When Cox tries to prove that Locke's state of nature is a state of "want,
rapine and force," he amasses a large number of references to the "anarchy" and
"inconveniences" which exist in the state of nature, due to the ignorance and
partiality of men before they had established a "common judge" of disputes among
them. But the following words are from Hooker, not Hobbes:
when families were multiplied and increased upon earth, after separation
each providing for itself, envy, strife, contention, and violence must grow
amongst them.... Men always knew that when force and injury was offered
they might be defenders of themselves. . . that no man might in reason take
7. Locke's answer to this point was: "This, whether it be the doctrine of the Leviathan, I
know not. This appears to me out of the New Testament." 7 WORKS 420 (London, 1821).
8. R cHaD HOOKER, OF THE LAws OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY, Book I, ch. x, para. 1, in
1 WORKS 184 (Oxford, 1865).
9.

10.
11.

Cox, LOCKE ON WAR AND PEACE 41, referring to LoCKE,SECONDTREATtSE ch. vii, no. 91.

HOOKER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 186 (I, x, 3).
Id. at 186-7 (I, x, 4).
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upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination
proceed in maintenance thereof inasmuch as every man is towards himself and
them whom he greatly affecteth partial and therefore that strifes and troubles
would be endless except they gave their common consent all to be ordered by
some whom they should agree upon .... 12
Cox is right, as the above quotation implies, in noting that for Hooker man
has left the prepolitical state and he cannot return to it. This is a major difference between his theory and that of Locke, for whom the possibility of return
to a pregovemmental state through revolution is an important element of his
theory. This is worth discussing, but it should not blind us to the very real dependence of Locke Upon Hooker for some of his most important concepts.
This dependence is clearest, and the Strauss-Cox interpretation is most in
error, in the case of Locke's theory of natural law. It is simply not true that
Locke's natural law "bears practically no resemblance, except in name, to what
was meant by his contemporaries,and certainly can in no way be reconciled with
what his seeming authority, Richard Hooker, meant by the natural law." One
would expect that after all the controversy about the Essays on the Law of Nature,
Cox would take a more moderate position and recognize the continuities in
Locke's theory with the classical, Stoic, and Christian tradition coming to him
through Richard Hooker. Instead, he exaggerates Locke's references to the ignorance of man in the state of nature and his desire for self-preservation, in
order to make him sound as much as possible like Hobbes. As the quotation from
Hooker above indicates, the traditional natural law theory had not denied that,
in practice, men often are ignorant of, or misinterpret, the natural law.13 This
was one of Aquinas's principal reasons for the necessity of divine revelation to give men greater certainty as to the precepts of the moral law. 14 Moreover,
self-preservation was regarded by the traditional theorists as one of the primary
precepts of -the natural law. As. Aquinas puts it,
.. . Every substance seeks its own preservation according to its own nature.
Corresponding to this inclination, the natural law contains all that makes
for the preservation of human life, and all that is opposed to its dissolution. 15
Thus the natural law of self-preservation is derived by Aquinas from a natural
desire in man to preserve himself. This desire has a purpose, because the universe
and everything in it were created by a purposive God. Given this frame of reference in traditional theory, Locke's allusions to man's desire for self-preservation
do not necessarily make him into a Hobbesian.
What does distinguish Hobbes's law of self-preservation from what had gone
before is that it is unlimited by any moral obligation. When Cox tries (p. 84) to
argue that Locke is a Hobbesian, he quotes from Chapter IX, no. 128, of the
Second Treatise, Locke's assertion that in the state of nature man has the power
12.

Id. at 186-7 (I, x, 3-4).

13. Cf. Hooker again: "If then it be here demanded by what means it should come to pass
(the greatest part of the Law moral being so easy for all men to know) that so many thousands of men notwithstanding have been ignorant even of principal moral duties, not imagining the breach of them to be sin..." Id. at 180 (I, viii, 11).
14. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.Ia, Ilae, Q. 91, a. 4.
15. Id. at Ia, IIae, Q. 94, a. 2, as trans. by J. G. Dawson in A. P. D'ENTRiVES (ed.),
AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 123 (Oxford, 1954).
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to do "whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself"; but he omits
Locke's crucial qualification, immediately following- "within the limits of the
law of nature." (It is indeed best, as Cox observes, pp. 36, 37, to "go to the
original" "to reveal the true meaning of the author.") As in the case of Hooker
and the traditional theory, the moral force of an objective natural law, inbuilt in
nature, obliges man at all times, whether in the state of nature or out of it
(although, for Locke, the judgment of the application of that law may be surrendered to a legislative majority by the social contract).
That a moral law obliges man in the state of nature is important for a proper
assessment of the thesis that in international relations, Locke like Hobbes broke
with the traditionof internationallaw as represented by Hooker and Grotius. As
proof that Locke is a Hobbesian in international relations, Cox argues (1) that
Locke believes that states live in a competitive state of nature, and (2) that he
never refers to the ius gentium (law of nations) but only to the law of nature,
between states. But it is essential to note what kind of state of nature and natural
law Locke is writing about. The Hobbesian states are unlimited by anything but
the "natural" law of their own preservation, whereas Locke says explicitly that
princes "owe subjection to the laws of God and nature. No body, no power, can
exempt them from the obligations of that eternal law."1 6 Cox grudgingly admits
(pp. 146, 164) that Locke has a theory of the just war, that he sets limits on the
rights of conquerors, and even that he believes that governments have a general
duty to preserve the rest of mankind. However, he argues that, since governments
are judges in their own cases in international relations, they will always opt for
their own self-preservation and aggrandizement. Yet as Cox's own admissions
indicate, there is still a fundamental difference between the two conceptions of
international morality. On the one hand, Hobbes believes that states should strive
for their own self-preservation unrestrained by any higher law; and on the other,
Locke holds that states should observe the precepts of the natural law in their
relations with one another, although in the absence of a common judge they are
likely to have divergent views of the interpretation of that law.
The argument that Locke, like Hobbes, ceases to make Grotius's distinction
between the ius gentium, considered as positive international law, and the ius
naturae,which governs relations among nations, is irrelevant to the central point;
but it is used, along with the discussion of the state of nature, to bracket together
with Hobbes other writers on international law and on natural law, such as
Pufendorf and Wolff (p. 146), who ae clearly opposed to the Hobbesian conception. 17 This illustrates again the fallicy of the argument that because a writer
speaks of nations as in a state of nature with regard to one another, or does not
accept the ius gentium as a separate category of law, he is therefore a Hobbesian
in his approach to international law and relations.
16.
17.

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ch. xvi, no. 195.
ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, in A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS

(New York,

1947), which Cox cites with approval (p. 212, note U) as recognizing the change between
Grotius and Hobbes, notes that, while the above writers utilized the concept of the state of
nature in their theories, for Pufendorf the natural law "is not a complex of essentially biological urges. It is the old moralist natural law of the scholastics and even more of Grotius" (p.
116), and "Wolff's state of nature is diametrically opposite to Hobbes's. It is moralistic in
the scholastic fashion." (p. 149)
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For states in their international 4relations as for individuals in the state of
nature, Locke believes that there are frequent disagreements and conflict. Does
this make war man's natural state and "peace therefore unnatural and derivative"? As many writers have pointed out, it depends on what you mean by the
word "natural."ls If man's natural state is taken to mean that which prevails
most of the time, Locke could be said to hold that disagreement and conflict are
natural conditions of man. If it means the state which he is morally obliged to
strive for, and ideally could attain, peace, in Locke's thinking, is natural for man.
In fact, man is part angel and part beast, and Locke recognizes -both aspects, as
have most religious and moral philosophers. Hobbes, however, exaggerated one
side of the human condition, and this was both his originality and his weakness.
Locke was influenced by Hobbes's concept of the state of nature as an analytical
tool; but for its specific character and for the law which governed it, he drew on
Hooker.
The fundamental error of the Straussian approach to the history of political
ideas is exposed by Cox on pages 68 and 69 when he divides political philosophy
into two types: classical "utopianism" as represented by the theories of Plato and
Aristotle; and "modem political realism, as first articulated by Machiavelli," and
"tacitly" followed by Locke. Now this is, I submit, a false dichotomy and a simplistic typology for the wide variety of schools and individual theories which go
to make up the history of Western political thought. It is because political philosophers are so varied in their responses to the recurring questions of the legitimate exercise of the political power that the study of the history of political
thought is such a fascinating subject. If they could all be crammed into Professor
Strauss's categories, it would be a much less interesting field. As it is, even bizarre
interpretations such as his are useful in compelling us to analyze more closely and
understand more thoroughly the complex doctrines and relationships of the
great masters of political thought. Since new political movements are wont to
search for precedents in the past, this process of continuous re-evaluation is a
never-ending one. In this respect, Locke on War and Peace and the school it
represents have made a useful contribution in stimulating renewed study of the
philosopher who of all political theorists was the most influential upon American
political ideas and institutions.
PAUL E. SIGMUND, J.
-18.- Cf., for example, the list of the various possible meanings in DAVID G. RrrcIE,
NATURAL RIGHTS 71-77 (London, 1894), and in BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN
INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAw 327-345 (Cambridge, Mass., 1931).

PERMANENCE DU DROIT NATUREL.

By Philippe Delhaye. Louvain: Nauwelaerts,

1961. Pp. 156.
The first part of Delhaye's work gives a sketch of natural law doctrines all
the way from Antigone and Plato to and through Suarez, Melancthon, Vitoria,
Hobbes, and Grotius. The author is somewhat apologetic for making this hasty
summary, which of course is far short of a historical work based on much care-

ful study, such as that by Rommen or the specialized work by Lottin. He need
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not be apologetic for beginning with a synopsis: positive data are always relevant
so far as they go. The least they do is to afford orientation. Yet there is a certain lifelessness about this part of Delhaye's study. It is as if he was told he
ought to get up the data, and he dutifully does so. The reader does not get
the impression that Delhaye himself saw a great light in the recited facts.
The overriding interest of the author is theological. He does care about what
Aristotle and Cicero took the natural law to be, and what was the "nature"
to which they referred. But St. Augustine and St. Thomas mean far more to
him, and Melancthon's refusal to go with the Thomist doctrine that all things
naturally love God more than they love themselves seems to be definitive against
Melancthon rather than a point for further inquiry. (pp. 99-100) The chief assumptions are two: that a natural law teaching, nicely tidied up, makes a good
case for moral philosophy as commonly taught by Catholics, and that natural
law, so far from needing any defense, simply stands impregnable.
The second part of the work is more vital and more of a challenge, and
contains important insights which would bear development. One is that justice
and temperance, so basic for the moral life, are most inadequately dealt with
in the Bible; in regard to them, Revelation has given only very general (vastes)
directives. (p. 119) Another insight is that although human nature is given
and is once for all "made," it is also as Sartre says, all the time being perfected and achieved, and this development occurs, not in a vacuum, but according to the various ways it is weighted by historical climates and vicissitudes.
(pp. 133-134) Third, the author recognizes the important place of intuition in the
moral life.
The difficulties one has with the work as a whole must be mentioned. First,
the author tends to raise good questions and then drop them. He notes Mercier's
statement that human nature is its own law, but merely remarks that Mercier
was a great man; the interesting problem is left hanging. Second, natural law
is seen as existing, with God as its foundation. It would seem to be more realistic to have begun with "things," and eventually perhaps to have arrived at
natural law and even God as foundation of it. Third, the author is not simply
silent, though remarkably reticent, on the subject of the moral judgment, which
might well seem near the center of things when he is dealing with intuitions
in morals. Lastly, the "permanence" of natural law never was more impressive
than it is today, a fact which the author does not mention.
LEo R. WARD

By Norman N. Greene. Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1960. Pp. 213. $3.95.

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. THa EXISTENTIALIST ETHIC.

In 1956 Jean-Paul Sartre told this reviewer that he had not yet written
his views on ethics and that it would take him ten more years to do so. His
silence has not prevented several commentators in the United States and abroad
from doing it for him. The irony of the situation is, thus, that Sartre could at
present consult his commentators in order to find out what his view would be
on ethics, if it ever came into definite shape. By this I do not imply that writ-
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ing and comments on existentialist morality are all wrong. There are indeed some excellent pages among the publications on that particular topic, but
the least that can be said is that their work as a global achievement is not
complete, and it is not complete because it is premature.
In order to remedy this lack of documentation, Dr. Greene has done three
things: (1) From Sartre's previous publications, including the novels, plays,
and philosophical works, especially from Being and Nothingness, he has deduced his moral principles; (2) he has compared these conclusions with what
he considers to be three major trends of thought today - Catholicism, Marxism,
and Liberalism; and (3) he has made a careful analysis of Sartre's articles on
Marxism published in Temps Modernes, and later on in Situations. Greene has
done these three things skillfully. One regrets from the start, however, that he
did not remain in close touch with the original texts. All through the book he
has kept himself "detached" from Sartre's writings and has condensed Sartre's
views with very few references and quotations. The initiated reader will "add"
the necessary footnotes by himself, but the one who is ignorant of Sartre's work
may well wish that in a book with scholarly ambitions he were given more
abundant occasion to check the original. The book has neither an index nor a
bibliography.
Greene's contribution, as I see it, lies in the second part of the book. The
first chapters summarize Sartre's life, give a condensed view of Being and Nothingness, and speculate on The Human Condition, all ground which has been
covered before. The reading becomes more stimulating with Chapter IV, where
the author discusses "Freedom as an Ethics." Greene has written some very
sound pages on that topic and shows that here we hold a cardinal point of a
Sartrean morality. I agree with much of what he says and believe with him that
Sartre "means well" and deduces with utmost honesty some of his ethical and
political positions. I believe also, however, contrary to Greene, that the transition from Sartre's speculative philosophy, as contained in Being and Nothingness, to a clear and systematic ethics is much more difficult than Greene seems
to imply. The latter writes at the opening of Chapter IV: "The passage from
an ontological description of human reality to an ethical theory can be risky."
(p. 44) Nothing could be more true, especially when Being and Nothingness
results in the tragic ending in which it actually does. But nowhere does Greene
imply what a formidable task awaits the French philosopher. It has apparently
been easier for his commentator to make that transition than for Sartre himself, who actually finds the task very hard.
Several pages of Greene's book are devoted to a comparison between
Sartre's ethics and Catholic morality. Some of their content would surprise a
French reader. Greene takes it for granted that Catholicism means Thomism,
and vice versa. To my knowledge, an average of six out of every ten professors
of philosophy in France are Catholics, but not one in six is a Thomist. Greene
seems to be ignorant of this situation. That the local conditions in the United
States are conducive to such misrepresentation, this reviewer will gladly accept,
but Sartre is French and does not have American Thomists in mind. In connection with the same topic, I read with surprise that "Sartre's position on the
Catholic moral law has much in common with that of modern positivists."
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(p. 88) No one would deny that the Sartrean notion of value implies a relativistic trend, yet his "empiricism" (?) is of a totally different brand from that
which was defended by Hume or his descendants. In fact a close study of
Sartre may reveal that, notwithstanding wide divergencies, he is closer to certain Catholic positions in ethics than he is to those of the positivists. I can assure
the author of this book that Sartre is deeply concerned with the positivists, but
not as his friends. To identify Sartre's approach with "empirical" methods (see
also p. 98) is definitely an oversimplification of the phenomenological and
Hegelian methods which are his.
Greene is at his best in the last chapters, where he attempts to analyze
Sartre's position vs. Marx. He has done the best he could with the material
at his disposal, and here I have admired the political scientist who knows both
Marx and Sartre the "fellow traveler." Unfortunately the book was written before the publication of Sartre's new book, Critique de la Raison Dialectique
(Paris, 1960), in which Sartre delimits more clearly his own position in relation
to Marxism. From a study of Sartre's new publication, it appears that the French
philosopher is more than ever a Marxist - more so than Greene seems to
imply on page 142 - yet more explicitly still than in the articles of Temps
Modernes he wants to protect what he calls rhumain, and by this one ought
to understand the individual intervention of the free man in history. History
is a dialectic in terms of economics and of production, but it is a dialectic
handled by man. This combination of Marxism and existentialism may seem
paradoxical, but Sartre manipulates the complex situation with consummate
art. Many will disagree with his conclusions but at the same time admire his
brilliancy. Even though his practical and everyday-political interventions may
be unrealistic and offer little in sound solutions, he no doubt remains France's
greatest writer and philosopher, and very much - as Paul Ricoeur puts it,
le Victor Hugo de son si~cle - head and shoulders above all others Greene
deserves credit for having helped us to understand Sartre's complex brand of
genius.
WILFRID DESAN

OF FOREIGN POLICY. By Kenneth W.
Thompson. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1959. Pp. viii, 148.
$3.50.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND THE DILEMMAS

Dr. Thompson is a thoroughly trained political scientist who has taught
in this field at the University of Chicago and at Northwestern University. He
is also deeply concerned with philosophical questions about the foundations of
political theory and especially with Christian ethics. In this book, which is
based upon lectures given at Duke University under the auspices of the Lilly
Endowment Research Program, he examines the many difficulties which stand
in the way of any direct applications of Christian ethics to the operations of
the modern nation-state. He studies the views of statesmen like Bismarck and
Churchill, historians like Herbert Butterfield and Geoffrey Barraclough, philosophers and theologians like Schweitzer and Reinhold Niebuhr, in a search for
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authentic norms that may be realistically applied to political action. On the
whole, he is disappointed in his quest. Philosophers and theologians who have
dealt with the subject are insufficiently acquainted with the complexities of the
actual facts, while those acquainted with the facts are indifferent to the normative
questions he raises. At one point (p. 133), he complains with some justification
that only a very few living philosophers have addressed themselves seriously to
these issues.
Thompson accepts the general thesis of Niebuhr in his Moral Man and
Immoral Society, and supports it by an impressive array of further evidence as
well as by cogent argument. As a matter of fact, we do not apply the same
moral standards to the state as to the individual person. An individual guilty
of such crimes as willful and wholesale deceit, breach of contract, mass murder,
and genocide would be regarded as a monster. But we are prepared to accept
them if they are supported by raisons d'etat. As Thompson says, "the state being
•

. .

a collectivity rather than an individual, is incapable of assuming the per-

sonal or subjective obligations that inhere in the concept of Christian justice."
(p. 109) It is impelled by a mass egotism which makes it blind to any independent standard it cannot identify with its own urge to power. Hence as George
F. Kennan has pointed out, "it is always guiltless in its own eyes," and "its
justice, accordingly, remains - and must remain - less than Christian." (ibid.)
The individual is open to appeals for sacrificial devotion, but as a citizen of
the modem nation-state he finds himself swept along willy-nilly into the abyss
of power politics. In this connection, the author's quotation (p. 117) of Romans
7 is very pertinent: "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man:
But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind,
and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." This
phase of Thompson's argument would have been helped by a disciplined analysis
of the difference between personal and political life and action. But it is difficult to deny the facts to which he is referring.
The needs of one nation-state differ radically from those of another. Hence
the author is rightly skeptical of that self-righteous moralism which so readily
identifies a given national policy with the welfare of mankind. "The one institution most capable of speaking for the world is the United Nations" (p. 134),
though the author's purely pragmatic defence of. this organization as a place for
the working out of effective compromises through "quiet diplomacy" lacks force
as well as coherence. The author accepts the view that "the ends of the state
must be subordinated to those of the human person" (p. 16), and speaks approvingly, though hesitantly, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
But he seems to be unaware of the connection between this declaration and
the tradition of natural law philosophy in the West. Indeed, he dismisses this
whole mode of thought, without any sustained analysis, as something "highly
abstract . . . which, in any case, the contemporary Western World has largely
abandoned." (p. 15)
While the author rejects disciplined philosophical analysis as a way of
bridging the gap between religious ethics and international politics, he believes
that the Christian perspective does have a general relevance to the world of
Realpolitik, which he spells Out in the form of a few general recommendations
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at the end of his argument. (pp. 126 ff.) Thus he attributes to religion, first
of all, a sense of the brotherhood of man which may serve to mitigate the
ferocities of political conflict. Second, there is the Christian teaching of patience,
and the willingness to face trials and tribulations, which will certainly be needed
if we are ever to complete the difficult transition from national autonomy to
anything like a world community. Finally, and most important of all, there
is a sense of humility and a readiness for self-criticism which are elicited only
by the recognition of transcendence.
It would be hard to reject the author's conclusion that these religious attitudes have in the past, to some degree, toned down the collective will to power,
and that they should be more deeply and intensively cultivated in the future.
Thompson has given us a realistic account of the dangerous and frustrating
complexities of world politics as practiced in our time. He has warned us effectively against oversimple and sentimental "Christian" solutions. But his
failure to spell out his "Christian perspective" into more specific and coherent
patterns leaves us facing the same gap as we faced before between hard, destructive forces on the one hand, and lofty, but seemingly inapplicable, moral
attitudes on the other. Patience in the pursuit of an authentic and coherent
purpose is, no doubt, very fine. But patience as a passive readiness to suffer the
foreseeable consequences of evil purposes pursued by ourselves and others, without any counterplan, or even coherent opposition, is hardly a virtue. After all,
we may not have much time.
JOHN WLD

OPEN VISTAS:

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES OF MODERN SCIENCE.

By Henry

Margenau. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. x, 256. $7.50.
Professor Henry Margenau of Yale University is one of those rare individuals who combine professional competence in physics with scholarship and
original speculation in the field of philosophy. In Open Vistas he has attempted
to expound for the general reader the connection between contemporary physical science and the humanities. He is especially concerned with the "progressive dynamism" of scientific method and scientific truth and its significance for
cosmology, ethics and religion.
The author begins with an analysis of scientific method and differentiates
clearly between the conceptual constructs and the factual data or "protocols"
of scientific thought. Theories are sets of constructs and must also satisfy the
requirements of empirical verification. "Facts are not interesting or important
ingredients of science unless they point to relations, unless they suggest ideas
combined into what is called theory." (p. 29) In the human sphere, facts
by themselves never carry ultimate convictions because it may be argued that
correct concepts may in time engender superior facts. Science confers theoretic
relatedness upon previously unorganized factual knowledge.
A major thesis of the author is that philosophy must take account of the
ideological consequences of scientific knowledge. The technological effects of
science are obvious; the philosophical significance of science is "obscure" or
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latent but nevertheless more significant in the long run. No culture is stable
unless these two aspects of the consequences of science are in balance. Our modem
culture is in a state of imbalance because the technological consequences of our
scientific theory are highly developed, but the obscure implications of science
for the values of our culture and our view of life have hardly been developed
and brought to consciousness. This book is a modest attempt in this general
direction.
In comparing contemporary philosophy of science with that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Professor Margenau finds that the contemporary
view is opposed not only to all a priori, necessary, or absolute truths of reason,
but also to absolute certainty based on intuition of axiomatic truths. Instead,
scientific truth is held to be subject to empirical verification and to change with
time. The reason for this relativistic evaluation of scientific truth is the recognition that the ultimate postulates of science are hypothetical, tentative, and unproved; our scientific knowledge is at best probable, but never absolute and
certain. So-called verification of scientific theory yields a high degree of probability, but the scientist cannot affirm the absolute truth of his postulates without committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Neither deductive nor
inductive demonstration yields anything more than probability subject to correction. (p. 73)
This leads the author to the Kantian conclusion that scientific knowledge
is ultimately grounded in faith, in the sense of voluntary, rational commitments
to principles of which he can never be absolutely sure. Unlike the arrogant
Positivists of the nineteenth century who pronounced definitive judgment on
what was possible and impossible, natural and supernatural, the modem philosophical physicist is humble and prepared for surprises and even revolutions
in his theoretical outlook. The scientist always refers to the data of experience
for verification, but he also relies on metaphysical faith in the ideal convergence
of the scientific adventure upon a unifying theory, upon laws and principles that
are unique, categorical, and all-inclusive. (p. 75) One is startled to find the
author presenting the reader with a creed which expresses what he terms "the
new faith of science"; but a creed which professes, not any absolute truth, but,
on the contrary, faith in the belief that "new principles of understanding are
constantly created through the efforts of man." (p. 76)
The concept of probability enters not only into the evaluation of scientific
knowledge but into metaphysical theory and cosmology. According to Margenau,
modem quantum theory leads to the conclusion that laws are statements of
probability regarding the mass behavior of particles or "onta." The thesis of
determinism which asserts the universality of the causal relation throughout
nature and human experience is no longer tenable; atomic particles are lawless and act by chance. The author speaks as if "the electron, itself, as an individual, decides what value of a physical observable it will exhibit in the act
of measurement" (196), though he admits that "the meaning of decision in this
context is not very clear." Randomness of action in the physical world of the
atom does not in itself constitute genuine freedom; for that we require chance
plus choice. Decision or choice is regarded "as an irreducible act, a component
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of historical reality which stands aloof from physical 'lawfulness." (p. 201) Historical reality is said to differ radically from physical reality in that the former
manifests indeterminacy as well as freedom, while physical reality is the domain
of probabilistic, statistical law. (p. 201)
Thus Margenau is in basic agreement with Kant and modern existentialism
in his acceptance of the fact of freedom as the unique characteristic of man. I
find it difficult to see, however, just how indeterminism in atomic quantum
physics makes the case for freedom in man any the stronger. As Cassirer pointed
out in his Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics (Yale, 1956) for which Margenau wrote a preface - none of the classical philosophers,
such as Plato, Spinoza, and Kant, denied the general causal principle and
equated freedom with causelessness. For all of them freedom did not mean indeterminism, but rather a certain form of determinism. "Thus the question of
free will cannot and must not be confused with the question of physical indeterminism." (p. 203) While Margenau agrees with Cassirer that indeterminism
alone is not enough to establish human freedom, he believes and maintains that
chance, together with choice, is necessary and sufficient.
The question remains, however, what is the relation between choice and
quantum indeterminacy? Is choice unintelligible apart from metaphysical indeterminism? Is choice incompatible with classical physics? If one accepts the
reality of mind as a new kind of causal agency having its autonomy and capable
of setting up norms and rules for itself, then the answer to the latter question
is in the negative. After all, quantum physics does not abandon natural law but
merely reinterprets it in terms of probability theory. It is worth remembering
that the first students of statistics, such as Qutelet, and the positivist historians
such as Buckle, applied statistical theory to demonstrate social historical laws comparable to those of physics. One may grant the individual his insignificant,
random movements and still maintain that the course of his life is determined
by the social facts of society and culture, as Durkheim and Tylor maintained.
Historical determinism is as much a kind of fate incompatible with human freedom, whether it be conceived inductively or deductively, by a priori demonstration or by statistical trends. Unfortunately, Margenau does not stop -to examine the nature of choice but assumes without argument that choice, along
with microscopic chance, adds up to freedom.
In this work Margenau limits himself to a discussion of some of the implications of contemporary physics for philosophic theory and the humanities
in general. While he recognizes that philosophy also influences scientific theory
he does not examine this reverse trend. Had he done so he might conceivably
have altered his diagnosis of the sickness of our Western culture. Perhaps our
imbalance is due, not only to a failure to develop the obscure consequences of
scientific physical theory, but also to the complementary tendency to draw hasty
conclusions from scientific theory without reckoning with long-established philosophic arguments.
Open Vistas is an intelligent, readable book which should put the fear of
the Lord into the minds and hearts of fact-minded scientists who neglect theory
and the theoretical implications of science for philosophy. Philosophical readers
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will benefit from its lucid surveys of scientific thought in the area of physical
science but will be inclined to question some of the philosophical arguments.
After all, though, the author's own theory is not final and absolute; and we
may anticipate that, in time, as he comes to treat more philosophical problems,
he may conclude that the more they appear to change the more they remain
the same.
DAVID BIDNEY

STUDIES

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER.
By Myres S. McDougal and Associates.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960. Pp. xx, 1058. $15.00.
IN

In collaboration with eight associates, Myres S. McDougal, Sterling Professor
of Law at Yale University, has produced a masterly work on world jurisprudence.
In this volume he has brought together the efforts of many years of labor, carried
on with dedicated singleness of purpose. He has accomplished what he has set
out to do - to give greater meaning to law by locating it in the context of a policy
whose goal is the dignity of man.
The student familar with the writings of Professor McDougal and his associates - William T. Burke, Florentino P. Feliciano, Asher Lans, Richard N.
Gardner, Harold D. Lasswell, Gertrude C. K. Leighton, Leon Lipson, and Norbert A. Schlei -will not find this book strange to him, for much of it has been
published at one time or other in article form. Read together, however, its
twelve essays provide a deeper insight into McDougal's thinking and orientation.
But the volume is more than a convenient source for better understanding of his
philosophy. From it there emerges a unified concept of jurisprudence that could
not have been gleaned from casual reading of its component essays as they appeared in legal journals over the past fifteen or twenty years.
These essays provide a policy-oriented jurisprudential context that is imaginative and useful as an approach to contemporary problems in world public order.
It has been said often that progress in the natural sciences has so outdistanced
developments in the social sciences that the latter cannot cope with the problem
created by the ever-expanding gap between the two. McDougal's work represents an effort to bridge this gap by developing a comprehensive framework of
inquiry which will permit full advantage to be taken of the knowledge and discipline found in all the social sciences.
McDougal's philosophy is simple to state. He is concerned with establishment
of a universal order of human dignity. By human dignity he means a social
process in which values are widely shared and in which private choice rather
than coercion is "the predominant modality of power." By values he means such
objects of human desire as power, respect, knowledge, skill, enlightenment, rectitude and affection. A society in which such values are shared is a free society.
That society in turn is not restricted to these values, so long as the other goal
values it pursues are not incompatible with them. McDougal insists that the
attainment of each value reacts favorably on others. Thus, for example, sharing
of power makes it easier to maintain sharing of respect and knowledge. When
respect is shared, it is easier to share power and knowledge, and so on. Lest the

JOHN J. CZYZAK
meaning of power be misunderstood, he defines it in terms of ability to participate in the making of important decisions. If such participation is general,
there is democracy insofar as the power variable is concerned. By shared respect,
he means that human 'beings are taken into consideration by all with whom they
come in contact in spheres of life beyond the making of collective decisions. When
knowledge is shared democracy works.
Social processes, according to McDougal, are explicable as interacting variables, all of which are in a relationship of ends and means. For example, distribution of respect affects the distribution of power and knowledge, distribution
of knowledge affects the distribution of respect and power, and so on. These
key variables are affected by the magnitudes of certain other variables, such as
balance, regularity, realism, and character, which in themselves are important
for the development of policies capable of achieving and maintaining that interrelationship among the key variables that we call democratic, i.e., power, respect,
and knowledge. In McDougal's contemplation of a universal order of human
dignity, he postulates this process in such a manner as to leave everyone free to
justify it in terms of his preferred theological or philosophical tradition.
Part I of the book establishes the framework of inquiry. It consists of two
chapters, the first identifying and appraising the diverse systems of public order,
the second concentrating on legal education and policy. Both stress the need for
legal training in the public interest and for making the law school a more powerful
instrument for transmitting not only skills in legal technicality but "the additional
skills that promise to mold the policy-makers capable of fulfilling the aims and
realizing the opportunities of the years ahead." (p. 147)
The remainder of the book deals more immediately with problems in world
public order, which McDougal defines as those features of the world social process
that are protected by law. In Part II, he concentrates on strategies for a minimum order, that is, a public order based on the principle that force is reserved
for support of processes of persuasion and agreement and is not used as an
instrument of unauthorized change. He refers to it as minimum order because
conformity of society is necessary. In the first essay, "The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-oriented Perspective," he seeks to
make clear the common interest of peoples as members of the world community
and nation-states and to outline their interrelationships and the constitutional
framework within which they act. The emphasis is upon giving meaning to
rules by considering them in light of community needs and aspirations. The
succeeding essay is a study of community control of international coercion. Anyone interested in policy-oriented inquiry will find this effort particularly satisfying.
It emphasizes that international law should not be regarded as a mere set of rules
but as a process of authoritative decision in the world arena requiring a distinction between coercion as such and the process of authoritative decision by
which regulation is sought.
Another essay, dealing generally with the rights of man in the world community, considers by way of example the scope of the foreign affairs power of
the United States under the Constitution. The competence of the United States
to participate in world social processes is examined in light of the pattern of
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behavior of our legal society, which assumes that it is better to meet problems
as they arise rather than have recourse to a framework within which they can be
examined and analyzed, even though such a framework already exists in the
United Nations Charter. The Charter, it is submitted, offers an opportunity
for developing specific arrangements among nation-states to insure the rights of
man in the world community.
Next in order McDougal has included in its entirety his lengthy essay on
treaties and executive agreements as interchangeable instruments of national
policy. This essay, of course, is so well known to the legal profession by now that
it scarcely needs comment.
The next essay deals with strategies for minimum order and is entitled "The
Veto and the Charter: an Interpretation for Survival." It is concerned with
principles and procedures for the interpretation of international agreements such
as the United Nations Charter. While its emphasis is on the problem the United
Nations faced in 1950, i.e., voting in the Security Council, it goes beyond the
limits of that discussion to recommend that every effort be made to establish "the
closest possible approximation to the genuine shared expectations of the particular parties -with
all contradictions, gaps, and ambiguities being resolved by
reference to fundamental community policies." (p. xiv) In McDougal's judgment, the United Nations Charter affords the basis for deriving such expectations if and so long as its purpose is not frustrated by interpretation in a manner
bearing no relationship to actual community objectives.
Part III of the book deals with strategies for management of shareable
resources. It refers to such resources as the oceans, air space over the oceans,
international rivers, polar areas and outer space, which admit of being shared
and used by all of the world community. The essay entitled "The Hydrogen
Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security" presents the international law of the sea as a growing and living thing in constant process of
adjustment in order to meet new demands by peoples throughout the world. At
the same time it seeks to clarify the concept of security by concluding that the
hydrogen bomb tests do not contravene the fundamental policy of the freedom
of the seas but rather can be explained as an exercise of reasonable measures
in order to insure security.
The essay on "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives versus
National Egoism" is intended as an introduction to a more comprehensive study.
Among other things, it expresses concern over misconceptions of the process of
decision by which controversies concerning the law of the sea have been resolved
and recommends a systematic contextual analysis of the processes of use, claim,
and decision by which the oceans are exploited and subjected to public order.
It exhorts nation-states to continue to recognize the mutual restraint required
by reciprocal interest.
The last essay in Part III, entitled "Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space,"
is anticipatory rather than immediate, since there are no existing community
regulations on the subject. Here, also, the study suggests the extent to which
resources of outer space may be shared. While it does not dismiss the notion of
seeking international regulation of outer space, it sees in the past pattern of
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behavior of our society the suggestion that the future law of space will most
probably grow in the same manner as customary law has grown in the past, in
an empirical, inductive way, gradually and with caution.
Part IV considers strategies for optimum order and suggests bases for promoting the greatest production and the widest possible sharing of human dignity
values among the peoples of the world. The essay entitled "The Comparative
Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of
Democratic World Order" stresses the need for comparative study of law in a
world that has shrunk in size and where boundaries of nation-states appear to
have an element of artificiality because people throughout the world are demanding common values that do not stop at frontiers. It states as the principal
objective of comparative inquiry clarification of the perspectives, conditions, and
alternatives necessary for securing and enhancing basic democratic values in a
peaceful world. It urges the need for a curriculum of comparative studies along
policy-oriented lines with a view to developing a framework for effective cooperation among the peoples of the world. The remaining study considers the
question of an international law of human dignity, which McDougal defines as
"the processes of authoritative decision of a world public order in which values
are shaped and shared more by persuasion than coercion, and which seeks to
promote the greatest production and widest public sharing, without discriminations irrelevant to merit, of all values among all human beings." (p. 987)
JOHN J. CZYZAK

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND RELIGION: A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE SUPPRESSION OF RELIGION BY THE COMMUNISTS, 1917-1925.

By Boleslaw Szczesniak. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1959. Pp. xx, 289. $6.75.
If one were permitted to make a quip concerning a very serious matter, one
could say that there are more believers than churchgoers in the Soviet Union
and more churchgoers than believers in the United States. The American ways
of life encourage the participation in an organized religious community even
if its religious tenets sometimes are so vague that an agnostic can join it. The
Soviet regime is, by contrast, bound by its atheistic dogmas (the flat assertion
of the nonexistence of God is a dogma which its adherents must accept on faith
but cannot prove by rational arguments), and discourages by all the means
at its disposal the external manifestations of religious beliefs. The Soviet citizen
who wants to join the Party and thus the vanguard ranks of the society, or the
citizen who simply intends to promote his career, has no choice but to avoid
religious practices. This is especially true of the educated class, because a university diploma is the key to Soviet careers. But even a humble worker or
peasant will avoid all sorts of unpleasantnesses by not being seen at a church.
However, no one has as yet invented a device to scrutinize the innermost of
human mind. Religion stubbornly refuses to die out after forty-four years of
existence of the Soviet regime; the Party hopes have been constantly frustrated.
The frequent press admonitions addressed to both old and young that they
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should avoid the pitfalls of religion, and the appeals by the Party and the Komsomol to their members that they should never relax their vigilance, prove that
religion is alive not only among old women, as some Western commentators believe, but also among the young people. The unanswerable question is, what
is the proportion of believers in the total population? Neither an outsider nor
Khrushchev would be able to provide the answer.
History has known many persecutions of one religion by another, but Russia
is the first place where a political regime has declared an open war on all religions. The experiment is tragic but it might prove in the end that the human
longing for a supernatural source of strength cannot be eradicated. Any scholarly
contribution to the knowledge of this problem is praiseworthy, because the
problem itself is of paramount importance.
Professor Boleslaw Szczesniak has succeeded in throwing documentary light
on the opening stage of the Communist struggle against religion. This stage,
1917-1925, is all-important; and the reader who has become familiar with it
will be able to follow, with full understanding, the information on the current
episodes in the same struggle. The great lines of the Communist policy were
then drawn. The early Bolshevik policy was continued by successive Party
leaders in the Soviet Union and also served as a model for similar policies in
Eastern Europe.
Szczesniak has concentrated his attention on Christian churches and in particular on the Russian Greek Orthodox Church - which had been the predominant Church prior to the October Revolution - and the Roman Catholic
Church. He adduces, however, also several documents relating to other Christian denominations and to the Moslems. The problem has never been identical
for all religious communities. The Russian Greek Orthodox Church was in 1917
and remains today the main enemy of the Communists, because it was traditionally the Church of the Russians and of most of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, i.e., of the great majority of the population. The Roman Catholic
Church, although it had its numerous congregations in old Russia, mainly
among the non-Russians such as Poles and Lithuanians, confronted the Party
with a different problem. The Party, which intends to control completely the
life of the citizens, cannot be reconciled with any organization having strong
external ties. Unlike the Greek Orthodox Church (at least before its recent
association with the World Council of Churches) the Roman Catholic Church
is an integral part of a world-wide community. The present Soviet policy of
"suffering" the existence of the Greek Orthodox Church insofar as mere religious worship is concerned stands in contrast with its irreconcilable hostility
to the Roman Catholic Church and, for somewhat comparable reasons, to the
Zionist movement, which is altogether forbidden. The Moslem problem is still
different, because it is a part of the Central-Asian nationality problem; the
Communist struggle against Islam is motivated not only by atheism but also
by the desire to stifle national consciousness in Central Asia.
Among the most important of the documents in this book are those concerning the Bolshevik decisions forbidding churches to teach religion to minors,
and assigning to the State the duty of inculcating atheism by all the means at
its disposal. This policy has remained the main feature of the Party line. The
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last word has not as yet been said by the Party. The Party postwar documents
indicate that it realizes the futility of an outright persecution; the post-Stalinist
system of a growing network of boarding schools is intended to provide the
answer. The children enrolled at those schools are cut off from parental influence insofar as possible and fully delivered to atheistic indoctrination by
State teachers. This network is bound to expand but at a rather slow pace, because the cost of operating a boarding school is obviously much higher than that
of a day school. Once this network of boarding schools becomes universal, the
battle for young minds will be fully joined.
It is hardly comforting to see in these documents how the Western world
reacted to the information concerning the ruthless persecution of believers in
Russia. A similar rather mild reaction to the Nazi extermination of Jews occurred during the last war. The suffering that is not seen with one's own eyes
apparently does not affect one very profoundly.
The author should be not only warmly thanked for his immense labor and
his judicious selection, but should be asked to continue his very useful venture.
This volume should become the first in a series which should span the whole
history of Soviet struggle against religion.
W. W. KuLsmI
THE JUDicLL DEcISION. By Richard A. Wasserstrom. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stan-

ford University Press, 1961. Pp. 197. $5.00.
This monograph is by an author who combines training in philosophy and
in law, and his work shows the confluence of these disciplines. While this combination may not be unusual on the European continent, where training in law
often has a humanistic setting, it is much less common than it should be in our
country, where legal education is almost exclusively oriented toward bar examinations and professionalism. Perhaps for this reason much of the work done
in American jurisprudence and legal methodology has perforce been done by
thinkers in the profession rather than in the schools - by men like Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo, Judge Thurman Arnold, Felix S. Cohen, Huntington Cairns, and others whose philosophical insights were often provoked or
enriched by their practical experience on the bench, at the bar, or in administrative positions.
The author, assistant professor of philosophy and law at Stanford University,
is concerned in this book with the problem of how courts within the AngloAmerican system ought to decide cases. The book is not so much an empirical
study as a consideration of the adjudicatory procedure by way of precedent, by
way of equity, and by way of what he calls a two-level procedure, which is intended to embody both precedent and considerations of justice directed toward
the legal rule rather than toward the specific decision.
The author's exposition is not always as clear and plain as one would like
it to be, especially when one wishes lawyers and judges to benefit from a book
on judicial decision making. The book would have been improved by more
frequent exposition and analysis in terms of actual court cases. As it is, the
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book has an abstract quality that will male it less attractive and significant
to those who need it most.
The heart of the book, at least to this reader, is Wasserstrom's concern with
precedent. He examines many of the justifications that have been urged in support of a rule of strict precedent, such as certainty, reliance, equality of treatment, efficiency of courts, the application of "practical experience," restraint
upon individual judges, and other such claims, all of which are found wanting.
When not attacked, precedents are often followed; but when attacked in litigation, it is only seldom that one finds a clear, unambiguous instance of strict
precedent - the following of a prior decision, not because the judge approves
of it, but only because he feels himself bound by it.
A recent example (if not merely an instance of res adjudicata) was the
position taken by Justice Brennan in the second Uphaus case (364 U. S. 388,
1960). Justice Brennan had dissented in the first Uphaus case (360 U. S. 72,
1959). When the second case came before the Supreme Court, the motion to
dismiss was granted by five Justices; Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Douglas
and Black, who had dissented in the first case, again dissented; but Justice
Brennan, in a brief separate opinion, wrote that while he still believed that the
majority had incorrectly decided the first contempt case against Uphaus, "that
holding, while it stands, also sustains the order challenged on this appeal. Solely
under compulsion of that decision, I think that the appeal must be dismissed. . .
The author, I am sure, feels that his book has resolved the paradox that "results from a desire to bring together in one legal system two seemingly incompatible ideas: the one, that rules of law once established ought not to be altered; the other, that the judiciary should not be inexorably 'engaged in forging
fetters for their own feet."' (p. 49) This is the same paradox asserted
by Roscoe Pound: "The law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still." How
this paradox is resolved is not clear; but the book does articulate the essential
questions relating to stare decisis and gives them more body than they normally
are assumed to have.
MILTON R. KONVITZ

